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The theoretical model presented in this thesis purports to explain the American 
diplomatic strategy toward Iran in the dispute over the latter’s nuclear program. The 
aim of the dissertation is two-fold. First, I deduce a provisional theoretical model of 
diplomatic strategy in conflict situations in which the perspective of the stronger 
power is assumed. Second, I apply the model to the conflict under study.  
 The diplomatic strategy, conceived as the stronger power’s plan of action for 
employing reward and punishment in order to persuade the weaker state to change a 
given policy, is considered primarily to be a function of two cognitive constructs; the 
key strategic belief and the image of the adversary.  
 The model fuses two concepts from cognitive studies within International 
Relations (IR). First, drawing on work on operational codes, I have developed the 
concept of the key strategic belief. Second, building on image theoretical studies, I 
have designed the concept the image of the adversary. The former may be conceived 
as a more general belief about the nature of states and the function of power, whereas 
the latter involves assumptions about the character of the relevant opponent. 
 The premise of the model is that statesmen in the pursuit of power aim to add 
to their states’ security in the manner which they see fit. The preferred theoretical 
perspective can perhaps be labeled as a modified form of defensive realism in which 
domestic level variables are allowed to operate and the rationality assumption is 
slightly relaxed. 
 As noted, the model presupposes a situation of conflict in which, according to 
Mitchell (1981: 18), “[the] parties come to possess mutually incompatible goals”, i.e. 
they cannot be fulfilled at the same time. Moreover, the model assumes a disparity in 
power resources and seeks to explain the behavior of the militarily stronger state.   
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 The thesis is built on the premise that beliefs and images hold a special 
significance when the policymakers shape the state’s diplomatic strategy to achieve 
its goals. Rival explanations for choosing one diplomatic strategy over another are of 
course also worth assessing. One avenue of interpretation would be to view the 
diplomatic strategy solely in light of relative capabilities. Such a systemic approach 
would thus assume that behavior could be considered a function of relative power 
resources. However, size does not prescribe behavior; superior military capability 
could perhaps help explain why the stronger power is in the position to demand a 
change in the weaker state’s behavior but would reveal little as to why the diplomatic 
strategy was composed in a given manner.  
 Another possibility would be to conceive the diplomatic strategy as a function 
of the national strategic culture. However, in most states there is no broad consensus 
as to underlying principles of foreign policy; the debate in the foreign policy 
community may include competing strains of thought. The basis for predictions may 
simply prove too open-ended, and as a result, the researcher would have difficulties 
forecasting behavior uniformly.  
 Instead of explaining the diplomatic strategy with reference to relative 
capabilities or national strategic culture, the thesis highlights the role of cognitions. 
An inquiry into the beliefs and the images of the relevant foreign policymakers may 
yield a more precise insight into the reflections that underlie the diplomatic strategy.   
  My intention is not to advance an argument as to which principles of statecraft 
are strategically or morally preferable. Nor do I argue that adversaries should be 
perceived as either revolutionary or status quo oriented. The only goal is to 
investigate whether there is a link between the key strategic belief and the image of 
the adversary, on the one hand, and on the other, the selected diplomatic strategy. 
 The enterprise is motivated by an ambition to uncover causal mechanisms 
between the cognitive constructs and those words and actions aimed at persuading the 
 3
adversary to act according to the stronger state’s wishes. To Elster (1983: 23-24), 
mechanisms have a dual role: 
First, they enable us to go from the larger to the smaller…. Secondly, and more 
fundamentally, they reduce the time lag between the explanans and explanandum. A 
mechanism provides a continuous and contiguous chain of causal or intentional links; a black 
box is a gap in the chain 
Although Elster (1993: 5) does not give an explicit definition of a causal mechanism, 
he does attempt to get closer to the meaning of the term:  
The distinctive feature of a mechanism is not that it can be universally applied to predict and 
control social events, but that it embodies a causal chain that is sufficiently general and 
precise to enable us to locate it in widely different settings. It is less than a theory, but a great 
deal more than a description, since it can serve as a model for understanding other cases not 
yet encountered  
As for the case study, the thesis attempts to elucidate the American diplomatic 
strategy by opening the black box of decision making, and more specifically, by 
examining the beliefs and images of the policymakers of the George Walker Bush 
administrations.1  
1.1 The Research Question  
A good research question should be interesting. At the same time it must be focused 
and clear, and, perhaps most importantly, capable of being answered. 
 As I approached the subject matter, I became interested in the broad question 
of why the United States (US) in its efforts to sway Iran, so to speak, acted 
“undiplomatically” by openly threatening brute force, thus ignoring president 
Theodore Roosevelt’s advice that the US should speak softly, but carry a big stick. 
Moreover, I was surprised by the strong threat perception conveyed by the American 
media as opposed to the mainstream view of Iran in European newspapers.  
                                              
1 From now on referred to as the Bush administrations.  
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 As a result, I began to take an interest in cognitive studies in international 
politics. Works on beliefs systems and images of other states held by policymakers 
especially captured my attention. These concepts are largely out of fashion today, and 
they were to me, and perhaps also to many fellow students, to a great part 
unexplored. Bordering on psychology, cognitive concepts are not all dominant within 
the field.  
 Conceiving the study of international politics as a continuous struggle, or 
perhaps a dialogue, between those who argue that the field should be organized 
around the assumption that man is rational, and those who regard that supposition as 
too simple, although useful for theory building, but ultimately bringing as much 
ignorance as insight, cognitive concepts such as beliefs and images may help bridge 
the divide between the two opposing camps. The notion that policymakers make 
decisions based on their estimate of the situation, rather than taking reality as a given 
fact, could provide some common ground. 
 The cognitive studies that I encountered differed in many respects. Most 
importantly, the cognitive devices under study were not defined in a similar fashion. 
Moreover, although these studies share the same principal perspective, the object of 
study was different. Whereas studies on belief systems assume a more general and 
encompassing scope, image studies are often narrower and perhaps revolve around 
one statesman’s conception of a given state. As an exemplar of the latter, Ole Holsti’s 
(1962) study on John Foster Dulles’ image of the Soviet Union broke new ground 
and became a classic. As for the former, Nathan Leites’ (1951) work on the 
Bolshevik operational code assumed a commanding position within the field and 
came to be a standard to which many later works aspired.  
1.1.1 The Theoretical Model  
My effort is an attempt to advance a model that fuses two core concepts from two 
diverging methodologies within the cognitive approach. The operational code was 
refined by Alexander George (1989 [1969]) as he put forth ten questions about 
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political life whose answers comprised the code. Ole R. Holsti (1977) argued in a 
later study that the first question was of greatest significance; this master belief was 
assumed to hold a key position from which the answers to the other questions of the 
code could partly be inferred, or at least, estimated.  
 The operational code was intended to reflect the belief system of the decision 
maker. As foreign policy is but one of many policy areas for state leaders, and 
George’s theoretical construct was designed to capture all aspects of politics, it 
seemed apt to redefine a new master belief that was applicable to international 
politics, and more specifically, to strategy.  
 The question whether states in the face of threats usually submits to or resists 
superior power reflects a protracted theoretical debate within the IR community. The 
policymaker’s view whether states tend to “fight or flight” when confronted by a 
superior power, may be considered the chief foundation of their foreign policy 
mindset. The key strategic belief thus has two opposing values; the working 
hypothesis is that the policymaker is inclined to perceive international politics from 
either the balancing or the bandwagon perspective.  
 Within the context of international conflict it is hypothesized that the 
policymaker’s key strategic belief, that states tend to balance or bandwagon, impact 
on the judgments concerning the optimal course of action. When dealing with an 
inferior power that opposes the wishes of the stronger state, what actions on the part 
of the stronger power are preferable? Are promises of reward or threats of 
punishment more effective in bringing about the desired outcome? I argue that the 
policymaker’s answer to such questions partly follows from his belief about the 
nature of states and their relations.  
 As for the image, I conjecture that the policymaker attempts to acquire a 
definite understanding of the nature of the adversary. The assumption that the image 
of the adversary conforms either to that of a status quo oriented power or that of a 
revisionist state, lies at the heart of the image as a theoretical construct as defined 
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here. The crux of the image is the perceived intention on the part of the weaker power 
to either conserve or disrupt the prevailing distribution of power, which in turn may 
impact on the policymakers’ judgment concerning the weaker power’s 
responsiveness to reward and punishment.  
 With respect to how and why the policymakers reach the conclusion that the 
other state more closely conforms to one of the ideal types, those questions are 
beyond the purview of this thesis to explore. In the model, the what question is 
highlighted and perceived intentions are considered the crucial element of the image. 
An insight into the decision makers’ image of the adversary should thus help explain 
the diplomatic strategy pursued in the conflict situation.  
 The dependent variable, the diplomatic strategy, is measured through those 
words and actions aimed at communicating the stronger power’s intention to reward 
and/or punish the weaker state, is thus considered a function of two factors. 
 In summary, the model has two dichotomous independent variables that I 
assume to have an impact on the dependent variable diplomatic strategy. The model 
is tested through a congruence procedure in which the researcher deduces predictions 
about the diplomatic strategy on the basis of the policymakers’ key strategic belief 
and their image of the adversary. However, the exploratory character of the model 
excludes any assessment as to the relative impact of the factors, and as a 
consequence, the model is indeterminate and cannot render any definitive predictions.  
 First, the policymakers may either hold that balancing or bandwagoning is 
more common in international politics. Second, the decision makers may hold an 
image of the state in question that either resembles that of a status quo power or that 
of a revisionist state. Four combinations are thus possible.  
 It is hypothesized that the belief in the bandwagon effect and the revolutionary 
image entail a preference for punitive measures, and conversely, the belief in the 
balancing effect and the status quo image involve a preference for accommodative 
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measures. The two other combinations are presumed to produce a more mixed 
strategy.  
  The model may be considered too simplistic, however, I maintain that theory 
is only a tool and more often than not theories are too all-embracing in scope and as a 
result work counter to their purpose.  
In the following chapters I will attempt to develop the model that is to be 
applied to the case at hand. Assuming a causal terminology one may depict the 








As the tentative causal model suggests, the questions the thesis attempts to answer 
may be formulated in the following manner:  
To what extent may the stronger power’s key strategic belief and its image of 
the adversary help explain the diplomatic strategy in conflict? 
                                              
2 As the graphic depiction illustrates I presume no interplay between the independent variables. Furthermore, I consider the 
image to be a more immediate factor than the strategic belief. I will return to these two questions and try to present 
persuasive arguments in defense of those choices. 
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To what extent may the Bush administrations’ key strategic belief and image of 
Iran help explain the US diplomatic strategy in the enrichment dispute? 
As such the thesis poses two connected questions; one theoretical and one empirical. 
To answer the empirical question the analysis raises two secondary questions: 
Does the key strategic belief of the Bush administrations’ correspond more 
closely to the balancing or the bandwagoning proposition?3 
Does the Bush administrations’ image of Iran more closely resemble the status 
quo oriented or the revolutionary ideal type? 
The research questions are interesting for several reasons. Although cognitive studies 
have been preoccupied with international conflict, to my knowledge there exists no 
explicit attempt to connect a reformulation of George’s master belief, combined with 
the image of the adversary, to diplomatic strategy in conflict. As such, the thesis 
represents something different.  
The field is in need of organizing devices. Such analytical tools help the 
researcher “select relevant data, relate the data to each other, and determine the 
boundaries of [the] topic” (Holsti 1992: 12). However, the risk is always present that 
such devices “act as blinders to other significant facets of the subject” (ibid.) Yet, 
they are vital in aiding the researcher to “make some sense out of the great diversity 
of data and events“. In addition, they may “create understanding by ordering facts 
and concepts into some meaningful pattern” (ibid.: 11-12).4 
 As for the case study, in the absence of extensive Great Power competition, the 
US role in the Middle East is a central aspect of international politics today. To some 
observers the difficulties the US experiences in the region are symbolic of the 
                                              
3 In the interest of style I will refer to the two key strategic beliefs interchangeably as perspectives, hypotheses, 
propositions, set of principles, or simply beliefs.  
4 As I by no means claim to have developed a theory, I will use different names for the theoretical device. For linguistic 
reasons I will refer to it interchangeably as an analytical or a conceptual framework, or more simply, a model. 
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receding American superiority and possibly a harbinger of the return to multi-polarity 
(e.g. Zakaria 2008). The conflict with Iran could perhaps be understood in light of 
that narrative. Moreover, the disagreements between the US and Iran are given wide 
coverage in the news media, and singling out the nuclear dispute as the central source 
of tension between the two states seems like a logical choice. In addition, the case fits 
the conditions of the model; the conflict pits a stronger state against a weaker one and 
there is a clearly defined issue of contention.  
 Iran is by no means a state belonging in the “near-peer” category; its GDP is 
one sixty-eighth of that of the US, and its military spending totals only one percent of 
the Pentagon’s (Zakaria 2007). 
1.1.2 The Nuclear Dispute  
The relations between the US and Iran have historically been marked by both 
cooperation and conflict. Over the past three decades, however, the relationship has 
been rather antagonistic. The ongoing conflict between the US and Iran may to a 
certain extent be traced back to the Islamic revolution in 1979 and the following 
hostage crisis. The US severed formal diplomatic relations with Iran in 1980 after 
Iranian student occupied the American embassy and took 452 US citizens hostage. 
They were released after 444 days. At the moment the Swiss represent American 
interests in Iran and formal communication between the US and Iran goes through 
Swiss intermediaries.  
 The relations between the Bush administrations and Iran have also been both 
cooperative and conflictual. From assisting the US in toppling the Taleban in 
Afghanistan to being decried as part of the Axis of Evil and threatened with brute 
force, Iran occupies a central position in the American security debate. 
 There are a number of obstacles to improvement in American-Iranian ties. The 
website of the US State Department (2008) lists the following “areas of objectionable 
Iranian behavior”: 
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Iran's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; Its support 
for and involvement in international terrorism; Its support for violent opposition to the 
Middle East peace process, as well as its harmful activities particularly in Lebanon, as well as 
in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the region; and Its dismal human rights record and 
lack of respect for its own people.  
Iran’s relationship to the US is complex and intriguing. Although the US and Iran 
disagree on a host of issues, one problem in particular stands out: Iran has refused to 
suspend its enrichment activities despite severe international pressure spearheaded by 
the US. The US suspects that the nuclear program is a step toward becoming a 
nuclear weapons power whilst Iran maintains that the program is only intended to 
serve energy needs. By inquiring into this particular issue one may perhaps hope to 
accumulate knowledge about the broader discord between the two states.5 
Given the historical animosities between the two nations it seems apt to 
presuppose that to the US, and perhaps to Americans as a people, Iran holds special 
significance, and the policymakers’ perception of that state may for that reason be 
colored or somewhat distorted. As such the case poses a challenge for the model in 
the sense that contextual factors may play a significant role. However, the image as 
defined here involves the stronger power’s perception of the weaker state’s intention 
to either conserve or disrupt the status quo; the question why the policymakers hold a 
given image of the adversary is not considered to be of any interest. Thus to a certain 
extent the model does incorporate the historical aspect.  
 For the US, Iran’s nuclear program constitutes a central cause of concern. 
Intensive investigation from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has 
failed to exclude the possibility that Iran may intend to develop a nuclear weapons 
capability and Iran’s defiance of the Security Council heightens concerns to that 
effect. For the US, the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program is in essence a non-
proliferation issue, and the diplomatic strategy is predicated on the notion that Iran 
cannot be entrusted with the knowledge to enrich uranium; a capability which in turn 
                                              
5 Given that the thesis attempts to explain the American diplomatic strategy it necessarily assumes the American viewpoint. 
For a comprehensive outline of an Iranian perspective with respect to both American-Iranian relations and Iran’s right to 
nuclear energy, I refer to Yazdani and Hussain (2006). 
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could enable Iran to enrich uranium to the level of weapons-grade, thus allowing for a 
crucial aspect of bomb making.  
 Iran maintains that it enjoys access to nuclear power under the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and that enriching uranium is an unalienable right which 
no other power may infringe. Its nuclear activities are claimed to be entirely peaceful 
and aimed at generating electricity.  
 The issue of contention between the two states as defined here concerns the 
uranium enrichment process, which may produce fuel for nuclear reactors, but could 
also provide highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is fissile material for nuclear 
weapons. In this conflict situation, where Iran continues its enrichment activities in 
spite of American demands that Iran is to suspend its enrichment program, there 
exists an incompatibility between the two actors’ goals. From the vantage point of the 
stronger power, a wide range of foreign policy tools are available. The working 
hypothesis is that the key strategic belief and the image of the adversary in 
combination help the policymaker calibrate the diplomatic strategy.  
 At this point, all measures have been ineffectual. Iran is still enriching uranium 
in spite of American threats to take military action to prevent Iran from mastering the 
fuel cycle.  
 I will divide the empirical part of the thesis into three subparts in which I first 
try to identify the dominant key strategic belief and gauge its standing in the foreign 
policymaking group, and second, I attempt to extract the administrations’ prevalent 
image of Iran. Finally, I make an effort to analyze those words and actions aimed at 
persuading Iran to comply with American demands. 
 The empirical part of the thesis thus relates to three areas central to students of 
American foreign policy. First, the key strategic belief reflects to a certain extent the 
debate among foreign policy pundits as to how the US should employ its vast power 
resources in its relations to other states. Second, another much disputed question in 
the American foreign policy establishment concerns the most accurate description of 
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Iran and the challenge it poses to the US. Third, the American diplomatic strategy 
toward Iran during the period under study could perhaps be conceived as a 
microcosm as to how the US in practice attempts to achieve its foreign policy goals in 
its relations to Iran.  
1.2 Conclusions 
The analysis argues that initially the administration’s key strategic belief to a great 
extent corresponded to the belief in bandwagon dynamics but grew weaker over the 
period under study as the balancing perspective gained strength. The key strategic 
belief was gauged indirectly using the status of the Bush doctrine as proxy; this 
methodological choice was made under the twin assumptions that the set of strategic 
principles enunciated by the first Bush administration were guided by the key 
strategic belief, and that the Bush doctrine itself was pervaded by the belief in 
bandwagon dynamics.  
As for the image, the analysis suggests that the administrations’ image of Iran, 
measured through the policymakers’ perception of Iran’s intent behind its nuclear 
program, remained mainly uniform over the years and more closely resembled the 
revolutionary ideal type than the status quo oriented type, although it did undergo a 
minor change as the policymakers increasingly began referring to Iran’s intent to 
acquire nuclear weapons capability as opposed to the earlier perception which 
emphasized Iran’s intent to acquire nuclear weapons; the image thus grew slightly 
less expansionist. 
 According to the model, the major change in the key strategic belief and the 
minor change in the image could shift the diplomatic strategy from being exclusively 
coercive to becoming increasingly accommodative, thus producing a mixed strategy.  
 During the nuclear dispute the US has pursued a diplomatic strategy toward 
Iran which has emphasized punitive measures over conciliatory ones. In the outset the 
diplomatic strategy exclusively emphasized the coercive aspect but gradually, as the 
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nuclear dispute gained importance, the US began offering concessions. However, the 
coercive measures, ranging from the threat of military force to economic sanctions, 
have retained their dominance as the accommodative option has remained fairly 
undeveloped. 
 Even if the findings were commensurate with the expectations derived from 
the model, the rudimentary analysis cannot connect the cognitive constructs to 
behavior in any satisfying manner. The research design does not allow any causal 
inferences about the relationship between the variables under study; any change in 
those variables that are considered independent cannot directly account for variance 
in the dependent variable.6 
 The preliminary character of the congruence procedure is primarily due to the 
fact that I prioritized the development of the theoretical model. Regrettably, the 
emphasis on theory led to a partial neglect of the empirical part of the thesis.  
For this decision I ask the reader’s indulgence and would like to encourage 
those responsible for evaluating my work to appreciate the exploratory character of 
this thesis. 
1.3 Thesis Outline 
The second chapter lays the foundation for the formulation of the theoretical model 
and essentially argues that the rationality assumption should be relaxed and that 
domestic level variables in the form of cognitions should be taken into account.  
In the third chapter I attempt to convey a clear understanding of the concepts 
of key strategic belief and the image before I develop the concept of diplomatic 
strategy. The object of this chapter is to deduce the theoretical model and arrive at 
predictions which are to be tested in the analysis. 
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 The fourth chapter addresses some methodological concerns related to validity 
and the possibility for establishing causal mechanisms through the congruence 
procedure. 
 The analysis is presented in the fifth chapter in which I first try to extract the 
key strategic belief held by the two Bush administrations before I move on to 
attempting to capture the prevalent image of Iran as an adversary. Finally, I make an 
effort to measure the diplomatic strategy pursued by the US toward Iran in the 
nuclear dispute. 
 The sixth and final chapter concludes the thesis by summarizing the key 
findings and revisiting the twin questions of whether the model is useful as a 
theoretical device and whether it helps explain the American diplomatic strategy in 
this case.  
                                                                                                                                           




2. The Theoretical Foundation  
According to Thomas Schelling (1980: 3) there is a clear fault line in conflict 
research; one group of analysts perceive conflict as “a pathological state” and looks 
for its “causes and treatment”, whereas another group “[takes] conflict for granted” 
and studies “the behavior associated with it”. Among the students belonging to the 
latter camp there is a further separation between those that “treat conflict as a kind of 
contest” and those that “examine the participants in a conflict in all their complexity”. 
This paper positions itself in the last-mentioned tradition, i.e. I do not consider 
conflict between states an anomalous state of affairs and I approach the subject matter 
hoping to know more about why one of the participants has acted in the given 
manner. 
The following chapter builds the groundwork for the core of this thesis. First, I 
argue that one may fruitfully analyze the diplomatic strategy by adopting the decision 
making approach, thus allowing internal factors to operate. Second, I try to present 
reasons for relaxing the rational actor assumption and for examining the role of 
cognitions, i.e. beliefs and images.  
2.1 The Decision Making Approach 
In David Easton’s (quoted in Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001: 553) terminology, 
decisions are “the outputs of the political system, by which values are authoritatively 
allocated within a society”. The concept of decision-making has long been central in 
diplomatic history, and later, in international relations. However, the study of “how 
decisions, or choices, are made” (ibid) initially received interest from other fields 
outside of political science. Most notably, psychology and economics were the two 
disciplines that first made decision-making a subject of systemic analysis (ibid).  
 Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (ibid) define decision-making as “the act of 
choosing among available alternatives about which uncertainty exist”. Decision-
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making theories are diverse and identify a large numbers of relevant variables and 
they vary as to which factors they acknowledge as the more important ones. 
However, in contrast to what one may call traditional political analysis, decision-
making theory directs attention to the “behavior of the specific human decision 
makers who actually shape government policy” (ibid). Rather than reifying or 
personalizing nation-states as the prime actors in the international state system, the 
decision making approach highlights the role of those acting on behalf of the state. 
 In the seminal work Foreign Policy Decision-Making by Snyder, Bruck and 
Sapin (1962: 65), the authors eloquently stated that: 
It is one of our basic methodological choices to define the state as its official decision-makers 
– those whose authoritative acts are, to all intents and purposes, the acts of the state. State 
action is the action taken by those acting in the name of the state  
Thus, those who prefer the decision making approach to political analysis imply that 
the level of decision-making is the most appropriate one.  
 The ideal number of levels for analysis of international politics and foreign 
policy is a recurring and much disputed question. For Wolfers (1962), two levels are 
sufficient. Waltz (1959) proposes three, whereas Rosenau (1966: 29-92) adds another 
two. To Jervis (1976: 15), the preferred level of analysis in not a matter of choice, 
rather, it is one of belief “about the nature of the variables that influence the 
phenomena that concern one”.7 
 The non-decision-making levels of analysis all focus on the setting in which 
the statesmen-makers must make their decision. The premise is, of course, that if the 
observer knows enough about the setting, he can explain and predict the actor’s 
behavior.8 Wolfers (1962: 13) sheds light on the issue by analogy:  
                                              
7 Rather than referring to the international system, I will employ the looser term international environment because the 
thesis does not deal with “general patterns of interaction”, but with explaining specific policy preferences (Jervis 1976: 15).  
8 Jervis (1976: 16) makes an interesting side point and notes that, if “actors believed that the setting is crucial they would 
not need to scrutinize the details of the [other] state’s recent behavior or try to understand the goals and beliefs held by the 
[other] state’s decision-makers”. 
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Imagine a number of individuals, varying widely in their predispositions, who find 
themselves inside a house on fire. It would be perfectly realistic to expect that these 
individuals, with rare exceptions, would feel compelled to run toward the exits…. Surely, 
therefore, for an explanation of the rush for the exits, there is no need to analyze the 
individual decisions that produced it 
For Jervis (1976: 19), in the context of foreign policy the analogy is too simple. If the 
given situation were so compelling, then 
all people would act alike, decision-makers would not hesitate nor feel torn among several 
alternative policies, nor would there be significant debates within the decision-making elite  
Wolfers’ analogy may be useful as an ideal type setting, although the situation is 
rarely as clear-cut. For instance, in the case of Britain’s reaction to Hitler’s ascension 
to power, not until March 1939 did Chamberlain conclude that Germany posed a 
threat to his country, though Churchill is said to have drawn inferences about Hitler’s 
intentions as early as 1933. So when is the house on fire?9   
 According to Wolfers (1962), the level of decision making is appropriate in 
situations in which the environmental constraints are less severe since there will be 
greater differences in behavior between states in the same objective situation. 
Conversely, the greater the external constraint, the less is the need to study decision-
making. 
 Jervis (1976: 16) argues that it is “unlikely that there is a single answer to the 
question of which level is most important“ as the utility may vary with the issue. 
However, given that the environment may exert an influence on “the general outline 
of the state’s policy but not its specific responses” and that “people in the same 
situations behave differently” (ibid: 17, 29), analysis at the level of decision making 
may in particular be preferable when the research question is conducive to such an 
enterprise and when the analyst works with a narrow scope.  
                                              
9 The level of analysis problem reflects to some extent the discussion about the decisive determinant of foreign policy. At 
the one extreme, the environmental approach presupposes that states are nothing but mere puppets of the environment. At 
the opposite extreme, the predispositional approach privileges factors internal to the state. 
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 Within the decision making approach there has been much debate concerning 
the object of study: the decision maker. In the following I will first paint a simple 
portrait of the rational actor model before I deal more thoroughly with what I have 
called the cognitive actor.  
2.1.1 The Rational Actor 
The following paragraphs build largely on excerpts from Graham Allison’s seminal 
article Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1989) and thus echoes his 
delineation of the model.  
 Implicit in much writing on international politics lies the rational actor model. 
Adopted by both analysts and practitioners, whether consciously or not, the model 
provides a powerful and simple basis for making inferences about the acts of states. 
In Allison’s (ibid: 337) view, one may explain state action on the international arena 
simply by showing “how the government could have rationally chosen that action” 
because in the rational actor model (ibid: 338),  
[t]he nation or government, conceived as a rational unitary decision maker, is the agent. This 
actor has one set of specified goals … and one set of perceived options, and a single estimate 
of the consequences that follow from each alternative  
In the face of a policy problem, or perhaps in a conflict, “[a]ction is chosen in 
response to the strategic problem which the nation faces. Threats and opportunities 
arising in the “international strategic marketplace” move the nation to act” (ibid.) 
 As for goals and objectives, the rational actor is able to calculate the costs and 
benefits of each course of action. Given the actor’s ability to maximize value, he will 
select “the alternative whose consequences rank highest in terms of his goals and 
objectives” (Allison 1989: ibid). 
 The explanatory power of the rational actor model results is derived from the 
manner in which the analyst may draw inferences: “[I]f a nation performed a 
particular action, that nation must have had ends towards which the action constituted 
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an optimal means” (ibid).  The rational actor model is thus an approach to 
international politics that is both powerful and simple. 
 The few paragraphs I have devoted to the rational actor model do not capture 
all the complexities of this approach to international politics. The brief description is 
arguably insufficient should the model be applied to the case. However, as a base-line 
for comparison with what I have called the cognitive actor, it does serve a purpose. 
The next chapter draws a somewhat contradictory picture of the decision making 
process.  
2.1.2 The Cognitive Actor  
According to Kal Holsti (1992: 320), “there is always an element of choice in policy 
making”. Throughout history statesmen have referred to compulsion as explanation 
for their choices, however, they are in most cases only “compelled” when they have 
rejected other options (ibid).  
 The question whether the perceptions of decision-makers matter, is of course a 
disputed one. One view within the debate stresses that: 
One may describe particular events, conditions, and interactions between states without 
necessarily probing the nature and outcome the processes through which state action evolves. 
However, and the qualification is crucial, if one wishes to probe the “why” questions 
underlying the events, conditions, and interaction patterns which rest upon state action, then 
decision-making analysis is certainly necessary. We could go so far as to say that the “why” 
questions cannot be answered without analysis of decision-making (Snyder, Bruck, Spain 
1962: 33). 
However, many scholars within the discipline have argued against the psychological 
approach. For Morgenthau (1968: 5-6), the pursuit of motives logically made sense, 
but in practice could not be carried out: 
To search for the clue to foreign policy exclusively in the motives of statesmen is both futile 
and deceptive. It is futile because motives are the most elusive of psychological data, 
distorted as they are, frequently beyond recognition, by our own interests and emotions of 
actor and observer alike. Do we really know what our own motives are? And what do we 
know of the motives of others?   
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Most likely, Morgenthau also believed that ambiguous cognitions were as difficult to 
capture as motives.10 
Harold and Margaret Sprout (1960: 147), on their part, contend that  
what matters in the explanation of decisions and policies is how the actor imagined his 
environment to be, not how it actually was, whereas what matters in the explanation of 
accomplishments is how the environment actually was, not how the actor imagined it to be.  
By distinguishing between what Harold and Margaret Sprout (1957) called the 
‘psychological environment’, i.e. the image, or estimate, of the situation, and the 
‘operational environment’, i.e. where decisions are executed, then policies and 
decisions “must be mediated by statesmen’s goals, calculations, and perceptions” 
(Jervis 1976: 13). The former may or may not correspond to the latter, i.e. the 
statesman may be wrong in his estimate of the situation. In policy-making, what 
matters is “how the policy-maker imagines the milieu to be, not how it actually is 
(Sprout and Sprout 1957: 318). Ole R. Holsti (1962: 244) agrees and states that a 
policy-maker “acts upon his ‘image’ rather than upon ‘objective’ reality”. Thus, there 
seems to be room for the analysis of the perceptions held by policymakers as a 
subfield of foreign policy analysis within the domain of international relations.  
  The discrepancy between the state’s image of the other and the 
‘objective’ reality may be attributable to a number of psychological, sociological, and 
organizational factors. For instance, states build intelligence gathering communities 
that are intended to learn the capabilities and intentions of its adversaries. Often these 
organizations fail to provide an accurate estimate of the situation. Sometimes their 
guesses are relatively precise, yet, they do not succeed in bringing their view across. 
In those cases, the policy-makers may be predisposed to preserving the image they 
already hold. Whatever the reason, the estimate of the situation on which decisions 
are made, needs not correspond to reality. Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1962: 65) also 
support this distinction: 
                                              
10 Singer (1961) made an argument in the same vein holding that the goal of parsimony was not compatible with such an 
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It is also one of our basic choices to take as our prime analytical objective the re-creation of 
the “world” of the decision-makers as they view it. The manner in which they define the 
situations becomes another way of saying how the state oriented to action and why. 
The task for the analyst then becomes to recreate the perceptions of the policymakers, 
and perhaps demonstrate how “[o]f all the phenomena which might have been 
relevant, the actors (the decision-makers) finally endow only some with significance” 
(ibid: 79). 
In the case of the attack on Pearl Harbor early December 1941, this important 
distinction was made apparent. American officials were expecting a military attack 
from Japan, but had predicted it to take place somewhere in Southeast Asia. Although 
there were data pointing to impending military action, American policymakers failed 
to ascribe the correct meaning to that information. Thus their definition of the 
situation was at odds with the objective situation, and as a consequence, their 
countermeasures were ineffective (K.J. Holsti 1992: 321).  
As Sprout and Sprout (1957: 319) have noted: “Attitudes are formed and 
decisions of foreign policy are constantly being taken on fragmentary and often quite 
defective estimates of the situation”.  
 According to Stein (2002: 292) the cognitive-psychological approach is 
especially helpful when  
representations of problems are contested, when these problems are not routine, the stakes are 
high to the choosers, and when the environment offers sufficient degrees of freedom to 
permit a range of choice. 
Under such circumstances, Stein (ibid) argues, the role of leaders is crucial because 
“institutional routines are often not considered adequate”. 
 Moreover, according to Jervis (1976: 28), it is “often impossible to explain 
critical discussions and policies without reference to decision-makers’ beliefs about 
the world and their images of others”. George (1989: 483) concurs:”[T]he way in 
                                                                                                                                           
enterprise.  
 23
which leaders of nation-states view each other and the nature of world political 
conflict is of fundamental importance in determining what happens in relations 
among states”.   
As for the representation of the problem in the case study, the most apt 
perception of Iran as an actor on international arena remains a disputed one. The 
potential proliferation of nuclear weapons to states that are considered enemies of the 
US is not a routine issue for American policymakers. No rule of thumb, or commonly 
accepted heuristic, exists as for the “best practice” in policy in such cases. 
Furthermore, the salience of the issue should not be downplayed. In the foreign 
policy debate, Iran conjoins two of the most notable security concerns of the US, i.e. 
proliferation of nuclear weapons and terrorism. As for the current distribution of 
power in the state system, the US was prior to its troubles in Iraq by many considered 
to be at the peak of its power in both relative and absolute terms. The power 
configuration of today allows American policymakers to pursue a wide range of 
policy options. Thus, the case in question appears to be one in which the utility of the 
approach chosen here should become evident. 
In the next subchapter I will survey some works within the cognitive approach 
before I introduce the concepts of the operational code and the image.  
2.2 Cognitive Studies 
Though students of international politics long have been aware of the importance of 
cognitions (e.g. Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1962; Boulding 1956; Sprout and Sprout 
1960; Jervis 1976), they have not reached a consensus as to which method of 
measurement that provides the most valid and reliable results. Studies within this 
subfield of foreign policy analysis cannot take place in a laboratory setting, and the 
researcher is thus forced to rely on the “written and spoken words of its subjects” 
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(Young and Schafer 1998: 64). The amount of data involved in such enterprises is 
therefore vast, and the analysis is by its extension labor intensive.11 
 Within the study of cognitions, there are broadly four methodologies that have 
been employed with adequate results (ibid). First, there are studies focused on 
operational code analysis that originated with the work of Leites (1951) and George 
(1989). Then, image theory arose with the enquiries of Boulding (1956), Jervis 
(1976), Ole R. Holsti (1962), and Cottam (1977). In addition, there are the two 
methodologies cognitive mapping, which is built on the efforts of Axelrod (1972), 
and conceptual complexity, an information processing approach, which originated in 
psychology, was adapted among others by Suedfeld and Rank (1976). 
  Thus, the ‘methodological arsenal’ consists mainly of four approaches that 
differ in primarily three respects. First, and perhaps most important, the cognitive 
construct under investigation is not identical. Second, the methodologies vary in 
regard to how the researchers may draw inferences about cognition. Third, they 
diverge in reference to the linkage between cognitive construct and behavior (Young 
and Schafer 1998: 68-69). The remainder of this chapter discusses works that build 
on the operational code and the image. I will not comment on the other two 
methodologies as they are not relevant for this study.  
2.2.1  The Operational Code  
The term operational code was first introduced by Nathan Leites (1951). His pioneer 
inquiry into elite belief systems, A Study of Bolshevism, broke new ground.  
 Alexander George (1989) refined the concept and introduced ten questions to 
which the “answers” constituted the operational code. The responses to the first five 
                                              
11 Allegedly, automatic content analyses are available for purchase for under U. S. $ 1000. Preferably, this thesis should 
have rested on a comprehensive computerized analysis that would have mitigated some of the validity and reliability 
concerns. However, I cannot afford it and must therefore build my thesis on an analysis that may be criticized for being 
subjective and superficial. However, I do believe that once graduate students start paying research institutes to perform 
their analyses, a dangerous precedent would be set. Moreover, an analysis performed by professionals does of course not 
guarantee that the thesis as whole will produce a satisfactory result.   
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questions George (1989: 487) refers to as the “philosophical beliefs”, whereas the 
replies to next five questions comprise the “instrumental beliefs”. The former set of 
beliefs encompasses the statesman’s “assumptions and premises he makes regarding 
the fundamental nature of politics, the nature of political conflict, the role of the 
individual in history, etc.”, whereas the latter category pertains to beliefs about “ends-
means relationships in the context of political action”. In combination, the 
philosophical and instrumental beliefs form the operational code (ibid). 
 George (ibid) argues that there are “important cognitive limits on the 
possibility of rational decision making in politics” and that “efforts at rational 
decision making in political life are subject to constraints”. First, the statesman’s 
must rely on incomplete information, second, his limited knowledge of ends-means 
relationships indicates that he cannot reliably predict the effects of selecting one of 
the available policy alternatives, and third, it is problematic for him to establish a 
single criterion for choosing the “best” course of action (ibid). 12 
Moreover, humans must simplify reality in order to cope with it. The 
complexity of the world requires that individuals structure their perceptions. This 
applies to the statesman as well as he must “comprehend complex situations in order 
to decide how best to deal with them” (ibid: 488). In such cases, “the actor typically 
engages in a ‘definition of the situation,’ i.e., a cognitive structuring of the situation 
that will clarify for him the nature of the problem, relate it to his previous experience, 
and make it amenable to appropriate problem-solving activities” (ibid). The task of 
extricating the essence of the situation is partly done “through the prism of his 
[operational code]” (ibid). As a result, George (ibid: 486-487) argues, “these beliefs 
… are among the factors influencing that actor’s decisions”.  
  On the basis of George’s ten questions, Ole R. Holsti (1977) developed 
a typology of political belief systems. According to him, the first question holds the 
                                              
12  However, the term operational code is a misnomer insofar as it does not refer to “a set of rules and recipes to be applied 
to the choice of action” but rather to “a set of premises and beliefs about politics” (George 1989: 486). 
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highest hierarchical value; the policymaker’s view on the nature of political life is a 
candidate for a “master belief”, i.e. a belief that may affect other elements of the 
actor’s belief system:  
What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of 
harmony or conflict? (George 1989: 489) 
George’s first question arguably captures a central belief about both national and 
international politics. Insofar as there exist separate realist and liberalist mindsets 
among foreign policy makers, the formulation seizes the core of those diverging 
worldviews. For our purpose, however, the formulation is not a good fit. Rather, by 
twisting the wording and bringing a connected issue into focus, one may extract a 
related belief.  
What is the dominant tendency in international politics? Do states in general balance or 
bandwagon in response to threats?  
The answer to this question is hypothesized to be of central concern when 
policymakers assess the optimal diplomatic strategy in a given case. For that reason I 
hypothesize that the answer to this question is a key strategic belief within this 
context. The question reflects a debate within the field of international politics as 
theorists find evidence that states do both. 
 Before returning to the key strategic belief and the hypothesized effects on the 
diplomatic strategy, I will assess some image theoretical work that may be of interest 
to the development of the model.  
2.2.2  The Image 
Kenneth Boulding made a significant development within the field when he 
published The Image (1956). The book’s central argument is that behavior is a 
product of the image held by the subject rather than immediate stimuli. As such, the 
studies on images have one unifying idea: The policymakers’ perception of reality 
may or may not correspond to reality; however, it is their representation of reality on 
which they base their decisions. At first glance this is a pretty straightforward 
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concept. Images are the interpretations or the perceptions of reality on which 
decision-makers base their policies (Young and Schafer 1998: 79). However, there is 
at least one theoretical challenge to this elegant concept: What are the ingredients or 
components of the image? In addition, there is an empirical obstacle: How does one 
measure the image? (ibid) I will return to the methodological question in the fourth 
chapter. 
 Our conception of another state is arguably composed of many parts, and if 
asked to describe our impression of another state, our response would probably differ 
to a certain extent from person to person. Take, for instance, any individual’s image 
of Germany. An engineer would perhaps emphasize the country’s strong 
achievements in manufacturing, whereas a philosopher might stress its longstanding 
tradition in the arts. But what are the key aspects of the national image from the 
vantage point of a statesman? In the case of Germany, the theorist or the practitioner 
of international relations would presumably accentuate the so called German 
problem, i.e. the belief that if Germany were to realize its power-political potential, it 
would strive to dominate the continent and thereby possibly provoke a countervailing 
response from other powers.  
 The image is a general concept and has been put to a number of different uses. 
No commonly accepted definition of the image has arisen, and its exact meaning has 
been presented at the analyst’s discretion. The question of the fundamental 
components of the image, i.e. the factors that an image comprises, has been answered 
in a variety of ways; however, in the context of nation states most analysts focus on at 
least two factors.  
 Herrmann and Fischerkeller (1995: 425) write that “[c]entral to any image of 
another actor is a judgment about the threat or the opportunity that actor represents” 
and that “[t]he second essential dimension … is relative power”. In addition, they add 
a “cultural dimension” which includes “judgments about the culture … and what 
norms of behavior the other is likely to respect” (ibid: 425-426). Thus, almost 
echoing the writings of Morgenthau on status quo and imperialist powers, Herrmann 
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and Fischerkeller (1995) emphasizes three factors; the perceived intent of the other, 
the relative power of the other, and a judgment regarding the other’s culture. For my 
purpose, however, I have chosen to only incorporate two factors: intentions and 
power. This choice is defendable as the length of this paper precludes a far-reaching 
discussion of the cultural aspect. The third chapter deals with the concepts of 
intentions and power and the relation between them.  
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3. Deducing the Theoretical Model 
In this chapter I will first define what I have designated the key strategic belief and 
then the image before I make an effort to develop the concept of diplomatic strategy.  
3.1 The Key Strategic Belief 
The belief that states tend to either balance or bandwagon in the face of threat, I 
hypothesize, may have an impact on states’ diplomatic strategy in conflict. The two 
positions differ in many respects. For this purpose the prescriptive element is 
arguably the most interesting one. I argue that the two strains of thought offer 
competing recommendations for the diplomatic strategy in a conflict situation. The 
relevant suggestions that follow from each perspective rest on diverging descriptive 
accounts of how international politics works. The propositions diverge as to the 
nature of states and the character of the state system. As a result, proponents of each 
view are likely to disagree about the utility of punishment and reward in conflict 
situations.  
 Before deducing the anticipated effect of the belief on the diplomatic strategy, 
I first will attempt to portray how these opposing beliefs perceive the workings of 
international politics. Then I turn to the differing perceptions of the utility of 
punishment and reward.  
 With respect to the case study, many analysts of American foreign policy have 
identified a split in the foreign policy making circles of the Bush administrations. The 
tug of war between two factions has been described as a conflict between, among 
other labels, neo-conservatives vs. realists, transformationalists vs. traditionalists, 
ideologues vs. pragmatists, expansionists vs. realpolitiker, and unilateralists vs. 
multilateralists.  
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 To draw a dividing line between those who hold that balancing dominates 
international politics and those who believe bandwagoning shapes the relations 
between states, I think is well-founded for the reason that, in relation to the perceived 
utility of punitive and accommodative measures, this division reflects central 
theoretical underpinnings for the diplomatic strategy in a concentrated manner that 
the dichotomies above do not.  
 Moreover, the beliefs under discussion are subject to an ongoing theoretical 
debate among scholars of international politics about which is the dominant tendency 
in the relations between states. Thus I hold that the preferred concept pair captures 
the essence of two competing visions for the articulation of diplomatic strategy and at 
the same time carries theoretical relevance as to the mechanisms that regulate 
international politics.  
3.1.1 Balancing versus Bandwagoning  
Within the context of a conflict situation in which the stronger state attempts to 
change the behavior of the other, balancing involves resisting the wishes of the 
stronger side. In contrast, bandwagoning implies that the weaker state accedes to the 
demands of the stronger power. This understanding of the concepts lies close to 
Walt’s (1987: 17): 
When confronted by a significant external threat, states may either balance or bandwagon. 
Balancing is defined as allying with others against the prevailing threat; bandwagoning 
refers to alignment with the source of danger.  
The balancing proposition lies at the heart of the balance-of-power theory 
(Morgenthau 1968, Waltz 1979). Realism as a theory of international politics 
assumes that Great Powers matter most. In virtue of their military capability they are 
the key players and their decisions to enter or break alliances are an important point 
of inquiry within the research program. Morgenthau (ibid) and Waltz (ibid) argue that 
Great Powers should and do join the weaker side to preserve the balance of power.  
 31
 Waltz (1979) separates the internal from the external balancing. The former 
refers to states’ acts whose aim is to maintain or upgrade the military capability 
whereas the latter involves forging closer relationships to other states. 
 In the more specialized or mid-range theoretical debate over which is the 
prevailing tendency in international politics the argument that balancing dominates 
has been most forcefully advanced by Waltz (1979) and Walt (1987). They hold that 
states balance in almost every instance; only in exceptional cases do states 
bandwagon. Their critics, on the other hand, point to several examples where 
balancing has not occurred and argue instead that bandwagoning is the rule rather 
than the exception (e.g. Sweeney and Fritz 2004) 
 As for bandwagoning, Walt (1991: 55) elaborates on his definition in a later 
work:  
Bandwagoning involves unequal exchange; the vulnerable state makes asymmetrical 
concessions to the dominant power and accepts a subordinate role …. Bandwagoning is an 
accommodation to pressure (either latent or manifest)  
Schweller (1994: 72) argues that scholars generally hold a balancing image of 
international politics whereas those that act in name of states more often believe that 
the bandwagoning hypothesis corresponds to reality. Moreover, the inclination of 
statesmen to hold the view that bandwagoning dominates has helped shape many 
expansionist policies. According to Schweller (ibid), the bandwagoning belief has 
been central to “every bid for world mastery”. Napoleon I (quoted in ibid: 73) once 
said that:  
My power depends on my glory and my glories on the victories I have won. My power will 
fail if I do not feed it on new glories and new victories. Conquest has made me what I am, 
and only conquest can enable me to hold my position  
Jervis (1976: 9) argues that the American intervention in Vietnam cannot be 
understood without reference to the strong belief in the so called domino theory. 
Predominant during parts of the cold war, the theory presupposed the notion that 
states in most cases would embrace communism rather than resist the ideology. 
According to Mearsheimer (2005), the effect was assumed to multiply and for that 
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reason “[eventually] almost every state in the international system would jump on the 
Soviet bandwagon” which would leave the US “alone and weak against an 
unstoppable juggernaut”. Thus whatever the argument’s empirical merit, the belief 
that bandwagoning dynamics prevail may contribute to policies predicated on that 
idea. 
The competing propositions hold different assumptions as to the nature of 
states. In the face of danger, states, according to the balancing perspective, will fight. 
Conversely, in the bandwagon perspective, states are assumed to flight. These 
diverging accounts of how states respond to threats from the external environment 
give rise to competing views as to the character of the state system. 
  According to Schweller (1994: 73), the bandwagoning image of international 
politics portrays the international state system as 
a complex machine of wheels within wheels. In this highly interconnected world, small local 
disruptions quickly grow into large disturbances as their effects cascade and reverberate 
throughout the system. 
In contrast, the balancing proposition assumes a different nature of international 
politics. The balancing perspective perceives “a world composed of many discrete, 
self-regulating balance-of-power systems” (ibid) and in an environment where 
balancing dominates, “prudent powers should limit their commitments to places 
where their core interests are at stake” (ibid.). Walt (1987: 4) concurs and writes that 
these “contrasting hypotheses [balancing vs. bandwagoning] depict very different 
worlds and the policies that follow from each are equally distinct”.   
 Those who subscribe to the view that we live in a balancing world, should 
advocate policies different from those that emanate from a bandwagoning 
understanding of international politics. Furthermore, whether those who act on behalf 
of the state hold that balancing or bandwagoning is the dominant tendency in 
international politics, should affect the state’s diplomatic strategy in conflict 
situations. 
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 From the definitions above I will attempt to extract differences with respect to 
the diplomatic strategy that each perspective may prescribe. In summary, both beliefs 
rest on diverging conceptions of international politics; whereas the balancing 
proposition envisages multiple balance-of-power systems, the bandwagoning 
perspective perceives a highly interconnected world. In the next subchapters I will 
assess the implications of each perspective for the formulation of the diplomatic 
strategy. 
3.1.2 Perceptions of State Interests  
The balancing and bandwagoning hypotheses diverge with respect to how 
international politics is assumed to operate. As a result, proponents of each perceive 
states’ interests differently.  
 Jervis (1991: 27) distinguishes between reputational and intrinsic interests. 
The latter pertains to ‘end values’, i.e. those interests that “are valued for their own 
sake rather than for what they contribute to the power relations between the 
protagonists” (Snyder quoted in ibid: 26). The former is related to the concept of 
image and refers to “the influence the state’s behavior will have on other events 
because of the changes in the expectations about how the state will behave in the 
future” (ibid: 27). 
 In a highly interconnected world then, behavior is not only guided by the 
intrinsic but also by the reputational interest. A defeat in the conflict at hand would 
imply not only that the contended value is lost, but also that the losing party also has 
displayed weakness and lack of resolve: It has exposed itself and revealed its actual 
power. 
 The bandwagoning proposition stresses the importance of the whole and the 
tight relations between its parts. As a consequence, even prima facie minor issues 
may be defined as vital ones. If policymakers hold that other states draw inferences 
from the state’s behavior, the conflict at hand is significant not only because of the 
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inherent values at stake, but also because third parties observe the state’s behavior 
and forecasts its later conduct on that basis. In a highly interconnected world, foreign 
policymakers must approach the world as a whole rather than analyze situations in 
isolation. 
  A defeat of minor intrinsic importance may thus gain significance as other 
states change their perception of the state. Should other states come to the conclusion 
that the emperor in fact has no clothes; the reputation of that state would suffer. 
Subsequently its ability to shape outcomes in later conflicts would grow weaker.  
 For a statesman that formulates policies on the assumption that bandwagon 
dynamics dominate international politics, the boundaries of an intrinsic interest are 
far from clear-cut. Subsequently, the distinction between the vital and non-vital, the 
central and peripheral, and significant and the insignificant, is blurred. If foreign 
policy is to be oriented toward satisfying the reputational interest, policymakers will 
have a daunting task distinguishing between core and peripheral interests.  
 The following statement from Robert Murphy (quoted in Jervis 1991: 20), a 
US Department of State political adviser, during the Berlin Blockade may illuminate 
this line of reasoning: 
Our retreat from Berlin would be tantamount to an acknowledgment of lack of courage to 
resist Soviet pressure short of war and would be amount to a public confession of weakness 
under pressure. It would be the Munich of 1948 … [and] would raise justifiable doubts in the 
minds of European as to the firmness of our ability to resist the spread of communism. 
The belief in bandwagoning is in essence a domino belief which Jervis (ibid: 22) 
defines as “the expectation that a defeat or retreat one issue or in one area of the 
world is likely to produce … further demands on the state by its adversaries and 
defections from its allies”. Even minor defeats could imply great losses as the 
bandwagon gains momentum and other states will be impelled to resist the stronger 
state. Thus even peripheral issues should be fought vigorously for as a defeat may 
accelerate the bandwagon.  
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 Now turning to the balancing hypothesis, in a world that is not highly 
interconnected foreign policy can perhaps be conducted in a more flexible manner as 
it allows the decision maker to approach the relevant situation in relative isolation. 
And perhaps more importantly, given that the world is not considered an 
interconnected whole, intrinsic interest may thus be prioritized over reputational 
ones, thus permitting the policymaker to separate the vital from the non-vital issues. 
However, it should not be inferred that the balancer does not take the effects on third 
parties into consideration. In fact, the balancer is just as attentive to the reactions of 
the states external to the conflict situation, however, the belief that balancing 
dominates involves the assumption that power repels and that a threatening posture 
may lead other states to band together in opposition. Thus the diplomatic strategy 
may take any form that is considered effective in the relevant situation; it should, 
however, be calibrated so as to not provoke a countervailing response from third 
party states.  
 To summarize; the bandwagon belief assumes a highly interconnected world 
where states tend to align with the source of danger and gains and losses are 
considered a force in their own right. By contrast, in the balancing belief the world is 
perceived quite differently; most importantly perhaps, states respond to threats by 
resisting the dominant power rather than acceding to it. Moreover, conflict situations 
are considered separable. As a consequence, the policymaker may approach each 
issue in greater isolation. States may thus fight for the intrinsic interest as opposed to 
trying to satisfy the reputational interest. The next subchapter discusses diverging 
perceptions of the utility of accommodative and punitive measures in conflict 
situations. 
3.1.3 Perceptions of the Utility of Reward and Punishment  
The formulations of the balancing and the bandwagoning belief are simplified 
notions. In order to elicit differences between them, it is necessary to express their 
underpinning principles in clear words. The descriptions are boiled down and reflect 
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an extreme representation of each position. The predictions one may deduce from the 
manner in which statesmen perceive the world, i.e. in either balancing or 
bandwagoning terms, are admittedly vague. However, a few observations can perhaps 
be noted with some certainty.  
 As noted above differing views as to the nature of states and the state system 
implies different room for the policymaker to maneuver. In conflict situations 
policymakers that subscribe to the balancing proposition have more freedom of action 
given that the international system is perceived as multiple balance-of-power 
systems, thus facilitating a more flexible approach.  
 Jervis (1991: 22) argues that many ”foreign policy disagreements turn on 
different evaluations of the consequences of concessions and limited defeats”. Before 
assessing the perceived utility of accommodative measures, I will attempt to estimate 
the perceived usefulness of coercive measures from each perspective. 
Do the distinct propositions diverge as to the level of punishment that is 
desirable? Balancers do not assume that states give in to power. On the contrary, they 
take it as given that states do not surrender until they have to. Moreover, they also 
believe that it is preferable for the weaker state to join a countervailing alliance to 
balance threats than to accede to the threatening state.  
Furthermore, the belief in balancing implies that threats in one conflict 
situation will create an incentive for other states to engage in either internal or 
external balancing. Threats and relative increments in power may spur others to take 
countermeasures to make certain that they will not be in a position to be “bullied”. 
Should the state assume a threatening posture in one situation, then it may make it 
harder for itself in later conflicts by creating an incentive for other states to add to 
their power. 
 A proponent of the balancing proposition may of course issue threats or resort 
to the use of force, however, it is evident he is more concerned that states external to 
the situation will take balancing measures. In a hypothesized two-state world where 
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the statesman represents the stronger power, there would be no need for hesitation 
with respect to the use of threats and ultimately force. If there were no other states in 
the system, then other states’ reactions to the diplomatic strategy would not be a part 
of the calculus; any means deemed effective in attaining the desired goal could thus 
be adopted. However, in such a world, the decision maker should nevertheless be 
occupied with the expected utility of threats in the existing situation. Should the 
statesman hold that threats will work counterproductively and induce the other state 
to engage in either internal or external balancing, then the use of threats should be 
avoided.  
 Cognizant of the danger of being perceived as a threat by third parties and 
ascribing little utility to threats in the relevant conflict situation, balancers should, 
everything else being equal, be more cautious with respect to issuing threats and to 
applying force.  
 On the other hand, if the policymaker does not subscribe to balancing 
proposition and instead holds the conviction that the weaker state will act according 
to the notion that “if we can’t beat them, we’ll join them”, then, I argue, the 
policymaker should be more willing to resort to threats, and ultimately, to violence. 
As states flight in the face of danger, the attractiveness of threats should be evident.  
 Mearsheimer (2005) summarizes the implication of the belief that 
bandwagoning dynamics dominate international politics:  
[Those who] believe that if a powerful country like the United States is willing to threaten or 
attack its adversaries, then virtually all of the states in the system – friends and foes alike – 
will quickly understand that the United States means business and that if they cross mighty 
Uncle Sam, they will pay a severe price. In essence, the rest of the world will fear the United 
States, which will cause any state that is even thinking about challenging Washington to 
throw up its hands and jump on the American bandwagon  
Mearsheimer’s precise, though somewhat rhetorical, wording indicates that the belief 
in bandwagoning entails greater willingness to put one’s faith in threats and the use 
of force. Rather than assuming that threats provoke a countervailing response, the 
dynamics among states should make states external to situation more amenable to the 
state’s wishes under comparable circumstances. 
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 Now turning to the utility of the conciliatory option as perceived by 
proponents of each perspective, the distinction between intrinsic and reputational 
interests is of central concern.  
 Figures in policymaking who subscribe to the balancing proposition are not 
ignorant of the value of reputation. However, as they conceive international politics 
as a system of more or less isolated balance-of-power systems, they are not as likely 
to assume that certain acts in one conflict situation will have an important impact on 
the state’s credibility with respect to living up to threats or delivering on promises in 
later instances. In this perspective, other states’ inferences will be made from case to 
case rather than being based on an abstract quality that is not likely to be perceived in 
the same manner throughout the globe. Balancers are therefore more prone to believe 
that the relevant situation is possible to disconnect from other affairs. Thus, a more 
pragmatic approach is feasible in which the pursuit of the intrinsic interest can be 
prioritized over reputational concerns, thus allowing for more elaborate use of 
carrots. 
 Moreover, a case can perhaps be made that those who believe that states 
generally balance against threats, will also maintain that in an effort to not appear 
aggressive, rewards may be considered an effective instrument of policy. In danger of 
repeating myself, the balancer is attentive to the threat perception of other states, and 
should for that reason be more inclined to use promises of reward as a tool of foreign 
policy. 
 Those who accept the bandwagoning principles would consider it detrimental 
to the reputation of the power they represent, if they were to, for instance, reward a 
state suspected of nuclear proliferation. Enticing a country to change its undesired 
policy would set a dangerous precedent for other states. Other smaller powers could 
be inspired to follow the same path, thus accelerating the bandwagon, and expect to 
be rewarded for the same unwanted conduct. Accommodative moves on behalf of the 
stronger power will be interpreted as weakness that others will come to exploit. 
According to the bandwagoning hypothesis, this process will feed on itself. Thus, in 
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this context the promise of reward as a means in the diplomatic strategy is largely 
discounted by those who believe that international politics are dominated by 
bandwagoning dynamics.13  
 Each perspective holds diverging prescriptions for the optimum diplomatic 
strategy. Those who subscribe to the belief that bandwagon dynamics dominate 
relations between states, may ascribe greater utility to threats of punishment as a 
means of foreign policy, whereas those who believe that balancing is the dominant 
tendency among states, may hold inducements in higher regard.  
 Therefore, one may expect in conflict situations that a decision making group 
that holds the former perspective should recommend an emphasis on threats of 
punishment, whereas a group of policymakers that is dominated by the latter 
perspective should propose a diplomatic strategy that stresses potential reward.14  
3.2 The Image of the Adversary  
3.2.1 Intentions and Power  
According to Morgenthau (1968: 145), sound foreign policy depends on accurate 
estimates of other states’ intentions and capabilities: 
It is the task of those responsible for the foreign policy of a nation … to evaluate correctly 
the bearing of these factors [the elements of power] upon the power of their own nation and 
of other nations as well, and this task must be performed for both the present and the future 
                                              
13 Although the two key strategic beliefs are assumed to mutually exclusive, it is conceivable of course that policymakers 
mix these two contrasted beliefs. In addition it is neither certain that the belief is fixed; it may perhaps vary the region of 
the world that the policymaker perceives. However, for the sake of simplicity I am compelled to keep them apart and 
consider them as two contrasting beliefs. 
14 The tacit is assumption is clearly that the statesman believes in either the balance or the bandwagon hypothesis. It is, 
however, conceivable that the relevant policymaker does appreciate the differences between them and policies will emerge 
without reference to either set of principles. Despite the possibility that the decision maker may not be cognizant of any 
abstract hypothesis, he will nevertheless in the context of a conflict situation assess what means are more likely to bring 
about the desired outcome. Thus, without consciously referring to a general problem-solving principle, he will inevitably 
consider the diverging prescriptions of each hypothesis.   
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Thus, in order to conduct successful foreign policy, the decision maker must assess 
the other’s power resources as they appear today as well as tomorrow. The latter task 
also involves some estimation of the other’s intentions. Kal Holsti (1992: 144) writes 
that the fact that states spend a great amount of resources is indicative of the 
significance of those factors:  
The reason that governments invest millions of dollars for gathering intelligence is to 
develop a reasonably accurate picture of other states’ capabilities and intentions  
When discussing images of another states, and perhaps those of enemies in particular, 
Kennan’s (1947) famous Foreign Affairs article easily leaps to mind as a key text that 
to a great extent shaped American policymakers’ image of the Soviet Union. In his 
analysis of the nature of the communist adversary, he emphasized the characteristics 
of the Soviet leaders and the system’s ideology and indicated that isolationism was 
not tenable and that appeasement would be ineffective. Kennan’s essay helped shape 
the containment doctrine which remained in place, though it did undergo some 
changes, throughout the cold war. 
 The notion that states tend to be either supportive or unsupportive of the status 
quo is an assumption found in many works of diplomatic history. For the purpose of 
this thesis I assume that policymakers also assess states in such terms. The dichotomy 
adapted here is of course not very nuanced. However, the notion that there exist states 
that are either satisfied or dissatisfied with the existing distribution of power runs 
through much of the literature in the field. As a result, historical analogies are widely 
available and the meaning of the concepts of a status quo and of an imperialist power 
should be possible to discern with some precision. I will elaborate on these concepts 
below.  
 As for the cognitive processes related to the formation and the maintenance of 
the image, Jervis (1976: 68) writes in his seminal theoretical work that: 
Once a person develops an image of the other – especially a hostile image of the other – 
ambiguous and even discrepant information will be assimilated to that image… If they think 
that a state is hostile, behavior that others might see as neutral or friendly will be ignored, 
distorted, or seen as attempted duplicity.  
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Thus, the image is resilient and shapes the information about the adversary’s behavior 
so as to conform to the image. Once the image is formed, it is resistant to change and 
exerts considerable influence on the policymaker’s judgment about the opponent’s 
motivations for choosing a given course of action.  
 Much can be said as to how policymakers’ images come into being. A great 
number of indicators may be relevant in that endeavor. However, for this purpose the 
question of how is not relevant. The related question of why a given image has come 
to prevail as opposed to a different one is of course also interesting. Unfortunately, 
the scope does not allow for an examination of that aspect either. 
 To summarize, the “why” and the “how” will no be explored whereas the 
question of “what” is highlighted. For the political analyst, in order to explain, and 
possibly forecast, the behavior of one state toward another, the question of what is 
most pertinent; if the salient characteristics of an image held by a group of 
policymakers are identified, then perhaps one could be able to explain why those 
decision makers preferred one course of action over another towards the state with 
which the image is associated.  
 Restating that perceptions, no matter their accuracy, are the basis on which the 
policymaker acts, perceptions should therefore impact on policy (Young and Schafer 
1998: 79). Therefore, given the dichotomization of the image adopted here, should 
the policymakers first have adopted either image, that is the image of a status quo or 
an imperialist power, one could expect that judgment to remain and future 
assessments of the other state’s behavior to be assimilated to that image.  
 The question whether the weaker power should be perceived as expansionist 
or status quo oriented, depends among other factors upon its intentions. In the next 
subchapter I will elaborate on the concept of intentions and its relation to capabilities. 
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3.2.1.1 Intentions 
Generally, observers take intentions to mean what one plans to do or what goals are 
hoped to be reached. Building on this common understanding, Jervis (1976: 48) 
defines the term as “the collection of actions the state will or would take because that 
is what others are trying to predict”.  
 Reading the intentions of adversaries is a difficult but momentous task for the 
decision makers. The fundamental question of “how to detect and counter an 
imperialistic policy” (Morgenthau 1968: 60) confronts those who conduct foreign 
policy: “The answer to that question has determined the fate of nations; for upon the 
correctness of that answer depends the success of the foreign policy derived from it” 
(ibid). 
 George Kennan (1958: 21-21) wrote that, 
in everything that can be statistically expressed – expressed, that is, in such a way as not to 
imply any judgment on our motivation – I believe the Soviet Government to be excellently 
informed about us. I am sure that their information on the development of our economies, on 
the state of our military preparations, on our scientific progress, etc., is absolutely first-rate. 
But when it comes to the analysis of our motives, to the things that make our life tick as it 
does, I think this whole great system of intelligence-gathering breaks down seriously.  
Thus, what outside observers can quantify may be easy to measure. In contrast, those 
factors that are harder to count may be more difficult to estimate correctly. Intentions 
arguably belong in the latter category. 
 Before I describe the difference between imperialist and status quo powers a 
brief discussion of the concepts of power, distribution of power and status quo is 
necessary. For now it is sufficient to bear in mind that the critical point concerns 
whether or not the adversary’s intention is to overturn or conserve the status quo. For 
the decision maker it is essential to make an accurate assessment with respect to the 
other’s intentions. According to Kissinger (1964: 22-23), “[a] series of paradoxes 
may be intriguing for the philosopher but they are a nightmare for the statesman, for 
the latter must not only contemplate but resolve”. Thus, faced with an adversary the 
statesman must determine the other state’s true nature. Given that military capability 
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is a necessary means to eventually reach the goal of a revolution in the international 
order, the following paragraphs focus on that aspect.  
3.2.1.2 Power  
The question of power has been in the forefront in debates within the field from 
Thucydides to the present day. However, consensus as to the role and nature of power 
has not emerged. In realist theories of international politics, power remains a key 
concept, although its content is hard to agree on. Gilpin (1981: 13) for example, 
admits that it is “one of the most troublesome in the field”. Nevertheless, the number 
of definitions should be interpreted as a testament to the significance of the concept, 
and even though academics fail to concur on its proper definition, most analysts 
believe it is an essential task to address the role and nature of this elusive concept 
(Baldwin 2002: 177).  
Morgenthau’s (1968: 106-139) contribution to this debate consisted in an 
approach to the concept that summarized “elements of national power”, i.e. factors 
such as industrial capacity, economic strength, population, national character, 
scientific knowledge, etc. In order to reach an assessment of the power of a given 
state, the observer would add up Morgenthau’s factors. In this “power as resources” 
approach, the power of a state relative to another, then, would be understood as the 
sum of its parts seen relative to the parallel sum of the other state. The distribution of 
power therefore reflects the disparity (or parity) in power resources. Thus, in this 
interpretation of the concept, power is conceived as a possession or a property of 
states. 
 In contrast to the understanding exemplified by Morgenthau, there is the 
“relational power approach,” in which the concept refers to a relationship between 
two or more actors. Instead of regarding it as a property of the actors in question, this 
approach highlights the relation between them and advances the notion of power as a 
type of causation.  In the relationship between, say, actor A and actor B, A’s behavior 
causes a change in the behavior of B (Baldwin 2002: 178). As a consequence of the 
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shift from “a property concept of power to a relational one,” power was no longer 
considered one-dimensional.  
 Although academics have engaged in heated disputes concerning the most apt 
definition of power, and whether or not power should be interpreted as “the sum of 
resources” or as a property of the relationship between the actors in question, a 
different conceptualization altogether may be possible. Perhaps Wolfers (1962: 104) 
cuts the Gordian knot by separating power from influence. The first concept refers to 
the “ability to move others by the threat or infliction of deprivations” whereas the 
latter denotes the “ability to do so [move others] through promises or grants of 
benefits”.  Wolfers (ibid: 104-105) stresses that these theoretical constructs are not 
unrelated in practice and as “a rule they will be found to go hand in hand”. 
 Wolfers (ibid: 104) connects power to coercion and influence to persuasion. 
Aware that the distinction is an oversimplification, Wolfers (ibid.) notes that in 
almost every case in which “these means achieve significant political results, there is 
present both an element of persuasion and an element of pressure or constraint 
bordering on coercion”  
 Wolfers (ibid) is thus fully aware that power and influence as means of foreign 
policy cannot be understood in isolation. In any conflict in which a given state tries to 
persuade its counterpart, “the coercive power in the background” plays a certain part. 
Wolfers (ibid: 108-109) illustrative example is worth quoting at length: 
[I]f any diplomat should doubt the assistance he gains from the mere existence of power in 
the hands of his government and from the threat of forceful action implicit in such power, he 
need only ask himself whether he would expect equal success in negotiating with a strong 
opponent if he were representing Iceland instead of the United States.  
The relationship between power and influence is not clear cut. In an effort to illustrate 
the interrelation between them, Wolfers (ibid) depicts them as opposing ends in a 
spectrum “into which one can fit the actual means used by nations in pursuit of their 
foreign policies”. 
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In Wolfers’ terminology, power is related to coercion and broadly reflects the 
concept of power advanced by Morgenthau.  In many cases, military capability is a 
necessary means for coercing others to conform to one’s wishes. Conceiving 
capabilities as one of the more tangible elements of power, as conceived by 
Morgenthau, that is relatively uncomplicated to measure, an assessment of the states’ 
military capabilities may contribute to an understanding as to how policymakers view 
the other state in power terms. To employ a sports analogy; if two boxers belong to 
different weight classes, the probable outcome of a match should be clear to actors 
and observers alike.  
 The study of international politics has to a great extent been absorbed by 
questions relating to war and the use of force. The preoccupation with military force 
as the key component of power has according to Baldwin (2002: 184) led to a neglect 
of other forms of power and impeded the understanding of not only “military 
statecraft itself” but also “the conditions under which military force should be used”.  
 Nevertheless, the traditional emphasis on military power as the ultimate 
measuring rod on which states may be compared does have some utility. A 
straightforward concept mitigates the problem of measurement. Although arguments 
against the one-dimensional concept of power may be numerous, it facilitates 
comparison between states. 
 Another much employed but vague concept is the balance of power. What is 
the precise meaning of the term? According to Wolfers (1962: 117), four 
interpretations are common: 
[T]he term refers somehow to the distribution of power among nations, it is taken in some 
instances to be synonymous with the distribution of power generally, and in other instances 
to imply the superiority of one country over another … Most frequently, however, the term 
signifies the equilibrium of an evenly balanced scale. 
The thesis adopts the latter understanding of the balance of power as “a roughly equal 
distribution of power between two opponents” (ibid: 118).  
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 Transferred to the proposed theoretical framework power represents 
punishment whereas influence corresponds to reward. For the development of the 
theoretical model these two concepts are central.  
3.2.1.3 Synthesis 
In the policy making process, I presume that the policymaker should attempt to gauge 
the intentions of the adversary; and decide whether the diplomatic strategy should be 
formulated on the basis of an expansionist or a status quo oriented image of the 
adversary. I hypothesize that words and actions on the part of the weaker power are 
interpreted by the stronger power in light of the image of the adversary that prevails 
within the central foreign policy making group. 
As stated above the question of how, or through which mechanisms the image 
is formed, falls outside the scope of the thesis to explore. However, intentions to 
either upset or preserve the status quo as perceived by the stronger power are 
necessarily coupled to a judgment of the expected benefits that the weaker power 
believes it will derive from an investment in capabilities. If the adversary does not 
possess any capability to upset the status quo, any voiced aspirations to pursue 
expansionist policies abroad would not be credible. Conversely, should a state claim 
that it did not have any designs to overturn the status quo, observers would perhaps 
argue that its great investments to augment its military power indicate that, indeed it 
does. The coupling of intentions to military power therefore seems to be a necessary 
one.  
To summarize, the inferred intentions are considered the crux of the image, 
however, the observer cannot infer intentions without reference to capability. In other 
words, intentions form the core of the image but capabilities are also a necessary 
factor to which the decision maker must pay attention. Simply put, the intentions 
represent the state’s power aspirations whereas the capabilities constitute the means 
to realize those ambitions.  
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 Confronted with the armament of another state, what inference should the 
decision maker draw about the intent of this action? Will other states consider the 
other’s efforts to improve its military might as an attempt to meet the security needs 
of its external situation or as a preparation for the use of force? The answer is not 
clear, and I believe it hinges among other things on the observer’s image of that given 
state. 
 Should the policymaker have an image of the other that corresponds to that of 
a status quo power, efforts on the part of the weaker state to add to its military power 
may be considered as a legitimate move to protect its security interests. If, on the 
other hand, the image held resembles that of an imperialist power, then an increment 
in military capability would perhaps be understood as a preparation for the use of 
force. 
Returning to the German problem, few observers today would argue that the 
reunification of the country has led to a bid for regional hegemony, as some analysts 
predicted at the time. The dominant image of Germany today largely corresponds to 
that of a status quo power. Should Germany, however, suddenly engage in a massive 
arms build-up and decide to develop nuclear weapons, observers would perhaps be 
inclined to alter their image of that state. Thus, efforts on Germany’s part to improve 
its military capabilities may affect outside observers’ estimates of the state’s 
intentions.  
 However, no balanced analyst would contend that Germany intended to upset 
the status quo if it were to modernize its air force by buying, say, fifteen state-of-the-
art fighter aircrafts. Thus, in that case proportionality would be important. It is hard to 
determine the critical point with respect to when the image of a state crosses the 
threshold from being status quo oriented to becoming imperialist. Furthermore, 
although the state in question may have intentions to overthrow the status quo, that 
may not be evident to outside observers. For instance, Germany under Hitler had 
revisionist designs; yet, those did not entirely become clear to other states before war 
was inevitable.  
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 I assume that, during a conflict the statesman of the stronger state evaluates the 
other state’s ambition with respect to its power position. The question the decision 
maker must strive to answer concerns the nature of the opposition: Is the adversary a 
status quo or a revisionist power? Thus, the image in this context equals the 
statesman’s estimate of the other’s intention and capability to maintain or disrupt the 
prevailing the distribution of power.  
 As a starting point for differentiating between status quo and imperialist states 
I will apply the distinction put forth by Morgenthau (1968). Before describing the 
imperialist state, I will first characterize the status quo power. 
3.2.2 The Status Quo Power  
The term status quo has its origins in the diplomatic concept of status quo ante 
bellum, i.e. a restoration of the power configuration prior to the war. Adapted by 
Morgenthau (ibid: 37), status quo refers to “[policies aimed] at the maintenance of 
distribution of power which exits at a particular moment in history”, however, that 
does not mean that such policies are in opposition to change altogether, although they 
are opposed to “any change that would amount to a reversal of the power relations 
among two or more nations” (ibid: 40). However, minor modifications of the 
distribution of power, which “leave intact the relative power positions … are fully 
compatible with a policy of the status quo” (ibid). 
 Kissinger (1964: 1) is also preoccupied with stability and what he calls the 
legitimacy of the international order: “Stability [has resulted] from a generally 
accepted legitimacy ….[which] means no more than an international agreement about 
the nature of workable arrangements about the permissible aims and methods of 
foreign policy”.  
 The legitimacy, as conceived by Kissinger (ibid), is not to “be confused with 
justice” but “implies the acceptance of the framework of the international order by all 
major powers”. As to what level of acceptance that is necessary to maintain the 
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system, Kissinger (ibid) adds that no power can be “so dissatisfied that, like Germany 
after the Treaty of Versailles, it expresses its dissatisfaction in a revolutionary foreign 
policy”. If a legitimate order is in place, wars may still occur but their scope is limited 
(ibid: 1-2). 
 A status quo power then does not intend to bring about any revolution in the 
existing power relations and will be mindful of the framework of the status quo, i.e. 
“the permissible aims and methods” (ibid: 1), in its foreign policy conduct. Thus, a 
status quo power is satisfied in the sense that it perceives its power position within 
the international order as optimal, or at least, favorable. Efforts on the part of a status 
quo power that seek to augment its national power are motivated primarily by 
increases in other states’ power. Thus, it does not intend to upset the current 
distribution of power, but to conserve it.  
 In conflict situations status quo powers should perhaps be amenable to 
persuasion. As the status quo oriented state is satisfied with its current position in the 
distribution of power, it holds no ambition to overthrow it. The stronger power may 
interpret the other state’s actions as legitimate and perhaps as a response to security 
concerns; efforts to strengthen its military capability may be construed as a reaction 
to external events.  
The weaker side’s motivations to augment its absolute power stem from 
legitimate grievances and/or conditions imposed on it from the outside. Thus a 
diplomatic strategy pronounced on the assumption that the weaker state is in fact a 
status quo oriented state could very well contain accommodative measures. In 
Morgenthau’s framework, concessions to a status quo power do not equal 
appeasement as the target state only has limited objectives. Accommodation could 
thus be considered a prudent policy.  
 Threats of punishment in the case of non-compliance on the part of the status 
quo state could work counterproductively as it may induce balancing behavior. Given 
that the weaker state intends only to conserve its position in the power hierarchy or is 
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responding to legitimate grievances, threats could serve to strengthen the weaker 
side’s perception of vulnerability and add to its firmness to sustain its behavior.  
 Therefore one could postulate that if the stronger power’s image of the other 
state corresponds to that of a status quo state, then one should see that the former 
adopts a diplomatic strategy that emphasizes reward and downplays punishment.  
3.2.3 The Imperialist Power 
Now turning to the imperialist power, a caveat is in order. According to Morgenthau 
(1968: 41), the term imperialism has “lost all concrete meaning”. Polemical usage has 
emptied the concept and its utilization usually expresses the observer’s disdain for the 
foreign policies of the state in question. For Morgenthau (ibid: 41-42), then, it 
“becomes the task of theoretical analysis  to break with popular usage in order to give 
the term an ethically neutral, objective, and definable meaning that at the same time is 
useful for the theory and practice of international politics”.  
 Morgenthau (ibid: 42) defines imperialism as “a policy that aims at the 
overthrow of the status quo, at a reversal of the power relations between two or more 
nations”.  However, Morgenthau (ibid) notes that not “every foreign policy aimed at 
an increase in the power of a nation is necessarily not a manifestation of imperialism” 
and that a policy “seeking only adjustment, leaving the essence of these power 
relations intact, still operates within the general framework of a policy of the status 
quo”. Moreover, if a policy is intended to preserve the power of an empire, it should 
not be designated as imperialistic because “imperialism is contrasted with the policy 
of the status quo and … has a dynamic connotation” (ibid).  
 For the statesman the fundamental question regards the judgment of the other’s 
policies. Is the foreign policy of the other state imperialistic or not? Does it aim at the 
overthrow of the current distribution of power, or does it merely intend a minor 
modification of the status quo?  
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 Students of international politics often invoke Neville Chamberlain’s image of 
Germany as an example where the policymaker had not come to grips with the 
realities of the situation. The image he held of Germany, presumably one in which 
Germany’s intentions consisted in an ambition to rectify justified grievances as 
imposed on it by the Versailles treaty, enabled him to make a deal with Hitler at 
Munich. The British prime minister failed to perceive Germany for what it really was, 
mistaking the imperialist state for a status quo power: 
It is quite well known that if one tries to appease a bandit by first giving him one’s purse, 
then one’s coat, and so forth, he is not going to be more charitable because of this, he is not 
going to stop exercising his banditry. On the contrary, he will become ever more insolent 
(Krushchev quoted in Jervis 1976: 61).  
Krushchev’s statement captures the defining characteristic of the imperialist power: It 
cannot be appeased. Concessions work contrary to their intentions as the imperialist 
power only desires more: “‘Appeasement’, where it is not a device to gain time, is the 
result of an inability to come to grips with a policy of unlimited objectives” 
(Kissinger 1964: 3). The adversary whose objectives are without boundaries cannot 
be pacified through accommodative measures. Any concession will add to the 
relative power of the other side and enhance its appetite and resolve to have more.  
 In a conflict situation, to check the ambitions of the revolutionary power, the 
stronger power must resist not only on the relevant issue of contention, but on all 
matters. If the weaker power’s unwillingness to alter its behavior is caused by its 
motivation to reach some sub-goal in a comprehensive program of expansion, then 
any display of weakness on the part of the stronger power will be exploited by the 
revolutionary power since it is always looking for an opportunity to expand. A 
prudent policy toward an imperialist state cannot include inducements as these 
inevitably will serve to reinforce its determination to upset the status quo. Thus a 
diplomatic strategy toward a revolutionary power must mind that the other is not 
responsive to limited inducements; only punitive measures are available.  
 Thus toward an adversary perceived as expansionist, one may expect the 
diplomatic strategy to maximize punishment and minimize reward.   
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 The next subchapter develops the concept of diplomatic strategy.  
3.3 The Diplomatic Strategy 
The concept diplomatic strategy is composed of two related ideas, diplomacy and 
strategy. Diplomacy is commonly understood to refer to negotiations between states, 
or more broadly, the art of conducting external relations on behalf of the state.   
 For Morgenthau (1968: 135) is the “quality of diplomacy” the most important 
of the “elements of power” because: 
The quality of a nation’s diplomacy combines those different factors [the elements of power] 
into an integrated whole, gives them direction and weight, and awakens their slumbering 
potentialities by giving them the breath of actual power  
Morgenthau (ibid) refers to diplomacy as “the brains of national power” and argues 
that “if its vision is blurred, its judgment defective, and its determination feeble”, the 
other elements “will in the long run avail a nation little”. Furthermore, Morgenthau 
(ibid) equate s the significance of diplomats in peace with generals in war. Both 
groups are concerned with “bringing the different elements of national power to bear 
with maximum effect”. Thus, a state that possesses an advantage in national power 
cannot use it on the international stage without the assistance of adept diplomats.  
 Strategy, on the other hand, usually carries one of two meanings. Firstly, it 
may refer to a branch of the art of war, and secondly, and more generally, to a 
systematic plan of action. It is the latter meaning that is adopted here. Two well-
known definitions of strategy are worth quoting: 
Strategy is ultimately about effectively exercising power (Foster quoted in Baylis and Wirtz 
2002: 4). 
Strategy is a plan of action designed in order to achieve some end; a purpose together with a 
system of measures for its accomplishment (Wylie quoted in ibid)  
To Wolfers (1962), reward and punishment are the primary means that states employ 
in pursuit of their foreign policy goals. 
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For this purpose the concept of diplomatic strategy may thus be defined as  
the plan of action for employing the twin instruments of policy, reward and punishment, 
either separately or in combination, in order to bring about a change in the adversary’s 
behavior. 
I hypothesize that the stronger power communicates its intention to punish or reward 
the adversary through words and actions. In addition, the stronger power may present 
the other state with a choice between two outcomes; the weaker state may accept the 
stronger one’s demands and receive the concessions stipulated, or maintain its 
resistance and face the consequences. The goal of the diplomatic strategy is to 
convince the weaker side to accommodate its behavior to the stronger power’s 
wishes.  
In order to measure the diplomatic strategy, or at least, be able to describe it 
with some accuracy, the concept must operationalized. What indicators may be 
relevant to that end? Arguably, diplomacy is about both style and substance. 
However, in order to measure the concept, one is forced to concentrate on those 
aspects that are tangible and more easily lend themselves to be counted and 
compared. Thus the researcher should perhaps concentrate on the substantial 
dimension and gauge the extent of those punitive and accommodative measures that 
are communicated to the adversary through words and actions.  
In this context, assuming a mixed strategy, the diplomatic strategy can be 
considered to consist of two components; the sum of costs that is to be imposed on 
the weaker state should it not bend to the stronger state’s will, and the sum of benefits 
that will accrue to the weaker side should it decide to alter its conduct in coherence 
with the stronger state’s wishes. Conceived as two ends of a continuum, the distance 
between the promised reward and the prospective punishment may perhaps be 
referred to as the discrepancy. 
Of course, a precondition for employing both carrots and sticks in a conflict 
situation is that the stronger power has something to offer that the weaker state wants, 
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and that it has the ability to harm or asymmetrically impose costs on the weaker 
party. 
 Admittedly, the two-dimensional concept of diplomatic strategy may be too 
basic to capture the complexities in a state’s actions toward an adversary in a conflict 
situation. However, measuring the dependent variable through prospective reward 
and punishment is a straightforward task as such factors are relatively easy to 
estimate, which in turn may simplify comparison to other cases. Moreover, as 
punishment and reward – sticks and carrots – may be considered the central means of 
foreign policy, it seems apt to conceive the diplomatic strategy as a combination of 
those two factors.  
 Similar concepts to the one defined in this chapter include deterrence 
diplomacy and coercive diplomacy. The logic of the latter is summed up by George 
(1991: 4):  
The general idea of coercive diplomacy is to back one’s demand on an adversary with a 
threat of punishment for noncompliance that he will consider credible and potent enough to 
persuade him to comply with the demand 
This definition has strong resemblance to the concept of diplomatic strategy, 
however, George’s (ibid) construct involves more variables that in turn produce 
different types of coercive diplomacy. This thesis, however, investigates potential 
links between the two cognitive constructs, on the hand, and the policymakers’ 
inclination to offer inducements and threaten punishment, on the other. Therefore, it 
seems apt to adopt a minimalist conception of a related construct. 
 In the conflict situation, the problem for the policymaker consists in finding 
the optimum trade-off between coercion and accommodation that maximizes gains 
and minimizes loss (Snyder and Diesing 1977: 10, 207).  
 Depending on whether the gravity point of the diplomatic strategy lies close to 
the accommodative or coercive end of the spectrum, it will be designated as 
accommodative or coercive respectively. In the latter case, the stronger side 
maximizes punitive measures and minimizes accommodative measures, and 
 55
conversely, in the former case, the stronger side minimizes punitive measures and 
maximizes accommodative measures. 
 In a conflict situation no diplomatic strategy will rely on pure coercion or pure 
accommodation. Moreover, threats of military action need not be pronounced and 
promises of reward are at times not expressed in definite terms. As Wolfers (1962) 
has noted, the distinction between power and influence is hard to draw, and as a 
consequence, a weaker power when confronted by a stronger state will in most cases 
pay careful attention to the superior capabilities of the latter. Thus threats can be 
present although they are not explicitly articulated.  
 Two dichotomies imply four combinations. In two instances one may expect 
the diplomatic strategy to be all but one-sided. In the case that the policymakers 
subscribe to the belief that international politics is dominated by bandwagon 
dynamics and the adversary is perceived as a predominantly revolutionary power, 
then the diplomatic strategy should emphasize punitive measures over conciliatory 
actions. If, on the other hand, the decision makers believe that balancing is the 
dominant tendency and the other state is perceived as a status quo oriented power, 
then the diplomatic strategy should downplay the threat of punishment and stress the 
possibility of reward. In the other two combinations one may anticipate more mixed 
strategies. Below I will elaborate on this point. 
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 Balancing Mixed Accommodative 
 
The research design does not allow for the quantification of effect. However, 
in the two cases that the two factors pull in different directions, what combination of 
coercive and accommodative measures may the researcher expect? 
The key strategic belief is assumed to be a more general perspective on 
international politics, whereas the image is associated with the adversary in 
particular. One could perhaps make the case that the belief stipulates the outline of 
the diplomatic strategy and that the image provides the more specific details.  
Conceived in such a manner, the belief would stipulate the general utility of 
conciliatory and punitive measures, whereas the image would yield assumptions as to 
the adversary’s responsiveness to reward and punishment.  
Thus the image could be more closely related to the diplomatic strategy than 
the key strategic belief. For that reason the tentative causal model suggests that the 
image is a more immediate factor than the key strategic belief. 
However, the preliminary character of the model precludes any authoritative 
assessment as to the relative impact of the two independent variables. Perhaps the 
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following case study may illuminate the relations between the cognitive constructs 
and the diplomatic strategy. 
 In the interest of parsimony I assume that the two independent variables are 
unrelated to each other. As a result, I have regrettably discounted several avenues of 
interpretation that would be interesting to explore. For instance, the two concepts 
may be related; for example, is it conceivable that a policymaker who holds a 
bandwagoning perspective is inclined to view all adversaries as in effect 
revolutionary powers? Conversely, if a policymaker holds that balancing is the 
dominant tendency among states, is it more likely that he will assume that all 
opponents simply react to external dynamics and actually are status quo oriented?  
Moreover, it is by means no a given that the policymakers actually think in the 
categories selected here; one cannot say with certainty that these concepts appear in 
the cognitive process. Even if they do, one cannot ascertain that they exist as clear-cut 
categories between which there are no grey areas.  
Such questions should admittedly be explored in a satisfactory manner. 
However, the scope of this thesis does not allow that. 
Conceiving both the belief and the image as the products of two separate 
cognitive processes that occur in isolation and at different points in time is arguably 
too simple; the complexity of the cognitive process should not be discounted. 
However, the choice to do so is defendable for at least three reasons.  
First, as the belief involves assessments of how international politics works and 
subsequently how foreign policy should be conducted, it is more general in character 
than the image. Whereas the image corresponds to the perceived nature of a given 
state, the belief involves assumptions about states generally. Thus, the assumption is 
warranted by a common sense supposition.  
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Second, although “everything is connected to everything else” analytically one 
must keep variables distinct. Thus, the segment of reality under study must be 
partitioned into concepts that are intelligible and clearly defined.  
Third, this paper is strengthened by a presentation that is easy to follow and 
theoretical constructs analyzed in isolation will help reduce confusion. Therefore, I 
presuppose that the two independent variables are unrelated and that the cognitive 
process involving the key strategic belief precedes the process in which the image is 
formed.  
3.3.1 Two Levels of Communication 
In diplomacy, what is done is often as important as what is said. Observers should 
recognize that communication between the parties take place on two levels: words 
and actions. Important non-verbal signaling can happen via military moves or 
political-diplomatic activities (George 1991: 9). 
 The relation between words and actions is often complicated and vague. 
George (ibid) writes that: “Actions may reinforce strong words, or they may 
compensate for weak words when it is not possible or prudent to utter strong words”. 
Moreover, deeds committed or not “can reinforce verbal threats and make them more 
credible or can dilute and weaken the impact of even strong verbal threats” (ibid). 
 Conventional wisdom has it that words are cheap; actions speak louder. In 
negotiations between states that may not always be the case; even behavior intended 
to convey an unambiguous message may be misread by the other party: “However 
strong the actions, they may be perceived by the adversary as equivocal or as bluffs” 
(ibid: 10).  
 Words may help clarify meaning of actions that the adversary may 
misinterpret. Correspondingly, actions may make words clearer or more intelligible. 
The relationship between actions and words, one may conclude, is not a given and its 
complexity obviously demands more than a few passages to develop a nuanced 
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understanding of the subject matter. However, the point of inquiry is the diplomatic 
strategy’s mixture of reward and punishment; the manner in which these intentions 
are communicated is of secondary importance.  
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4. Method  
The aim of this thesis is twofold. The model presented represents an amalgam of two 
traditions of the cognitive approach. By redefining the George’s master belief and 
transferring it to the more confined realm of foreign policy, and more specifically, 
diplomatic strategy, and combining it with the policymakers’ image of the relevant 
adversary, I hope to develop a model that is simultaneously parsimonious but also 
captures some of the complexity the decision maker faces in conflict situations.  Thus 
the primary task concerns the development of the theoretical model. Secondarily, I 
attempt to apply the model to the selected case by deducing anticipated effects and 
relating those to the case. As such, my effort is essentially a theory-building exercise 
which includes a test of predictions using a congruence procedure. Given that the 
focus of this enterprise is the development of the model I have given less thought to 
the methodological concerns related to the secondary goal.  
 The thesis features a case study approach, which, according to George and 
Bennett (2005: 5) implies “detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to 
develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events”. I 
would also like to incorporate Gerring’s (2004: 341) definition of a case study as “an 
in-depth study of a single unit (a relatively bounded phenomenon) where the scholar's 
aim is to elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomenon”.  
 I will explore the case looking for within-case correlation between the key 
strategic belief and the image on the one hand, and the diplomatic strategy, on the 
other. Thus I try to establish the dependent variable’s causes. Given the preliminary 
character of the analysis, I will not attempt to define causal relations in a strict sense; 
however, I do briefly discuss my findings and their relation to the model. Should the 
predictions accord with the outcome of the case, it would at the very least be an 
encouragement and an indication that the model may have a purpose. 
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 In contrast to the method of controlled comparison, which demands that the 
researcher finds two cases that are similar in every respect but one, the congruence 
method offers an alternative approach. The latter method does not, however, “achieve 
the functional equivalent of an experiment” (George and Bennett 2005: 181). Rather, 
its strength lies with the causal interpretation which the researcher may elicit through 
its use (ibid).  
 In essence, the congruence method stipulates that the researcher starts out with 
a theoretical proposition from which he tries to formulate more or less well-defined 
predictions. Should those correspond to the outcome of the case, the analyst may at 
least “entertain the possibility” that there exists a causal relation between the 
variables under study (ibid).  
 A strict criterion for such tests is “congruity” which presupposes that the study 
variables “vary in the expected directions, to the expected magnitude, [and] along the 
expected dimensions” (George and Bennett 2005: 183). Before the researcher 
addresses the question whether the independent and dependent variables are 
congruent, one must evaluate whether there is unexplained variance in the dependent 
variable that cannot be accounted for (ibid).   
 The congruence method has, as every other method, advantages and 
limitations. I will describe its relatively beneficial qualities before I turn to its central 
disadvantage. 
 Firstly, the method offers a great deal of flexibility and adaptability. The 
theory put to the congruence test need not be well-established. On the contrary, it 
may be explored for the first time. Perhaps one could argue that less established 
theories should not need to undergo as rigorous tests as highly regarded ones. 
Secondly, in many instances theories are ill defined; they neither have clarity nor 
internal consistency. As a consequence, they cannot be evaluated critically on the 
basis of a congruence test. However, the congruence method may help refine and 
develop the theories by making them testable. Thirdly, the method does not require 
 62 
much data; the researcher does not have to trace the causal process (although the 
congruence method may be combined with process tracing, as a form of controlled 
comparison) (ibid: 182: 183).  
 Although the method does have a few strengths, they may very well be 
outweighed by its weaknesses. The chief problem concerns the logic of inference: 
Should the outcome be consistent with the predictions postulated by the researcher, it 
may not necessarily mean support for a causal interpretation. A causal relationship 
may not exist although the test establishes congruence; the researcher should be 
particularly attentive to spuriousness (ibid: 184-185).  
 It is apparent that the congruence method has an important weakness that 
makes it difficult to draw causal inferences from testing theories this way. However, 
as the object of this thesis is mainly to present a preliminary theoretical model, and 
not to test or refine an already recognized theory, one could perhaps relax the 
methodological requirements that the researcher must set for himself.  
 If the aim, on the other hand, was to raise the status of a given theory by 
attempting to elevate the understanding of its causal relationships from ambiguity to 
near certainty, then perhaps the researcher should impose stricter criteria on himself. 
A theoretical model in its infancy, i.e. a period in which the researcher is not able to 
make clear, definite predictions, cannot be subjected to such rigorous tests which 
theories of higher rank could be expected to pass.  
Relying on a single case to test a model is arguably an insufficient foundation 
for demanding general explanatory power, should the case accord with my argument. 
However, congruity between the predictions and observations should strengthen my 
intention to develop the model further and perhaps test it against a broader set of 
cases.  
 Van Evera (1997: 78) stipulates two basic criteria for case selection. First, 
researchers should choose those cases that best serve the purpose of their defined 
goal. Second, relevant for theory testing, the investigator should make a choice on the 
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basis of strength and simplicity; the case selection should let the researcher perform 
strong tests with little effort.  
My purpose is to develop a model for the diplomatic strategy in conflict, and 
the choice to analyze the US diplomatic strategy toward Iran in the nuclear dispute as 
a test case is well-founded for several reasons. The case fits the conditions of the 
model, pitting a stronger against a weaker power measured through their power 
resources. In addition, the amount of data available openly through the internet 
facilitates the enterprise. Moreover, the conflict is ongoing and relevant in a historic 
perspective and thus of both political and academic interest. 
  Van Evara (ibid: 80) defines a strong test as one “whose outcome is unlikely to 
result from any other factor other than the operation or failure of the theory” and that 
evaluates “certain and unique” predictions. Given the exploratory character of the 
thesis, one cannot say with any certainty that the predictions, if they were to 
correspond with the observations, result from the postulated relationship between the 
variables under study. The predictions deduced are not particularly certain, thus 
weakening the test. However, to my knowledge there exists no well-established 
theory that connects cognitions to the formulation of diplomatic strategy in conflict, 
thus satisfying the criterion of uniqueness. The case is thus useful for my purpose of 
building theory; however, the number of unknowns involved in the enterprise renders 
strong tests unavailable.  
 The unit of analysis in the case study is the Bush administrations. It follows 
that one should have understanding of the boundaries of that unit, i.e. which members 
of the administration are central enough to be included and which members are 
peripheral enough to be excluded. Unfortunately, I have made no clear distinction in 
that respect; throughout the case study I have assumed that those individuals that 
have dealt with the nuclear dispute are sufficiently important to be considered a part 
of the group that develops the diplomatic strategy toward Iran.   
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The analysis presupposes that the relevant decision making group may be 
considered a “black box” in which the belief and the image may come to prevail. 
Although factions within the administrations may hold different views as to the 
manner foreign policy should be conducted and to the most accurate description of 
other states, I choose to perceive the foreign policy making group as a coherent 
whole. Inside the box, I acknowledge, that competition between factions who hold 
diverging beliefs and images occurs. Thus rather than analyzing the foreign policy 
making unit per se, I attempt to take apart words and actions emanating from the 
administration and primarily interpret those as indicative of the beliefs and images 
that prevail within the decision making group at the given time.  
4.1 Conceptual Validity and Reliability 
Ole R. Holsti (1969: 142) defines validity as “the extent to which an instrument is 
measuring what it is intended to measure”. Validity thus concerns the relationship 
between the empirical indicators and the theoretical constructs. As both the belief and 
the image are difficult to measure directly, I opted for a different approach, 
attempting to gauge the cognitive constructs through proxies. Thus I present no 
general suggestion as to how the researcher may measure the belief and the image as 
defined here.  
In the case study, however, I first try to assess the relative standing of the key 
strategic beliefs through the status of the Bush doctrine, which, I argue, is permeated 
with the belief that we live in a world where the bandwagon dynamics dominates. 
Second, I attempt to pronounce the prevalent image of Iran through the policymakers’ 
perception of Iran’s rationale for its nuclear program as conveyed through speeches, 
statements, interviews, and press briefings and so forth.  
 The indirect measurement of the concepts may concurrently strengthen and 
weaken validity. The proxy variables need not correspond well with the concepts, 
thus possibly heightening validity concerns. However, if they do correspond, they 
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may represent an alternative to direct measurement which in turn may increase 
validity.  
 As for the key strategic belief, I fail to see an alternative approach to the one 
chosen here. Estimating the standing of the beliefs directly would involve labor-
extensive reading of texts, which ultimately would not guarantee a more valid result. 
Rarely do statesmen reveal how they think in strategic terms. Such information may 
of course be available after the policymakers retire; however, this case encompasses 
events over the last six years. Thus estimating whether the administrations hold that 
balancing or bandwagoning dominates through the status of the Bush doctrine, may 
thus strengthen validity, given that the doctrine may be considered the key 
intellectual product of the first Bush administration. The decision to measure the 
standing of the doctrine throughout the period under study thus seems well-founded.  
 The image is operationalized through the prevalent perception of Iran’s 
rationale for its nuclear program. Estimating the image directly through officials’ 
statements in the media, hoping thereby to form an opinion of the image, will weaken 
validity as the measurement will most likely become a biased product of the 
researcher’s impressions. The image, conceived as intentions and power, may be 
gauged more accurately through the policymakers’ perception of the opposition’s 
investment in its power resources. At the moment the enrichment program lies at the 
heart of the American-Iranian discord, and as such it may be fruitful to attempt to 
estimate the policymakers’ image of Iran through their perception of Iran’s rationale 
for maintaining its enrichment activities.   
 Reliability, on the other hand, concerns objectivity and how the investigation 
is conducted. For the thesis to satisfy that requirement, its measurements and 
procedures must be reliable, i.e. “repeated measures with same instrument on a given 
sample of data should yield similar results” (ibid: 135). To Ole R. Holsti (ibid) 
reliability is a function of the researcher’s skill as well the ambiguity of the data. In 
order to mitigate reliability concerns, the case study should have rested on a content 
analysis which included an unambiguous coding system (ibid). Given that I have 
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prioritized the theoretical part of the thesis, I am forced to present an analysis that by 
most standards does not have an acceptable level of reliability.  
4.2 Sources 
The analysis rests primarily on primary sources in the form of speeches and 
statements. In addition I employ secondary sources such as insiders’ accounts about 
the workings of the White House. Sources should not be taken at face value; the 
researcher must appreciate the context in order to understand the “true” content of the 
source material (George and Bennett 2005: 107). The paper relies heavily on the 
spoken and written words of American officials either in the form of speeches, press 
briefings, and interviews. Chollet and Goldgeier (2002: 169) advance a strong 
argument in favor of attaching weight to speeches and statements. They hold that 
speech-making is “a critical part” of foreign policy process because in many cases it 
is during “speech-making … decisions get made”. Speeches are thus significant not 
only as messages to external audiences or as data from which to derive beliefs and 
images, but as the endpoint of the decision making process, thus preparing the ground 
for the implementation, by communicating to the bureaucracy and to factions within 
the executive that the relevant issue is settled (ibid).  
 This view is confirmed by former secretary of state, Warren Christopher 
(1998: 9): 
Policy debates [are] the lifeblood of government…. [but] in any given week as secretary, I 
received dozens of memoranda advocating various particular policy directions. However 
persuasive their contents, they did not constitute U.S. policy unless they were incorporated 
into a speech, public statement or formal government document. The challenge of 
articulating a position publicly compels leaders to make policy choices  
In addition, there is another argument for attributing importance to words relevant for 
the diplomatic strategy; to Christopher (ibid), speeches were “valuable tools of day-
to-day diplomacy [and] statements made on the public record were often more 
effective than private ones”. Thus making a public demand against another state in a 
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speech does reflect a policy decision to influence the other’s behavior (Chollet and 
Goldgeier 2002: 170).  
 The first part of the analysis concerns the key strategic belief. Here I rely on 
the primary sources for the enunciation of the doctrine and secondary sources such as 
Jervis (2003), Gordon (2006), and Woodward (2006) for the interpretation, who all 
are well-respected.  
 Then I turn to the image of Iran held by the administrations. In order to 
measure the image I gauge the policymakers’ perception of Iran’s rationale for its 
nuclear program. Depending on the policymakers’ image the program is presumed to 
be serving either civilian or military needs. In the latter case I interpret the perception 
to indicate that a revolutionary image prevails, and conversely, in the former, I 
assume that the policymakers hold an image of Iran as oriented toward the status quo.  
 For this part primary sources are used to arrive at the prevalent image. More 
specifically, I attempt to analyze the policymakers’ formulation in speeches, 
interviews, and statements when describing the Iranian nuclear program with respect 
to the perceived Iranian rationale.  
 The third part of the analysis involves gauging the development of the 
diplomatic strategy throughout the period under study. Here I approach the American 
diplomatic strategy from a communication perspective, trying to interpret American 
words and actions as messages expressive of intent to either punish or reward Iran. 
Words and actions have a complex interrelationship that I cannot explore here; 
however, the assumption is that communication takes place on two levels on which 
words and actions may reinforce or weaken each other. 
The chronological account of the diplomatic strategy builds on newspaper 
articles, most notably from the respected Washington Post and the New York Times, 
and speeches, press releases and so forth. I have searched the archives of both papers, 
which are available through log in, and assessed the official account of the same 
event, which is available through the relevant web sites. For instance, if the Post 
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reports that the US imposes new sanctions on Iran, I would then search the official 
transcripts of statements given by, for example, the president or the secretary of state 
and so on. Secondarily, I would look in the online versions of weekly magazines such 
as The Economist, Time, and Newsweek. Thus the method rests on the assumption 
that these two newspapers would report any change in the American diplomatic 
strategy as defined here. I believe that presumption is justified given the status of 
these institutions and the significance of the nuclear dispute.  
 The journalist Seymour Hersh has written extensively in the New Yorker on 
the American diplomatic strategy and the ideas concerning Iran that supposedly exist 
among key officials. Although his sources must have some relation to the top echelon 
of the administration, his prophecies have failed to materialize. That may suggest that 
Hersh may have been fed misinformation, and even that the media have been used as 
a mouthpiece in which highly orchestrated “information” is leaked to convey 
messages to Iran. Moreover, Hersh’s writings rely substantively on unofficial quotes, 
thus facilitating potential distortion. In any case, I choose to avoid Hersh to avoid 
potential bias. 
  The primary sources used in this thesis are conceived concurrently as data 
points for those cognitive constructs under study and as messages to the adversary.15 
Thus the researcher must assess the context in an ad hoc manner in order to separate 
those words that are expressive of the relevant cognitive constructs from those words 
and actions that are aimed at influencing the adversary. This inherent contradiction in 
the manner sources are employed is an empirical weakness of the thesis, and the 
findings cannot be judged in isolation from that fact.  
  In research on beliefs and images the risk that a tautology emerges is 
prevalent. As the cognitive constructs are believed to guide behavior, the observer 
                                              
15 Every statement has of course multiple audiences. In the case of Iran the state plays a significant role for the American 
public at large, given the historic relationship between the two nations, but Iran is also important for staunch supporters of 
Israel, given the enmity between the two states and the extent of fierce anti-Semitic rhetoric on the part of elements of the 
Iranian regime. 
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cannot infer the content of beliefs and images from behavior. If the researcher does 
arrive at a given image using actions as data, one has not established a causal relation 
between the two variables (Young and Schafer 1998: 81).  In order to alleviate this 
problem I try to triangulate sources and avoid inferring cognitions on the basis of 
behavior.  
4.3 Preconceptions  
When mind analyzes mind the observer should guard against his own preconceptions. 
This thesis deals with perceptions, and as a result I have become more aware of the 
beliefs and images I hold myself, and perhaps more importantly, fully cognizant of 
my shortcomings as an observer. Although uncertainty may increase with knowledge, 
that does not indicate that awareness of one’s limitations is a weakness. In fact this 
process has helped me reassess my images of both Iran and the US, thus allowing me 
to interpret the evidence in a more sober light.  
 It is often said that the moment one begins to believe in a given hypothesis, 
one will deny the importance of pieces of the puzzle that do not conform to one’s 
initial interpretation. Although I would like the predictions to correspond with my 
observations, I would much rather accept that the model may not be a good fit as 
opposed to clinging on to a theoretical construct that has little relevance to reality.  
  As the thesis builds almost exclusively on American sources, the risk is 
present that I will be influenced to embrace the administration’s point of view 
regarding, for instance, the image of Iran as a state. However, I believe this concern is 
to a certain extent mitigated through the fact that the thesis involves gauging beliefs 
and images, thereby possibly making the observer more conscious in that respect.   
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5. Analysis  
This chapter forms the empirical part of the thesis. In the following subchapters I will 
first try to assess the administrations’ key strategic belief, i.e. the belief that we live in 
either a balancing or bandwagoning world, before turning to the task of identifying 
the Iran image and discuss whether the image has changed or remained the same over 
the six years under study. Then I will try to describe the American diplomatic 
strategy toward Iran throughout the period under study. Finally, in the concluding 
subchapter I will attempt to link the cognitive constructs to the diplomatic strategy. 
5.1 The Key Strategic Belief 
In the following section I will attempt to carefully make an inference as to which 
perspective on international politics that prevails within the central foreign policy 
making group of the Bush administrations.  
In the first part I will try to define the Bush doctrine and discuss to what extent 
it is influenced by the beliefs under study. The second task involves gauging the Bush 
doctrine’s standing today. The assumption is, of course, that the Bush doctrine is 
formed according to principles central to either the balancing or the bandwagoning 
perspective.  
Studying perceptions is never simple. The decision to employ the Bush 
doctrine as the decisive test in the search for indices that either the bandwagon or the 
balancing hypothesis dominates thinking in the White House, may perhaps be 
criticized for being too superficial. However, as the following discussion shows, the 
Bush doctrine, conceived as a set of strategic principles, assumes a given image of the 
workings of international politics; the founding principles of the doctrine impinge on 
core assumptions of both beliefs. 
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 The answer to the question which perspective pervades the Bush doctrine is 
considered a proxy test for the more comprehensive question of what key strategic 
belief has the upper hand within the administration. It follows that the matter of 
investigation should focus on those constituent parts of the doctrine that reflect either 
the balancing or the bandwagoning hypothesis.  
 A doctrine in this context refers commonly to a set of guidelines or principles 
for the formulation of foreign policy. Some observers do no agree that the Bush 
doctrine represents a shift in the American approach to the world, arguing that it only 
served as a justification for the Iraq invasion.  
 Others (e.g. Melby (2004), Gaddis (2005)) perceive a revolution in American 
foreign policy thinking. Jervis (2003: 365) concurs and holds that “the doctrine is 
real” and “quite articulate, and American policy since the end of the military 
campaign [against Iraq] has been consistent with it”.  
 However, if the Bush doctrine is nothing more than an ad hoc rationalization 
for the war on Iraq, it would be a strong counterargument against attaching so much 
importance to it. The invasion was clearly a manifestation of the principles laid out in 
the doctrine; the doctrine is, however, well-founded and far-reaching. In Gaddis 
(2002: 54) view, there is a “coherence in the Bush strategy that the Clinton security 
team … never achieved”. Moreover, as Jervis (2003: 365) notes there is a strong 
tendency among policymakers to behave in accordance with the explanation they 
have given for their actions at later junctures. In that case a doctrine intended to serve 
as a rationalization may nevertheless guide behavior in the future.  
5.1.1 The Bush Doctrine 
President Bush (2002a) unveiled his doctrine in his speech to the 2002 graduating 
class of West Point. The speech was structured around three key points:  
We will defend the peace against threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve 
the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the 
peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent (Bush 2002a) 
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The first sentence constitutes a summary of the perceived relationship between 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and so called rogue states. The second 
point concerns the role of American power in the world and its relationship to 
other states. As this thesis primarily deals with a key strategic belief and the 
image of an adversary, Bush’s third point, the question of spreading American 
values to other countries, is considered to be of lesser importance although the 
impulse to encourage others to adopt an American inspired system of 
governance cannot be understated in a wider perspective.  
In the post 9/11 context the confluence of Islamic radicalism and the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons in American strategic thinking is evident. The 
worst-case scenario assumes a “non-deterrable” fanatic equipped with a “nuclear 
suitcase”. According to Litwak (2008: 93), the attacks produced “a new calculus of 
threat” that centered on non-state terrorist groups and rouge states. The risk that an 
irresponsible state such as those belonging to the “Axis of Evil” would either transfer 
technology and weapons to groups whose goal is to hurt American interests, or 
employ unconventional means themselves, was stressed by Bush (2002a) at West 
Point:  
The gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and 
technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along 
with ballistic missile technology – when that occurs, even weak states and small groups 
could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this 
very intention, and have been caught seeking those terrible weapons. They want the 
capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends – and we will oppose 
them with all our power 
Given that enemies of the US in this new age cannot be expected to be successfully 
checked by traditional ways of deterrence and containment, the US should assume the 
initiative:  
We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot put our 
faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties, and then 
systemically break them. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited 
too long… We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the 
worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is 
the path of action. And this nation will act (ibid) 
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The need for a shift toward the offensive in US relations to its enemies was repeated 
in 2002 State of the Union address (Bush 2002b): 
I will not wait on events as dangers gather. I will not stand idle as perils draw closer and 
closer. The USA will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with 
the world’s most destructive weapons  
The means to conduct a more aggressive strategy was also stipulated:  
Our security will require transforming the military … a military that must be ready to 
strike at a moment’s notice in any dark corner of the world. And our security will 
require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for pre-emptive 
action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives (Bush 2002a)  
According to Jack Snyder (2003: 29) America at that time embodied “a paradox of 
omnipotence and vulnerability”. The combination of heavy US military spending and 
a strong fear of terrorist attack has “fostered a psychology of vulnerability that makes 
Americans hyper-alert to foreign dangers and predisposed to use military power in 
what may be self-defeating attempts to escape their fears” (ibid). Snyder (ibid) argues 
that the adoption of the Bush doctrine must be understood in this light.  
 Now turning to the task of dismantling the Bush doctrine in light of the beliefs 
under study, I will assume Jervis’ (2003) analysis as my point of departure. In his 
view (ibid: 365), the doctrine has four key components, 
(1) a strong belief in the importance of a state’s domestic regime in determining its 
foreign policy and the related judgment that this is an opportune time to transform 
international politics; (2) the perception of great threats that can be defeated only by 
new and vigorous policies, most notably preventive war; (3) a willingness to act 
unilaterally when necessary; (4) and, as both a cause and a summary of these beliefs, an 
overriding sense that peace and stability require the United States to assert its primacy in 
world politics 
Instead of commenting on each component of the doctrine as defined by Jervis, I will 
analyze two concepts that are central to all four parts and thus fundamental to the 
Bush doctrine as a whole: hegemony and preventive war. These two are in turn 
strongly connected to each other and to the two perspectives under study. Therefore, I 
will consider each concept’s relation to the balancing and bandwagon hypotheses 
respectively.  
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In the following paragraphs I argue that the Bush doctrine is heavily 
influenced by the bandwagon perspective and only slightly inspired by the balancing 
proposition.  
 Recalling that the balancing perspective portrays the realm of international 
politics as more or less isolated balance-of-power systems in which the state may 
approach each foreign policy problem in isolation. Balancing implies that the 
policymaker must expect other states to resist superior power and should emphasize 
the importance of not being perceived as a threat. Given that the world is not 
considered highly interconnected, there is a greater scope for pragmatism that 
facilitates flexibility and enables an elaborate use of both sticks and carrots.  
 The bandwagon perspective, on the other hand, perceives the relations 
between the system’s parts to be tight, and as a consequence, gains and losses 
multiply and gather momentum. This notion is in its essence a domino belief and may 
hinder a clear distinction between reputational and intrinsic interest as the state 
should always strive to maintain the guise of power and resolve. Subsequently, the 
bandwagoning position allows for less flexibility and could as a result perhaps 
produce more dogmatic policies. For fear of communicating weakness and gaining a 
reputation of rewarding negative conduct, those that hold the bandwagon perspective 
should prioritize punitive measures over conciliatory ones.  
 The central question for this chapter involves a judgment as to whether the 
Bush doctrine is formulated on the basis of bandwagoning or balancing dynamics. At 
the time of release of the 2002 NSS (Bush 2002c), the document that outlines the 
relevant set of principles, the question of Iraq heavily occupied American strategic 
thinking. The strategy document sketches both the motivation behind, and the 
intended effects, of a regime change in Iraq. Thus a discussion of this kind must take 
into consideration the cognitions that brought about the invasion.  
 In many respects an act of preventive war presupposes hegemony; elevating 
wars of choice to the body of principles that guide a state’s foreign policy does 
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indeed assume great disparity in power resources. Before examining to what extent 
the notion of preventive war is influenced by those perspectives of international 
politics under study, I will first analyze the concept of hegemony and the 
administration’s perception thereof.  
5.1.1.1 Hegemony 
In Jervis’ (2003: 376) view, American hegemony is the element of the doctrine that 
ties the three other components together. The term itself is controversial and is at 
times employed interchangeably with related concepts such as empire and primacy. 
The former is often utilized in polemic texts and holds adverse connotations. The 
latter is narrower and commonly refers to the most powerful state in the state system, 
primus inter pares. Thus perhaps hegemony is preferable in this context as many 
would agree that US has a somewhat different status than being merely the first 
among equals, and conversely there is yet to emerge a consensus that the US in fact is 
an empire.  
 In any case, the Bush doctrine stipulates that there should be no confusion as 
to which state is the dominant power in the realm of international politics. President 
Bush in his West Point speech (2002a) made it perfectly clear that the US aimed to 
maintain this position of strength:  
America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge – thereby making 
the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and 
other pursuits of peace  
The 2002 NSS (Bush 2002c) document is perhaps more tactful and states that “our 
forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a 
military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States”. 
Although the formulation is slightly more diplomatic, the gist of the argument is 
essentially the same.  
 To prevent near-peer states such as China or rising powers such as Russia from 
challenging the US, America intends to preserve an advantage in military capability 
so great that any efforts to bridge that gap will inevitably result in harm to those states 
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that try. Thus, by communicating that competition in the military domain is futile, the 
administration hopes to channel rivalry between states into non-military contests.  
 The notion that a vastly superior power by way of armaments will remove the 
incentive to compete militarily cannot be informed by the basic position of the 
balancing hypothesis. In a world where power pushes away rather than attracts, a 
strategy aimed at negating Great Power competition by sprinting ahead cannot be 
considered prudent. The American determination to deter or dissuade others from 
attempting to compete demonstrates an uncompromised insensitivity to the security 
dilemma. Although the US may be convinced of its own benign intentions, the 
possibility that other states are not reassured, should perhaps be factored in; in the 
balancing proposition increments in military power create an incentive for other 
states to arm as well and would thus compel states to act counter to the American 
intention of abolishing military competition.  
Rather, it seems apt to presume that the idea that superiority in the military 
sphere induces other states to lay down their weapons is heavily influenced by the 
belief in bandwagon dynamics. Instead of assuming that states will engage in 
balancing as a response to the American military advantage, the statements quoted 
above seem to encapsulate the position that American power will attract others onto 
its bandwagon and make them accept American hegemony.  
 Thus the Bush doctrine may be interpreted as a strong assertion of American 
hegemony. The superiority in military terms provides the US with the unique ability 
to act unilaterally, should it choose to do so. The concept of preventive war does in 
many respects presuppose a capacity to undertake military action single-handedly. 
Below I will elaborate on the relation between hegemony and preventive war.  
5.1.1.2 Preventive War 
With the 2002 speech at West Point and the release of the 2002 NSS, the first Bush 
administration elevated preventive war against “rogue states” and terrorist groups to 
official doctrine. Although it was presented as doctrine of ‘pre-emption’, it does in 
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fact more closely resemble the related concept of preventive war. As a consequence, 
the doctrine blurs the normative and legal distinction between the two.  
 At the time the press characterized it as a revolutionary change in American 
foreign policy that would supplant the outdated concepts of the cold war, 
containment and deterrence. Confusion concerning the role and importance of the 
concept of pre-emption is partly due to the fact that the administration was 
simultaneously presenting a general doctrine and building a specific case for war 
against Iraq (Litwak 2003: 53). To this day, ambiguity exists as to the relevance of 
the doctrine and the conditions under which it may be employed. I will return to this 
question in chapter 5.1.3.  
 America’s position as the dominant power in the state system gives rise to a 
persisting tension in US policy debates: the superior military capability that permits 
the US to attack an adversary’s unconventional weapons in war, also allows for the 
use of military force in situations that fall short of war (ibid). 
According to Kegley and Raymond (2003: 388), the concept of pre-emption 
applies to actions that aim to “quell or mitigate an impending strike by an adversary” 
whereas a preventive military attack “entails the use of force to eliminate any 
possible future strike, even when there is no reason to believe that aggression is 
planned or the capability to launch such an attack is operational”.  
Applied to the current American political context, in which the anti-terrorism 
and the non-proliferation agenda to a certain extent have merged, linked by the 
disputed assumption that there exists an incentive for states to distribute WMDs to 
non-state organizations, Litwak (2003: 54) argues that the terms hold slightly 
different meanings; preventive action pertains to a set of techniques to forestall the 
proliferation of WMDs that in extreme circumstances includes the use of force; pre-
emption refers to the military actions when the actual use of such weapons is 
imminent.  
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 Although other factors are of course relevant, imminence is the key 
determinant of pre-emptive action. The American administration invoked the concept 
of pre-emption in the run-up to the Iraq war, however, most observers would today 
not dispute that the invasion constituted a case of prevention. The US worked hard to 
persuade allies that Iraq in fact possessed weapons of mass destruction and that their 
use could be imminent. The investigation to support the American pre-war 
allegations that were intended to drum up diplomatic support for the war has instead 
confirmed the position of the more skeptical allies.  
 According to Jervis (2003: 370), the preventive war doctrine is “based on 
strength and on the associated desire to ensure the maintenance of American 
dominance”. Its rationale is to deny hostile states the possibility to acquire 
unconventional weapons that may even out American conventional superiority. 
 In military thought the strategic utility of preventive war is disputed; Bismarck 
reportedly compared it to suicide for fear of death. Jack Snyder (2003: 30) has argued 
that preventive war itself weakens a state’s security position because the preventive 
use of force sparks ceaseless limited wars. A great number of historic examples 
indicate that “the preventive pacification of one turbulent frontier … has usually led 
to the creation of another, adjacent to the first”. 
 Even if the concept of preventive war may at times be intellectually or 
strategically defensible, Jervis (2003: 359) argues, it cannot be sustained by the 
American political system over time. Evidence to support military action aimed to 
counter emerging threats is necessarily ambiguous, and as a consequence, arguments 
in favor of the use force will easily be rebutted. Jervis (ibid) employs a counterfactual 
to support his point:  
If Britain and France had gone to war with Germany before 1939, large segments of the 
public would have believed that the war was not necessary. If the war had gone well, 
public opinion might still have questioned its wisdom; had it gone badly, the public 
would have been inclined to sue for peace 
Thus the cost of a war that the public considers unnecessary will in time erode 
domestic support.  
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 As the dominant state in the international system, the US has the power to 
shape the norms that govern the use force between states (Kegley and Raymond 
2003). The concept of preventive war impinges on the status of international norms. 
States do of course not enjoy equal rights, and any document outlining the strategy 
for a Great Power will probably not assume as point of departure the notion that 
entitlements are evenly shared between all states. However, the view that no rules 
bind the dominant power in the system, whereas inferior states must respect and obey 
the norms set by the strongest power, is somewhat perplexing. This paradox is 
perhaps recognizable as the US, on the one hand, attempts to delegitimize terrorism 
as an instrument of warfare, and on the other, assaults the norm of state sovereignty 
by invading Iraq. What does this idiosyncratic perception of international norms tell 
the outside observer?  These contrasting principles inherent in the Bush doctrine 
suggest that the administration believes that other states will respect the superior 
position of the US because of its power.  
 The distinction between preventive action and pre-emption is arguably vague. 
However, the adaptation of the preventive war concept under the rubric of pre-
emption as a strategic doctrine has further blurred the boundaries between the two 
concepts. Under international law, self-defense is considered legitimate. If attack is 
imminent, the presumed target state has the right to strike first. However, if that is not 
the case, i.e. the one party merely suspects that the other side’s intention is to attack, a 
number of problems related to motivation and intentions arise. From the vantage 
point of a statesman, one cannot say with any security what an adversary will and 
will not do in the distant future. Moreover, chances are that the adversary himself has 
not even decided the future course of action. Besides, intentions may change. 
 As Jervis (2003) notes, the problem of gauging intentions is largely resolved in 
the Bush doctrine as it assumes that the regime characteristics determine foreign 
policy; if you know whom your are dealing with, you will also know what they 
intend to do. Given the rogue character of the would-be proliferators, the only 
prudent policy is to stop them before they acquire powerful weapons.  
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   From the perspective of a policymaker that subscribes to the bandwagoning 
belief, the preventive war concept could perhaps be recommended. As a strong 
assertion of American hegemony, it sends a forceful message to other states that the 
US has great resolve and will not yield an inch in its war on terror. As such, the Bush 
doctrine could perhaps be interpreted as a manifestation of the desire to project an 
image of forcefulness and determination. Openly embracing American hegemony as 
a given fact does perhaps indicate that the doctrine of preventive war is strongly 
influenced by the belief in bandwagon dynamics. The doctrine itself and the fact that 
it was publicly pronounced could easily be perceived by other states as arrogance; 
perhaps US policymakers held the belief that they should boast US power in the 
anticipation that it would signal strength and boldness. The effects would echo among 
the enemies of the US and one by one, they would agree to give up their pursuit for 
unconventional weapons and return to the fold.  
 Adopting preventive war as a strategic doctrine could not be considered sound 
foreign policy from the viewpoint of a proponent of the balancing hypothesis. States 
should aim to appear benevolent and threats should be directed toward the enemy in 
question as opposed to embracing a defiantly confrontational posture toward the 
external world as a whole. Being more sensitive to the security dilemma, the balancer 
should emphasize that threats without a well-defined target, should be avoided. 
Moreover, given that policymakers should be wary to upset the rules of the system 
that regulate inter-state conduct, the notion of preventive war itself would, according 
to the balancing hypothesis, be considered unwise.  
 As noted, some observers of American foreign policy downplay the 
importance of the Bush doctrine and hold that it was merely intended to support a 
regime change in Iraq. This paper, however, is written on the assumption that the 
doctrine indeed represented a significant shift in the manner which the US relates to 
its environment. Instead of perceiving the doctrine as intellectual ground work for a 
one-time policy of invasion that, as soon as it has outlived its purpose, will join other 
obsolete strategic ideas on the scrap heap of history, I consider the set of principles 
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enunciated by the first Bush administration as indicative of a more momentous shift 
in American strategic thinking. Although any invocation of the concept of preventive 
war may not be on the horizon for some time, it is possible that the blurred distinction 
between pre-emption and prevention has become, if not permanent, maybe at least 
long-lasting. Thus preventive action remains a policy option but cannot be described 
as a blue print solution which American policymakers discretionary can apply in 
conflict with states perceived as hostile to the US. The circumstances under which the 
doctrine will be invoked are ill defined. As of yet, despite all the tough rhetoric 
towards Iran, no serious steps have been undertaken on part of the US to provoke a 
military confrontation in which escalation dynamics would ensure initial domestic 
support for military action against the theocratic state. The conditions under which 
the doctrine will be applied are vague.  
 Jervis (2005) argues that US has not embarked on a new course from which it 
cannot deviate; rather, the Bush doctrine cannot be sustained. However, should the 
Bush administration be forced to adopt a different posture toward its environment, it 
does not mean that the future foreign policies of the US will revert to those of the 
Clinton era. Even if the next administration attempts to commit the US more strongly 
to multilateral institutions, Jervis (ibid) predicts, the allies will not have forgotten the 
role of anarchy, which was highlighted by the first Bush administration, in binding 
the behavior of states; a slide back to unilateralism would always be feared.  
 Perhaps one may draw further insight into the beliefs that prevailed in the 
Bush administration from the one case where the doctrine was put to use. The 
following subchapter examines the rationale behind the 2003 Iraq war and attempts to 
elucidate its intended effects. 
5.1.2 The Implementation of the Bush Doctrine 
With reference to the concept of pre-emption, American forces invaded Iraq in the 
spring of 2003. What did the administration hope to achieve by changing the Iraqi 
regime? What effects on friends and foes were desired?  
 82 
According to Gordon (2003), at the time there existed a comprehensive vision 
for the Middle East within the administration; the toppling of Saddam’s regime was 
perceived as an integral component of a broader effort to reshape the region. 
America’s vast power resources should be used to promote democratization as the 
status quo in the region had become untenable for the US security situation. In the 
9/11 attacks the majority of the hijackers came from Saudi Arabia and Egypt, both 
states ruled by repressive regimes propped up by American power. In this new 
American thinking, according to Gordon (ibid: 156) the combination of oppression 
and American support led to “alienation, resentment and hatred of the West” which in 
turn increased the risk of more terrorist attacks. Among central policymakers this 
democracy deficit argument as the “root cause” of terrorism gained ground (ibid). 
 According to Bob Woodward in State of Denial (2006), Paul Wolfowitz, then 
deputy secretary of defense, helped organize a group whose objective was to produce 
the strategy to fight radical Islam. The outfit was named Bletchley II after the group 
of British intelligence experts that formed during the Second World War to break the 
ULTRA German communications code. The president of the conservative think tank 
The American Enterprise Institute, Christopher DeMuth put together a group of 
intellectuals that consisted of among others the Middle East historian Bernard Lewis, 
a Cheney favorite who had written extensively on the issue of tensions between the 
West and Islam and, and the IR theorist and Newsweek columnist Fareed Zakaria. 
The group perceived the September 11 attacks as a manifestation of a broader conflict 
within Islam and as a different kind of terrorism than the 1970s version exemplified 
by the Red Brigades in Italy. As opposed to dealing with alienated groups disloyal to 
their nation state, the American government now faced a protracted ideological 
struggle, and Saddam’s regime, being weak and vulnerable, represented an 
opportunity to transform the Middle East, the group concluded.  
In a speech made in November 2003 Bush (2003a) defined the status quo in 
the region and explained why the political situation there could not be allowed to 
remain unaltered: 
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As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a 
place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export. And with the spread of 
weapons that can bring catastrophic harm to our country and to our friends, it would be 
reckless to accept the status quo 
A related assumption behind this new vision for the Middle East may have been that 
peace and stability in the region was not attainable before the states in that area had 
become democratic. Perhaps inspired by the liberal peace thesis, in which 
democracies are considered more pacific than other regime types, and the related 
Fukuyama’s end-of-history thesis in which liberal democracy is conceived as the 
historical end point of human governance toward which history inevitably progresses, 
American decision makers may have determined that given America’s superior 
power, this was an opportune time to accelerate history and democratize the region at 
gunpoint.   
Gordon (2003: 159) holds that the key rationale for the Iraq war was the belief 
held by the Bush administration that “the elimination of the Iraqi regime will send a 
decisive message to friends and adversaries alike throughout the Middle East: 
threaten the United States and its friends in the region and you will pay a terrible 
price”. This assumption, according to Gordon (ibid) was linked to the notion that  
[the] development of a freer, more democratic Iraq allied to the United States would show the 
entire Arab world that siding with the United States can bring peace, prosperity and freedom, 
whereas opposing it can bring heavy costs.  
Gordon (ibid) goes on to note that the “Bush team … believes that, particularly in the 
Middle East, signs of strength are respected but weakness is punished”. 
 America’s determination and willingness to resort to force would thus create 
fear in the rulers of the most autocratic region in the world, which in turn would 
induce political change toward democracy. The strategy of compelled 
democratization resonates well with the notion that a strong and forceful posture will 
propel threatened powers to accede to the stronger power’s demands by reforming 
and becoming more democratic. Such a line of reasoning is strongly reminiscent of 
the core assumptions of the bandwagon perspective.  
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The narrative above seems to imply the belief that bandwagon dynamics shapes 
the relations between states. Although one may establish with some degree of 
certainty that the Bush administration at the time of the Iraq invasion was guided by 
central principles in the bandwagon hypothesis, one may not infer that the relative 
standing of this belief has remained constant throughout the period under study. The 
next subchapter approaches the question of the development of the Bush doctrine’s 
standing after its first, and so far only, implementation.  
5.1.3 The Status of the Bush Doctrine 
In July 2006 Time Magazine proclaimed “The End of Cowboy Diplomacy” (Allen 
and Ratnesar 2006) and wrote that “[t]he shift under way in Bush’s foreign policy is 
bigger and more seismic than a change or a modulation of tone” and that “the 
Administration has been forced to rethink the [Bush] doctrine” as its “effectiveness is 
exposed by the very policies it prescribed”. The article cites Condoleeza Rice’s 
ascendancy and her push for pragmatism as evidence that the strategic thinking that 
prevailed during the first Bush presidency was now on the wane. 
 To Norman Podhoretz (2006), the editor-at-large of the Commentary 
Magazine, the reports of the death of the Bush doctrine, as he understands it, are 
‘greatly exaggerated’. To bolster his argument he quotes several presidential 
statements that support his view: “If we go by the President’s speeches … there is not 
the slightest indication that today he is any less committed than he was at the start to 
… the substance of the Bush doctrine”.  As for the policies that seem to contradict the 
guiding principles of the Bush doctrine, Podhoretz (ibid) laments:  
In short, the fact that the President has lately been talking a lot about diplomacy and entering 
into multilateral negotiations has no bearing on the question of whether the Bush doctrine is 
dead, since it never ruled these out in the first place  
These differing accounts arguably rest on competing understandings of what 
constitutes the Bush doctrine. The fact remains, however, that president Bush on 
several occasions during his second period in office has repeated the core 
components of the doctrine as defined here. As a case in point, the central thrust of 
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the Bush doctrine was reiterated in the 2006 National Security Strategy (Bush 2006a: 
28):  
If necessary …, under long-standing principles of self-defense, we do not rule out the 
use of force before attacks occur, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of 
the enemy’s attack. When the consequences of an attack with WMD are potentially so 
devastating, we cannot afford to stand idly by as grave dangers materialize. This is the 
principle and logic of pre-emption 
At the rhetorical level several statements indicate that the position of Bush doctrine 
remains unblemished. However, the combination of three factors indicates that the 
basic tenets of the Bush doctrine have in fact been reversed. First, the second 
administration adopted a new style and tone in its diplomacy; second, the new foreign 
policy team exchanged those person closely associated with the ideological 
component of the Bush doctrine with so called pragmatists; third, foreign policy itself 
shifted from being confident and unilateral to becoming more cautious and 
multilateral.  
 In Bush’s second period former national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, 
was appointed secretary of state January 2005. In her confirmation hearing she 
(quoted in Gordon 2006) stated that “the time for diplomacy is now”. In the 
immediate aftermath she made a conciliatory trip to Europe aiming to reestablish 
good relations between the US and its allies. In her first year as secretary of state Rice 
took 19 trips to 49 states. In contrast to the supposedly multilateralist Colin Powell, 
who went abroad 12 times and visited 37 countries, Rice’s travel schedule may be 
considered as a sign of a greater effort to consult allies and an increased attentiveness 
to their concerns. Moreover, less than a month after Rice’s first trip to Europe the 
president followed suit and met with European leaders. As opposed to his visit to 
Europe in 2001 when he only stopped in Poland, the UK, Spain, and Italy, all states 
that supported the American fig-leaf interpretation of international law prior to the 
Iraq war, this time around he had long meetings with the French President Chiraq and 
the German Chancellor Schröder, leaders that opposed the very same war (Gordon 
2006). 
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 The second inauguration of president Bush also saw other changes in 
personnel. Paul Wolfowitz, the author of the 1992 draft memo that outlined a new 
foreign policy for the US in the post-cold war era, which emphasized negating great 
power competition and the preventive use of force, and by many considered the chief 
architect of the Bush doctrine, Douglas Feith, undersecretary for defense, and  John 
Bolton, under secretary for arms control and international security, and point man for 
the first Bush administration’s diplomatic strategy toward Iran, who all held key posts 
in foreign policy making process, and viewed by many observers as representing 
what came to the be the dominant voice in the articulation of the Bush doctrine, were 
all replaced. The new foreign policy team included well-known pragmatists such as 
Robert Zoellick, deputy secretary of state, Nicholas Burns, undersecretary of state, 
and Christopher Hill, North Korea negotiator (Cannistraro 2007, Gordon 2006, Mann 
2004). 
The new style of American diplomacy was not only reflected in the choice of 
new staff but also accompanied by a change in substance. North Korea may serve as a 
case in point. In 2001, as one of his first actions, Bush broke with what the president 
held to be unreasonable patience with dictators and their weapons programs. The 
Clinton approach identified with 1994 Agreed Framework, according to which the 
US would provide economic aid and offer proliferation-resistant reactors if North 
Korea were to suspend its nuclear program, was now perceived as counterproductive. 
The Bush team derided the agreement and perceived it as an example of 
appeasement. In September 2005, however, the second Bush administration 
implemented a contradictory policy and agreed to deal with the regime by providing 
energy aid, extending security guarantees, and normalizing relations, should the 
counterpart give up its nuclear program. Thus the US 2005 approach to North Korea 
strongly resembles that of 1994. Although the 2005 deal since then has collapsed it is 
nevertheless revealing that it was reached in the first place (Gordon 2006).  
 Although the president’s rhetorical exercises indicate that the Bush doctrine 
does retain its status in the second Bush administration, the altered style and 
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substance of American diplomacy and the fact that the second inauguration saw 
several key figures that helped formulate of the Bush doctrine strategy leave their 
posts, suggest that the position of the Bush doctrine is weakened. Thus it seems fair 
to conclude that the doctrine of preventive war is largely abandoned as a security 
problem panacea, but one cannot conclude that it will not resurface should unforeseen 
events occur.  
 Conceiving the status of the Bush doctrine as a proxy variable for the relative 
standing of the belief in balancing vs. bandwagoning among the central foreign 
policymakers, the downward trajectory of Bush’s set of strategic principles, 
enunciated in 2002 and implemented in 2003, suggests that the belief in the balancing 
perspective has been strengthened to the detriment of the bandwagon perspective. 
5.2 The Bush Administrations’ Image of Iran  
American-Iranian relations have undergone several swift changes throughout history. 
From being the US most dependable ally in the region to becoming decried as part of 
an Axis of Evil, the image prevalent in the minds of American policymakers is most 
likely complex and perhaps even contradictory. Takeyh (2007) argues that ”a 
perception of Iran as a destabilizing force congealed in the U.S. imagination [after the 
1979 revolution] and has endured ever since” 
 This chapter attempts to extract the prevalent image of Iran held by the central 
foreign policy making group within the two Bush administrations. First, I will briefly 
assess whether the perception on a more general level, as conveyed by the president, 
has changed throughout the period under study. Then, I will turn to analyzing the 
evolution of the American perception of the Iranian intent behind its nuclear program. 
The fundamental question concerns whether Iran’s rationale for maintaining its 
nuclear program, in spite of international pressure, is perceived to be economic or 
military-strategic.  
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 In the following subchapter I argue that the two core arguments advanced by 
American policymakers that allegedly indicate Iran’s malign intent do not stand 
scrutiny particularly well. Iran’s has plausible economic need for nuclear energy and 
its unwillingness to develop the nuclear program under the auspices of the IAEA does 
not necessarily imply that Iran’s intention is to develop a nuclear weapons capability.  
 Throughout the period under study both administrations have consistently 
invoked Iranian intent to develop a nuclear weapons capability as the predominant 
rationale behind the nuclear program. At no point has a member of either 
administration referred to Iran’s proclaimed need for diversifying its energy 
production as the driving factor in the regime’s nuclear ambitions. The analysis of the 
US perception of Iran’s intent thus lends credence to the possibility that the image of 
Iran as largely expansionist has been maintained throughout both terms. However, the 
analysis also suggests that the assumption that Iran is determined to develop nuclear 
weapons is weakened as officials have instead begun referring to Iran’s intention to 
develop a capability to produce nuclear weapons. 
 Under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (IAEA 1970) Iran enjoys the right 
to have a civilian nuclear program. However, the dual-use character of the technology 
gives rise to diverging perceptions as to the Iranian intent for its nuclear program. 
Given that the process of uranium enrichment simultaneously produces nuclear fuel 
that can be utilized in the production of electricity and, if highly enriched, be 
employed as fissile material for a nuclear bomb, two broad interpretations are 
available; observers may accept Iran’s argument that the nuclear program is intended 
to serve civilian needs, or refuse the validity of Iran’s statements and instead assume 
that Iran’s efforts indicate that it intends to develop a nuclear weapons capability.  
 Furthermore, a related secondary inference, in the case that the observer 
interprets Iran’s actions as evidence that it seeks a nuclear weapons capability, 
concerns the perceived the character of Iranian motivation: Is Iran’s desire for a 
nuclear weapons capability motivated by legitimate security concerns or illegitimate 
power aspirations?  
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 In the competitive realm of power politics, the possession of a nuclear weapon 
provides states with a deterrent in the presence of an existential threat. Iran is 
bordered by American military power in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and as such, it 
may perceive its position as encircled. Thus the perception that the regime in fact is a 
status quo oriented power that merely seeks the means to its survival, may perhaps be 
in conformity with the assumption that intends to develop a nuclear weapons 
capability.  
However, should Iran acquire a nuclear weapons capability, its initial 
motivation to do so would not matter much, as its actions would inevitably alter the 
current distribution of power. An Iran armed with nuclear weapons, or even 
possessing a nuclear weapons capability, may disrupt the existing status quo between 
Iran and the US. The Middle East today has one nuclear power, Israel. In addition the 
US has a strong military presence in the region. As Iran is hostile to both Israel and 
America, Iranian nuclear weapons will most likely have destabilizing effects on the 
regional distribution of power. 
Thus the analysis assumes that the crux of the image held by American 
policymakers concerns the question whether Iran’s nuclear program is intended to 
serve civilian or military needs. In the latter case I make a distinction between those 
who perceive Iranian efforts as expressive of intent to develop nuclear weapons as 
opposed to those who envisage that Iran seeks a nuclear weapons capability.  
If the group of relevant policymakers hold that the nuclear program is intended 
to serve civilian needs I interpret that as an indication that the status quo image is 
dominant, and conversely, if the decision making group perceives a military 
rationale, I will assume that the imperialist image is prevalent.  
Should policymakers belonging to the latter group concurrently maintain that 
Iran does not necessarily intend to develop nuclear weapons, but does seek a nuclear 
weapons capability, I will consider the image to be slightly less imperialist.  
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 The US attempts to bring the Iranian enrichment program to a halt. The key 
objective for American policymakers, I posit, is to avoid that Iran acquires a nuclear 
weapons capability. A clear understanding of what a nuclear weapons capability 
implies is a necessary precondition for the following discussion. By capability one 
usually understands the requisite level of scientific knowledge combined with enough 
fissile material enriched to weapons grade. In addition capability often implies the 
possession of the appropriate means of delivery. In the case that an actor has acquired 
a nuclear weapons capability, the possession of actual nuclear weapons would be 
available in the short-term should those responsible choose to develop them. 
 The nuclear weapons capability is often considered a threshold, or a point after 
which “the horse is out of the barn”, as the aphorism goes. A caveat, however, may 
be in order; the capacity to produce nuclear weapons and the intent to acquire that 
ability do not mean that the state in question intends to develop nuclear weapons.  
 The distinction between an intention to develop nuclear weapons and an 
intention to develop a nuclear weapons capability is relevant. In the former case the 
ambition to become a nuclear weapons possessing state is to a greater extent fixed 
whereas the latter objective refers to the potential possession of a nuclear weapons. 
As such, the pursuit of the capability may imply a more significant role for external 
actors as the potential proliferator is considered to be more responsive to changes in 
its the international environment. 
5.2.1 The Iranian Nuclear Program and its Standing under the NPT 
The Iranian nuclear program dates back to the early 70s when Iran was ruled by the 
Shah Pahlavi. After initial help from European powers Iran was forced to turn to 
Russia after successive US administrations had tried to thwart Tehran ambitions to 
master nuclear technology. The Reagan administration persuaded European states to 
enforce export controls with respect to dual-use technologies and Germany to cease 
its cooperation with Iran’s program. In the 90s the cooperation between Russia and 
Iran intensified as the former superpower assisted in building two nuclear reactors at 
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Bushehr. The Clinton administrations attempted to dissuade Russia from providing 
further assistance by threatening economic sanctions and promising expanded 
economic ties. An agreement was reached in 1995 in which Russia assured it would 
not help construct additional reactors or give fuel-cycle assistance to Iran. By 2000, 
however, the accord had fallen apart (Takeyh 2006: 136-138).  
 The nuclear issue received less attention as the Clinton administration 
managed to prevent any considerable international cooperation with Iran. However, 
events in August 2002 changed the importance to which Western intelligence 
agencies attached to the Iranian nuclear program. An opposition group uncovered that 
Iran had extensive facilities for uranium enrichment in Natanz and that Iran had 
received outside support from Russia and the Abdul Qadeer Khan network. The 
disclosure that Iran’s nuclear program was far more advanced than expected 
intensified the conflict under study (ibid: 137-139). 
 The American reading of the NPT (IAEA 1970) is at odds with the Iranian 
understanding. Under article IV signatory states have the “inalienable right” to 
“develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
without discrimination”. Article II, however, calls on non-nuclear powers to forego 
the pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. The US maintains that its effort to deny 
Iran from mastering the technology is legitimate as long as Tehran is pursuing a 
nuclear weapons option. Given that Iran has deceived the nuclear agency, it is in 
violation of article II, and has thus forfeited its legitimate access to nuclear 
technology. Tehran insists, however, that the nuclear program only serves civilian 
needs and thus is in conformity with the requirements of the treaty.16  
 In Washington there is growing impatience with the non-proliferation regime 
and the article IV of the NPT in particular, as states may develop the technology 
                                              
16 For the Iranian point of view, I refer to the letter from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
(2008) to the secretariat of the IAEA.     
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necessary for a nuclear weapon under the guise of a civilian program (Allison 2004, 
Joseph 2006).  
 As for Iran’s intentions, some arguments exist in the favor of interpreting 
Iran’s nuclear ambitions as peaceful. Iran’s primary argument is that the process of 
enrichment produces fuel for the generation of electricity. The obvious 
counterargument to this claim involves Iran’s position as a producer of oil and natural 
gas; why does an oil-rich state need nuclear power? When the Shah Pahlavi 
controlled Iran, the US favored the building of the Bushehr reactor. In fact the US 
was supportive of what was perceived at that time as a diversification of energy 
production and an investment in the economy (Hart 2005).  
Although a country is a net producer of hydrocarbons, investment in nuclear 
energy can both be an economically and technologically sound policy. Norway may 
be a case in point since it chose to heavily invest in the search for hydrocarbons at a 
point in time which its demand for energy was largely met by the domestic 
production of hydroelectric power. No analyst questions the wisdom of that policy 
today. In addition, the activities related to the search and the production of oil and 
natural gas may have helped Norway climb the technological ladder which in turn 
may have benefited other sectors of the economy. Finally, as the demand for energy 
on the global market is likely to rise as states such as China and India rapidly 
industrialize, it makes perfect economic sense to boost the production of energy. 
Thus the argument that Iran has no economic need for atomic power is, at least, partly 
negated.  
  With respect to the second possibility there also exist grounds to believe that 
Iran’s nuclear program is intended to meet military needs. Iran has failed to disclose 
all enrichment related activities and attempted to hide parts of the nuclear 
infrastructure. In negotiations with the IAEA Iran has adopted a rather defensive 
posture and been unwilling to fully cooperate. Iran’s failure to be candid toward the 
IAEA indicates that there may be grounds for suspicion; if Iran is merely committed 
to developing its civilian energy program, it might as well do so in full cooperation 
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with IAEA? Tehran’s excuse is that it allegedly feared an attack on its facilities from 
either the US or Israel.  
However, to equate Iran’s behavior with the intent to acquire a nuclear 
weapons capability is an example of the logical fallacy affirming the consequent. The 
logical missteps may be displayed as following: If Iran intends to secretly develop a 
nuclear weapons capability, it would try to hide its activities and engage in stonewall 
tactics (if A, then B). Given that Iran has attempted to hide its activities and engaged 
in stonewall tactics, it intends to secretly develop a nuclear weapons capability (given 
B, then A) (Hart 2005). 
 The crude evaluation of the two core arguments indicates that there is some 
ambiguity concerning Iranian rationale for its nuclear program; it is far from certain 
that Iran is bent on developing nuclear weapons. A sober assessment of the evidence 
suggests that Iran may intend to seek a nuclear weapons capability, although that 
interpretation is by no means given. I hypothesize that the ambiguity that surrounds 
Iranian intent is partly resolved through the policymakers’ image of Iran. For the 
policymaker, I assume, it is in such ambiguous cases that the image of the opposition 
is convenient in the decision making process. The key inference whether Iran’s 
nuclear program is intended to meet civilian or military needs is assumed to be drawn 
with reference to the policymaker’s image of Iran.  
In the following analysis of American statements I will search for words that 
support either interpretation of Iranian intent, however, I will first try to sketch a 
more comprehensive perception of Iran as conveyed in speeches held by the US 
president. 
5.2.2 President Bush’s General Perception of Iran 
The following subchapter surveys the president’s more general perception of Iran as a 
state before I address the key question of perceived intent of the nuclear program. 
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 In president Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address (Bush 2002b) a nearly 
unambiguous image of Iran was painted: “Iran aggressively pursues these weapons 
[WMDs] and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people’s hope 
for freedom”. 
 In the very same speech the much regretted phrase “Axis of Evil” was 
expressed for the first and the last time:  
States like these [Iraq, Iran and North-Korea], and their terrorist allies, constitute an Axis of 
Evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, 
these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, 
giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to 
blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be 
catastrophic (Bush 2002b) 
One year later president Bush (2003b) also devoted a paragraph of his State of the 
Union Address to Iran: 
In Iran, we continue to see a government that represses its people, pursues weapons of mass 
destruction, and supports terror. We also see Iranian citizens risking intimidation and death 
as they speak out for liberty and human rights and democracy. Iranians, like all people, have 
a right to choose their own government and determine their own destiny 
Approaching the end of his first term president Bush (2005a) gave a description of its 
adversary as an illegitimate state that abuses its people: 
Iran remains the world's primary state sponsor of terror -- pursuing nuclear weapons while 
depriving its people of the freedom they seek and deserve 
As for the second Bush administration the image of Iran pronounced consistently 
throughout the first period in office, seems largely to be conserved on the rhetorical 
level. In a speech given to a group of veterans early 2006 Bush (2006b) said that:  
The international community is also speaking with one voice to the radical regime in Tehran. 
Iran is a nation held hostage by a small clerical elite that is isolating and repressing its 
people, and denying them basic liberties and human rights. The Iranian regime sponsors 
terrorists and is actively working to expand its influence in the region. The Iranian regime 
has advocated the destruction of our ally, Israel. And the Iranian regime is defying the world 
with its ambitions for nuclear weapons  
During the same speech president Bush (ibid) made a clear reference to the perceived 
nature of Iran’s nuclear program: “[The] world’s premier state sponsor of terror 
cannot be allowed to possess the world’s most dangerous weapons” 
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The president’s description of Iran from the 2002 State of the Union Address 
was restated by Bush (2006c) four years later at the same occasion, thus suggesting 
that the general image had not changed. Bush (ibid) also said that the “Iranian 
government is defying the world with its nuclear ambitions, and the nations of the 
world must not permit the Iranian regime to gain nuclear weapons”.  
 October the following year Bush (2007a) repeated essentially the same 
message, but in addition compared Iran to Nazi Germany and likened today’s 
situation to Munich of 1938: 
I’ve told people that if you’re interested in avoiding World War III, it seems like you ought 
to be interested in preventing them [Iran] from having the knowledge necessary to make a 
nuclear weapon.17 
During this year’s State of the Union Address, Bush (2008a) also invoked a stark 
image of its adversary:  
We're … standing against the forces of extremism embodied by the regime in Tehran. Iran's 
rulers oppress a good and talented people. And wherever freedom advances in the Middle 
East, it seems the Iranian regime is there to oppose it. Iran is funding and training militia 
groups in Iraq, supporting Hezbollah terrorists in Lebanon, and backing Hamas' efforts to 
undermine peace in the Holy Land. Tehran is also developing ballistic missiles of increasing 
range, and continues to develop its capability to enrich uranium, which could be used to 
create a nuclear weapon 
Thus the president’s rhetoric toward Iran seems to adhere to same principles 
throughout both periods in office. Although hard to distinguish these statements from 
the broader effort to pressure Iran, speeches from both tenures indicate that the 
prevalent image of Iran corresponds to that of an expansionist state that intends to 
upset the status quo. With references to extremism, meddling in Iraq, support for 
Hezbollah and Hamas, and its unwillingness to suspend enrichment, the image on the 
more general level more closely resembles that of a revolutionary power rather than 
that of a status quo oriented one. At first sight there seems to be a high degree of 
                                              
17 In contrast to speeches prior to 2007 the president here seems to draw a new red line as he refers to the knowledge to 
produce nuclear weapons as the central point of concern. I will elaborate on this below.   
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consistency and coherence between the images of Iran held by the first and the 
second Bush administration. 
 According to Middle East scholar Ray Takeyh (2006: 1), undiplomatic 
discourse has characterized American-Iranian relations since the 1979 revolution. At 
the heart of the estrangement lies “a profound and frequently mutual 
misunderstanding of the enemy [and] getting Iran wrong is the single thread that has 
linked American administrations of all political persuasion” (ibid). 
5.2.3 The Administrations’ Perception of the Iranian Rationale for 
its Nuclear Program 
Now moving on to analyzing the more particular question whether the 
administrations perceive Iranian intent behind its nuclear program as benign or 
malevolent, I analyze statements in chronological order to track any change in the 
administrations’ perception of whether the program is intended to serve civilian or 
military needs.  
 After Iran’s undeclared activities were revealed in 2002 the director of the 
IAEA Mohamed Elbaradei made a visit to Natanz the following year. At a later press 
conference the director (quoted in Eeles 2003) described the site as “centrifuge 
uranium-enrichment facility which was still under construction” and noted how 
“comprehensive and sophisticated” it was. In response to Elbaradei’s comments the 
State Department stated that Iran had “[a] nuclear program based on deception and 
bad faith, and an ambitious rush to develop a nuclear fuel cycle, whose true purposes 
can only be to produce fissile material for its nuclear weapons program” (ibid).  
 John R. Bolton (2004), then undersecretary for arms control and international 
security, testified before a congressional subcommittee in June 2004 and presumably 
spoke on behalf of the administration:  
The United States strongly believes that Iran has a clandestine program to produce nuclear 
weapons, and has been warning publicly about Tehran’s weapons ambitions for over a 
decade  
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His view was based on the two arguments discussed above:  
No comparable oil-rich nation has ever engaged, or would be engaged, in this set of activities 
-- or would pursue them for nearly two decades behind a continuing cloud of secrecy and lies 
to IAEA inspectors and the international community -- unless it was dead set on building 
nuclear weapons (ibid) 
In August 2005 the conclusions of the 2005 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 
were leaked to the Washington Post (Linzer 2005). The intelligence community 
judged “with high confidence that Iran currently is determined to develop nuclear 
weapons despite its international obligations and international pressure, but we do not 
assess that is immovable“ and had “moderate confidence in projecting when Iran is 
likely to make a nuclear weapon … it is unlikely before early-to-mid next decade” 
(NIE 2007).   
As such, the view held by the intelligence community assumed that Iran was at 
least ten years from acquiring the bomb. This estimate was in conflict with the 
administration’s rhetoric as officials repeatedly had warned that Iran was five years 
from having the bomb. Perhaps more importantly, the consensus view among US spy 
agencies was that even though Tehran may have decided that it desired nuclear 
weapons, it could be persuaded to follow a different path. Thus the intelligence 
document somewhat undermined the administration’s assumption that Tehran was 
“dead set” on developing nuclear weapons (Linzer 2005).   
November that year Robert G. Joseph (2005), then undersecretary for arms 
control and international security and Bolton’s successor, made a speech at the 
Carnegie International Non-proliferation Conference:  
Let me be clear about the Iranian regime’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. Iran has pursued 
numerous routes to acquire an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle capability to provide it with 
fissile material for weapons. Iran is going down the plutonium route through construction of 
a heavy water research reactor and a heavy water plant. It has conducted experiments to 
separate and purify plutonium. Iran also has pursued the ability to begin enrichment, thereby 
going down the uranium route to a bomb. It is building facilities to convert and enrich 
uranium. All of these efforts involved a dizzying array of cover stories and false statements. 
Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is real -- an issue the Bush Administration takes -- and 
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believes the international community takes -- very seriously. And let us not forget that the 
leader of this regime recently called for the State of Israel to be ‘wiped off the map.’18 
However, April the following year, then undersecretary of state R. Nicholas Burns 
(Burns and Joseph 2006), gave a briefing on the Iran nuclear issue that departed from 
those views expressed to this date in both style and substance; as opposed to referring 
to Iranian determination to acquire nuclear weapons, Burns directed attention to 
Iran’s “very obvious attempt to create a nuclear weapons capability for itself”. At the 
same briefing, Bolton’s successor, Robert Joseph (ibid), portrayed the nuclear 
program as driven forward by malign intent and proclaimed that “Iran is …. pursuing 
a nuclear weapons capability”. Thus administration officials had slightly modified 
their position as to the true purpose of Iran’s nuclear program.  
 That the administration to a certain extent had moderated its view was also 
evident in October 2007 when Bush (Bush 2007b) visited the National Defense 
University where he announced his aim to deploy a missile defense: 
The need for missile defense in Europe is real and I believe it’s urgent. Iran is pursuing the 
technology that could be used to produce nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles of 
increasing range that could deliver them  
Thus the assumption was no longer that Iran was determined to press ahead in its 
pursuit of nuclear weapons.  
The release of the 2007 NIE in December recast the debate about Iran’s intent 
and the discussion as to what means are appropriate for meeting Iran’s nuclear 
aspirations (Litwak 2008). The document judges the status and prospects of Iran’s 
nuclear program. In bold print the authors state that they do not assume that Iran 
intends to acquire nuclear weapons. Its key conclusions include the twin assessments 
that Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program in fall 2003 and that Iran “at a 
minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons” (NIE 2007). As for 
the image of Iran, the document stressed that “Tehran’s decisions are guided by a 
cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, 
                                              
18 My emphasis.  
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economic, and military costs”. Thus the intelligence community dismissed the notion 
that Iran is an irrational state determined to disrupt the regional order. Instead Iran 
should be perceived as responsive to international pressure, the documented stated, 
and suggested that “some combination of threats of intensified international security 
and pressure, along with opportunities for Iran” may “prompt Iran to extend the 
current halt to its nuclear weapons program”.  
The 2007 NIE further weakened the notion of Iran as a revolutionary power: 
Its decisions were made on a cost-benefit approach and the policymakers are thus 
amenable to external pressure. By extension the NIE argues that Iran is vulnerable to 
external events and may forego the development of nuclear weapons should it 
conclude that it is its interest to do so.  
 The document severely undercut the Bush administration’s tough rhetoric. The 
president’s national security adviser, Stephen Hadley (2007), first commented the 
conclusions of the intelligence document. The thrust of his briefing cites the 
intelligence document as supportive of the administration’s views and strategy. In 
response to the question whether “[i]t was troubling that the United States was so 
wrong about what Iran was doing or what its intentions were?”, Hadley (ibid) replied 
that, 
I don’t think we were wrong about what it’s doing or what its intensions were. Our concern 
was that they were pursuing a nuclear weapon. We saw the enrichment … we saw the 
ballistic missiles. And it led people to conclude: We are concerned that they were pursuing a 
nuclear weapons program and might have a covert program to actually weaponize highly-
enriched uranium in order to be [sic] a nuclear weapon. And that’s what the NIE has now 
discovered. 
On the other hand, however, Hadley (ibid) twice insisted that the NIE’s conclusions 
were misguided given that “[having] mastered that ability to enrich uranium, they 
[Iran] will have the capacity to make weapons-grade uranium. That is the long pole of 
the tent”.  
 The effort to interpret the findings of the NIE as a vindication of the 
administration’s stance and at the same time deride its conclusions was not 
particularly successful. The president pursued a slightly less self-defeating strategy.  
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 On December 4 the president (Bush 2007c) gave a press conference in 
response to the conclusions of the 2007 NIE. Bush  argued that the new threat 
assessment to a great extent validated the US approach to curb Iran’s nuclear 
aspirations. To the question whether the president was still convinced that Iran “is 
trying to build a nuclear bomb”, he replied that, 
We know that they're still trying to learn how to enrich uranium. We know that enriching 
uranium is an important step in a country who wants to develop a weapon. We know they 
had a program. We know the program is halted. 
President Bush went on to note that “if Iran were to develop the knowledge that they 
could transfer to a clandestine program it would create a danger for the world”.19 
Thus the NIE should be understood as “warning signal” because “they [Iran] could 
restart it [the nuclear weapons program]” and what “would make a restarted program 
effective and dangerous is the ability to enrich uranium, the knowledge of which 
could be passed on to a hidden program” (ibid).  
 In effect the president proclaimed that Iran could not be allowed to have the 
scientific know-how to enrich uranium, openly articulating for the first time the 
underlying premise for the administrations’ diplomatic strategy. Fearing that this 
knowledge could be transferred to a nuclear weapons program that Iran could be 
pursuing hidden from scrutiny, the scientific know-how to enrich uranium should be 
kept out of Iranian hands. Moreover, despite the fact that the intelligence 
community’s perception of Iranian intent was in disagreement with that espoused 
both by the first and the second Bush administration, the president argued the NIE 
had vindicated the American position because Iran had dismantled its weapons 
program in response to his administration’s actions. The intelligence document thus 
presented the US with an opportunity to “rally the [international] community to 
pressure the Iranian regime to suspend its program” (ibid). 
                                              
19 My emphasis. 
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 At a joint press conference with Israel’s prime minister Olmert during a trip to 
the Middle East in January 2008 president Bush (2008b) had polished his initial 
response to the NIE and bluntly stated that: “Iran was a threat, Iran is a threat, and 
Iran will be a threat”.  
 The president seemed to have accepted that Iran had halted “weaponization” of 
its program, he did not seem persuaded that Tehran’s intensions were benign; 
although evidence suggested that Iran had abandoned the military aspect of the 
program, Bush refused to alter his perception of Iranian intent as to the true purpose 
of the nuclear program: 
A country which once had a secret program can easily restart a secret program. A country 
which can enrich for civilian purposes can easily transfer that knowledge to a military 
program. A country which has made statements that it's made about the security of our 
friend, Israel, is a country that needs to be taken seriously. And the international community 
must understand with clarity the threat that Iran provides to world peace. 
In April 2008 at the NATO summit in Budapest president Bush (2008c) addressed 
the perceived necessity of a missile defense in light of Iran’s nuclear aspirations and 
repeated the very same phrase employed his in October speech quoted above: 
The need for missile defense in Europe is real, and in my opinion, it is urgent. Iran is 
pursuing technology that could be used to produce nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles of 
increasing range that could deliver them.20 
In summary, the assumption that Iran’s program is intended to produce nuclear 
weapons seems to have been weakened throughout the period under study. On the 
more general level, American policymakers have repeatedly brought the issue of 
terrorism into focus and emphasized Iran’s alleged regional ambitions. Iran has 
consistently been denounced as a state that does not respect “the rules of the game” 
and harbors power aspirations that are in conflict with America’s regional role. 
 In contrast to the crude study of the more general perception of Iran as a state, 
the analysis of the more specific image found a moderate change in the perception of 
                                              
20My emphasis.  
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Iran’s rationale for its nuclear program. Although the administration has firmly 
rejected the notion that the nuclear program is civilian in nature, the assumption that 
Iran is persistently seeking nuclear weapons seems to have been replaced by the more 
nuanced proposition that Iran may be seeking a nuclear weapons capability.  
 Thus the analysis suggests that the administrations’ image of Iran corresponds 
more closely to that of an imperialist state than one of a status quo power. 
Throughout the period under study, the image has evolved from being strictly 
revolutionary to becoming slightly less so.21  
5.3 The American Diplomatic Strategy toward Iran 
The dispute under study is not merely a US-Iran feud. Although France, Great 
Britain, and Germany (EU3), China, Russia, and the IAEA, all are important players 
in this conflict, the thesis assumes the American perspective as the point of departure. 
The research question dictates that other states’ concern over the enrichment issue is 
not brought into focus. 
 Chubin (2006: 81) summarizes the role of two of the key actors the in the 
diplomatic efforts to prevent Iran from mastering the full enrichment cycle: “[EU-3] 
has acted as ‘good cop’ to the United States’ ‘bad cop’”.  At the risk of grave 
simplification, the thesis assumes that the US is the dominant actor and the fact that 
the EU3 has overseen the diplomatic overtures to Iran is presumed to be a strategic 
choice for US in which the EU3 acts as a vehicle for the American diplomatic 
                                              
21 Although the 2007 NIE seems to assume an image of Iran as a state oriented more toward the status quo rather than 
explicitly revolutionary, one should not draw the conclusion that the administration is isolated in its view that Iran in 
essence is a dangerous state. The hard-line Lieberman- Kyl act indicates that the image of Iran as a player in the 
international system that does not respect the rules of the game is also found outside the White House. Moreover, 
presidential contenders John McCain and Hillary Clinton have been fierce in their rhetoric toward the regime. Perhaps the 
image held by the current and the former administration is shaped among other things by the formative events of September 
11 which in turn contributed to a merging of the non-proliferation and anti-terrorism agenda. As these memories will fade 
with time, perhaps the 2009 administration will be able to take fresh look at Iran and reach a different conclusion as to what 
the exact nature of the Iranian threat is and its motivation to defy the US. However, that the new administration will come 
to believe that Iran in fact is a status quo oriented state is far from certain. In any case it seems clear that any resolution of 
the conflict in the sense that Iran ceases its enrichment activities either through persuasion or the application of force is not 
likely to happen within the time the current Bush administration has left in office.  
 103
strategy. Thus incentives and disincentives communicated on part of the EU3 are 
assumed to be integral to the American diplomatic strategy.   
 Furthermore, the tensions between the two states are not merely the product of 
a disarmament issue. According to Takeyh (2007), the strategic and political 
differences run deep. As a result a number of issues divide the US and Iran. From the 
Islamic republic’s opposition to the Israeli-Arabian peace process via its support for 
groups hostile to Israel to the character of its political involvement in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, these two states differ on a host of issues. As a consequence of these 
disagreements, the US has imposed a wide array of sanctions on Iran.22  
However, the analysis confines itself solely to the nuclear issue and those 
words and actions aimed at persuading Iran to suspend uranium enrichment. That 
delimitation may be criticized as artificial, as other facets of the broader discord are 
important to Iranian-American relations perceived as a whole,  but one may hope to 
gain greater insight into the broader conflict by singling out the one source of tension 
that stands out as most pertinent for American policymakers to address. The temporal 
boundaries of the analysis are set to 2003, when the dispute concerning Iran’s nuclear 
program intensified, and until May 2008.  
 In the words of the retired American ambassador John W. Limbert (2008), 
“these two erstwhile allies have preferred to communicate through posturing, 
exchanging insults, threatening, sermonizing, and resorting to occasional violence”. 
In this subchapter I attempt to draw an accurate picture of the US diplomatic 
strategy in the nuclear issue and try to assess whether the diplomatic strategy has 
changed throughout the period under study.  
 First, I will present a brief background of US relations toward Iranian under 
president Bush before I attempt to take apart the diplomatic strategy pursued by the 
                                              
22 For the interested reader I refer to Kenneth Katzman’s (2008) congressional report Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy 
Responses.  
 104 
US toward Iran in the nuclear dispute. To measure the he diplomatic strategy, I 
analyze those words and actions that communicate incentives and disincentives.  
 It is perhaps apt to presume that US strategy toward the Middle East operates 
on three separate levels. I assume that the US, first, on the region specific level, aims 
to maintain or improve its power position in the region. Second, on the state specific 
level, it seeks to conduct a coherent policy toward states with the objective to co-opt, 
contain or coerce the state in question. Third, on the issue specific level the US tries 
to persuade individual states to act in compliance with American wishes on particular 
matters. The two lower levels are arguably subordinate to the higher goal of 
sustaining or altering the current distribution of power. Although the researcher may 
find it difficult to analyze US efforts on the different levels in separation, this thesis is 
concerned with those computations that underlie the efforts on the lowest level.  
 The American diplomatic strategy to persuade Iran to suspend enrichment is 
the focus of the case study. However, given that these three levels may relate to each 
other, the thesis must briefly consider the two higher levels. Although the scope does 
not allow for an elaborate analysis, the thesis must at least have some appreciation of 
the broader US approach to the region, as a whole, and to Iran as a player in the 
regional distribution of power.  
 After the September 11 attacks, the US decided to restructure or refashion the 
Middle East. Gone were the concepts of deterrence and balance-of-power that formed 
the corner stones in the first Bush administration’s initial foreign policy outlook. 
According to Rice (2000), 
the American military must be able to meet decisively the emergence of any hostile military 
power in the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Europe -- areas in 
which not only our interests but also those of our key allies are at stake. America's military is 
the only one capable of this deterrence function, and it must not be stretched or diverted into 
areas that weaken these broader responsibilities 
This conservative approached was replaced by the Bush doctrine which emphasized 
American hegemony, preventive war and democratization of the Middle East. The 
2003 Iraq was the first, and so far the last, implementation of the doctrine.  
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 America’s role and its vision for the desired political development in the 
region changed in the wake of September 11 attacks. As opposed to primarily being a 
guarantor of security with a limited military presence in the region, the US decided to 
fundamentally alter the distribution of power and removed both the Taleban regime 
in Afghanistan and the Baathist regime in Iraq from power. In their place the US 
installed pro-American governments. However, the political loyalty of the new rulers 
of Afghanistan and Iraq is being questioned as the successor regimes have proven 
somewhat responsive to Iranian diplomatic advances, thus creating an ambiguous 
image of the regional distribution of power; the new external situation may 
simultaneously represent a threat to and an opportunity to Iran (Takeyh 2006). 
 As the vision for America’s role in the region as a whole shifted toward the 
offensive, the Iran strategy also changed, although America’s muscular confidence 
was not to last. Prior to the devastating terrorist attacks in 2001 the US broadly 
sought to contain Iranian influence in the region and to deter unwanted Iranian 
behavior (ibid). In 2002, however, president Bush branded Iran as a member of the 
Axis of Evil, after Iran had cooperated to remove the Taleban from power in 
Afghanistan. 2003 the US invaded Iraq, and many observers argue that overthrow of 
Saddam Hussein was undertaken as a part of a greater initiative to upset the regional 
distribution of power; evidence suggests (e.g. Dunn 2007) that if the newly 
established Iraqi regime had found it easier to consolidate its rule, Iran may have 
been the next hostile power to fall prey to American military power.  
In the immediate aftermath of the Iraq invasion Iran offered a ‘Grand Bargain’ 
to the US through the Swiss ambassador. The administration did not respond to the 
Iranian invite to engage in a dialogue over mutual strategic concerns, which included 
among other things, Iran’s nuclear program (Leverett and Flynn 2006). As the 
entanglement in Iraq has imposed greater strains on American resources, ambitions to 
topple the rulers in Tehran seem to have lost their initial appeal; America’s strategy 
toward Iran has reverted to that of containment and deterrence (Nasr and Takeyh 
2008).   
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 The execution of the diplomatic strategy is arguably related to the 
developments on the regional and the national levels. Of course, in the case that the 
US had decided to overthrow the Iranian regime, efforts to analyze the American 
diplomatic strategy in the nuclear dispute would be a futile endeavor. Although the 
US in the heyday of the Bush doctrine may have contemplated the regime change 
option, that policy failed to materialize. Today the attractiveness of the concept of 
coerced democratization is no longer as high, and the American approach to the 
region and to Iran seems less vigorous and aggressive. Thus in the absence of any 
definite intentions to overthrow the Iranian regime, there is scope for an analysis of 
the diplomatic strategy in the more isolated nuclear dispute.  
 The analysis argues that the American diplomatic strategy in the nuclear issue 
has evolved from relying solely on coercive measures to becoming increasingly 
accommodative. A shift occurred in 2005 when the US decided to put its weight 
behind the EU3 diplomatic talks with Iran. After that point, the US pursued a two-
faced strategy in which the threat of force remained present, but the promise of 
reward simultaneously gained importance. Although the positive incentives promised 
to Iran are tangible, they do not seem to rectify broader Iranian grievances. The 
diplomatic advances have not addressed Iran’s security concerns or the regime’s 
legitimacy as a member of the international society. As such, the analysis suggests 
that the US has failed to erect an incentive structure that may be conducive to an 
agreement in which Iran suspends enrichment. In addition, I argue that the US has not 
managed to convince Iran that the US does not ultimately desire a change of regime, 
thus making it more difficult to persuade Iran to suspend enrichment.   
5.3.1 The First Bush Administration  
In June 2003 the IAEA found Iran in non-compliance with its obligations under the 
Safeguards Agreement as it had, among other things, failed to declare imports of 
uranium and those facilities where uranium was stored and processed. The IAEA 
report (2003) acknowledges that the amount of uranium is not “large” and that the 
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material would “need further processing before being suitable for use as the fissile 
material component of a nuclear explosive device”, however, the fact that Iran had 
not fully cooperated with the agency constituted a “matter of concern”. 
 On September 12 that year IAEA calls for Iran’s full cooperation with the 
agency’s inspectors and demands the cessation of uranium enrichment by October 31. 
The US declares that this resolution is Iran’s last chance; failure to comply will result 
in referral to the Security Council (Chubin 2006: xvi). On October 21 the EU3 
managed to reach a deal with Iran where it agreed to temporarily suspend enrichment. 
The Economist (2003) questioned the Tehran agreement at the time and asked 
whether Iran actually wanted full transparency with the nuclear watchdog, or merely 
wanted to buy time. The EU3 did, however, also hint at possible nuclear help to Iran 
in exchange for full cooperation and transparency (ibid). 
 A month later the IAEA’s conclusions from a report on Iran’s nuclear program 
were leaked. Despite clear breaches, the agency had found no evidence that Iran was 
seeking nuclear weapons or that Iran had a nuclear weapons program. In response, 
John Bolton held that the findings “were impossible to believe” because a “massive 
and covert Iranian effort to acquire sensitive nuclear capabilities” made sense “only 
as part of a nuclear weapons program”. Moreover, an October Time article (Karon 
2003) claimed that members of the administration had leaked stories of the possibility 
that Israel could attack Iran’s nuclear facilities from the air, thus communicating 
veiled threats of military action. 
 In mid December 2003 Iran signed the Additional Protocol to the NPT, which 
gives the IAEA the right to conduct more intrusive inspections; however, Iran’s 
domestic institutions must consent to the agreement before it may enter into legal 
force. As of today, Iran has failed to ratify the agreement (IAEA 2008b). 
 Late December that year Libya pledged to dismantle its nuclear program. Bush 
(2003c) held a press conference in response where he remarked that: 
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The United States and our allies are applying a broad and active strategy to address the 
challenges of proliferation, through diplomacy and through the decisive action that are 
sometimes needed.  
As for Iran’s nuclear program Bush (ibid) stated that “[the US is] supporting the work 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency to hold the Iranian regime to its treaty 
obligations” but concurrently pointed to the example of Iraq should states choose not 
to follow Libya’s example: 
We obtained an additional United Nations Security Council Resolution requiring Saddam 
Hussein to prove that he had disarmed, and when that resolution was defied, we led a 
coalition to enforce it. All of these actions by the United States and our allies have sent an 
unmistakable message to regimes that seek or possess weapons of mass destruction. Those 
weapons do not bring influence or prestige. They bring isolation and otherwise unwelcome 
consequences (Bush 2003c). 
However, Bush (ibid) did outline the prospect of relaxation of tensions in the 
American-Iranian relationship:  
And another message should be equally clear: leaders who abandon the pursuit of chemical, 
biological and nuclear weapons, and the means to deliver them, will find an open path to 
better relations with the United States… Libya has begun the process of rejoining the 
community of nations 
The administration thus encourages Iran to halt its enrichment program and signals its 
willingness to pursue the diplomatic track. However, by referring to the case of Iraq 
and “decisive action”, the threat of military force is also implied, should diplomacy 
fail. The president refers to possible entry into the “community of nations” in case of 
Iranian compliance; however, the vagueness of such a promise leaves uncertainty as 
to the American willingness to reward Iran for suspending enrichment.  
The president (Bush 2004) commented on Iran’s nuclear program in a speech 
given at the National Defense Univeristy on 11 February 2004 and explained that:  
Iran is unwilling to abandon a uranium enrichment program capable of producing material 
for nuclear weapons. The United States is working … to ensure that Iran meets its 
commitments and does not develop nuclear weapons. 
In addition Bush (ibid) proposed that one “should refuse to sell enrichment and 
reprocessing technologies to any state that does not already possess full-scale, 
functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants”, thus outlining the twin US goals of 
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preventing Iran from mastering the fuel cycle and altering the non-proliferating 
regime to close what the US perceives as a loophole.  
 One may argue that the first Bush administration was largely preoccupied with 
the war on Iraq, and that the nuclear dispute was not prioritized by the administration 
with respect to the attention it received and the urgency with which it was dealt. 
Apart from the EU3’s unconfirmed suggestion that Iran could be admitted some 
technological help, the accommodative option went largely unexplored, although 
Bush communicated that Iran would gain entrance to “the community of nations” 
should it decide to abandon “its pursuit of nuclear weapons”.  
The first Bush administration seemed largely to define its posture toward Iran 
through the term Axis of Evil, which communicated a possible intention to overthrow 
the Iranian regime. The perception that US desired a regime change may have been 
reinforced by the 2003 Iraq invasion. Moreover, the fact that Iran’s 2003 offer was 
rebuffed may have strengthened Tehran’s perception that Iran “was next”. The 
administration did little to counteract the Iranian threat perception.  
In conclusion, one may assert that the diplomatic strategy heavily emphasized 
coercion and downplayed accommodative measures. However, one should also note 
that the diplomatic strategy toward Iran did not fully evolve until Bush’s second term 
when the nuclear issue gained importance and assumed a more central position on the 
US foreign policy agenda.   
5.3.2 The Second Bush Administration 
During president’s Bush second term the diplomatic initiative gained some 
momentum. The following analysis argues that the coercive aspect of the diplomatic 
strategy has remained strong, but negotiations with Iran have also become 
increasingly accommodative.  
 Early 2005, rumors spread that the US was planning a preventive military 
attack on Iran. In February that year the president was confronted at a press 
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conference in Brussels with the allegations and replied that, “this notion that the 
United States is getting ready to attack Iran is simply ridiculous. And having said 
that, all options are on the table”. The last remark was followed by laughter (Bush 
2005b). 
 On March 11 that year the US signaled that it had slightly modified its stance 
on Iran’s nuclear program by joining the EU3 diplomatic initiative and announcing 
that if Iran met American demands, the US would drop its opposition to the Iranian 
membership in the World Trade Organization and “consider, on a case-by-case basis, 
the licensing of spare parts of Iranian civilian aircraft” (Rice quoted in Weisman 
2005), thus offering limited incentives. As for the European diplomatic track, Rice 
(quoted in ibid) said that the US shares “the desire of European governments to 
secure Iran’s adherence to its obligations through peaceful and diplomatic means” 
and that her administration was “prepared to take practical steps to support European 
efforts to this end”. In return, the EU3 accepted the American demand that failure to 
cooperate would result in Iran’s referral to the UNSC, the institution which has the 
authority to impose sanctions (ibid). 
 The willingness to support the European diplomatic approach marked a shift in 
the US diplomatic strategy in the nuclear dispute as the president has on several 
occasions rebuffed European demands to join the European led diplomatic effort 
(ibid). According to Weisman (2005), the administration had been averse to join the 
EU3 for fear of legitimizing the regime in Tehran and rewarding Iran for bad 
behavior.  
Although the administration accepted the European position of offering 
inducements, the vice-president (quoted in BBC 2005) made it clear that the positive 
incentives only constituted one side of the coin: “[If] the Iranians don’t live up their 
obligations and their international commitments to forego a nuclear program, then 
obviously we’ll have take stronger action”. 
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 On March 13 the Sunday Times revealed that Israel had drawn up plans for a 
combined air and ground attack on Iranian targets that had been authorized by the 
then prime minister Ariel Sharon. According to the news paper, the plan had been 
discussed with American administration officials who had “indicated provisionally 
that they would not stand in Israel’s way if all international efforts to halt Iranian 
nuclear projects failed” (Mahnaimi 2005).  
 Iran resumed its nuclear program in August after the negotiations broke down. 
In response, Condoleezza Rice (2005), now secretary of state, encouraged China and 
Russia to stand behind the US threat of sanctions against Iran, thus enabling a 
concerted approach from the UN veto powers that could include economic sanctions. 
According to Rice (ibid), a “unified message” was needed because “it is not 
acceptable for Iran to enter into negotiations … and then summarily walk out of them 
and break the agreement”.  
 Later that month the IAEA (2005) declared that Iran was in “non-compliance” 
with its obligations under the NPT and urged Iran to suspend all activities related to 
uranium enrichment. In addition, the nuclear agency (ibid) warned that if Iran failed 
to comply with this resolution, and given the “absence of confidence that Iran’s 
nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purpose”, Iran could be referred to the 
Security Council. 
 Around that time Russia offered to enrich uranium on Iran’s behalf. The 
nuclear fuel was to be used in the Russian constructed heavy water reactor in Bushehr 
and transported back to Russia once spent. Putin thus presented a way out of the 
diplomatic standoff that reduced the risk of proliferation. The proposal was well 
received by Bush and his administration during the meeting with Putin in South 
Korea on November 18. According to National Security adviser Hadley (2005) the 
administration found it “an interesting idea … [and] a potential avenue out”. As to the 
question if this solution would prove acceptable to the administration, Hadley (ibid) 
replied that it was supported by the EU3, “who are taking the lead in the 
negotiations” and “we think it’s a good avenue to explore”. 
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 On February 4, 2006 the IAEA reported Iran to the Security Council. After 
Iran’s referral, the confrontation between the US and Iran intensified. In response to 
the nuclear watchdog’s vote, Iran announced it would resume enrichment and be less 
cooperative toward the agency’s inspectors (The Daily Telegraph).  
 The vote was made after Iran early January declared it would resume small-
scale enrichment activities, thus complicating the prospective Russian resolution of 
the conflict. Iran’s actions in January were criticized by the US as they had, according 
to Rice (quoted in Bernstein and Weisman 2006), “shattered the basis for 
negotiation”, and thus paving the way for referral to the Security Council and 
possible punitive measures. Robert Joseph (quoted in ibid), under secretary of state 
for arms control and international security, explained, however, that going “to the 
Council provides a menu of options that can be used to try to get Iran to reverse 
course” and does not “signal an end to negotiations”. 
 The dispute heated up as the international pressure on Iran grew stronger. The 
US worked to persuade its European allies, Russia and China to support sanctions, 
and attempted to isolate Iran by hindering Iranian political and economic cooperation 
with other states, and more specifically, by preventing arms sales and the transfer of 
“sensitive” dual-use materials (Burns and Joseph 2006). The administration’s stance 
hardened as Robert Joseph (quoted in Sanger and Sciolino 2006) declared that the US 
was determined to make sure that “not one centrifuge spins” in Iran. Concurrently, 
the Iranian president Ahmadinejad proclaimed that suspending enrichment “is our red 
line, and we will never cross it” (quoted in ibid). 
 On the last day of May that year the US made an offer to Iran to join the EU3 
in the diplomatic talks, should Iran suspend its enrichment activities, thus ending a 
nearly three-decade policy against direct talks with Iran. The proposal represented a 
shift in the US position. Prior to this decision the administration had judged that 
joining the diplomatic overtures would serve to legitimize the regime (Weisman 
2006a). According to the New York Times (Sanger 2006), members of the 
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administration described this change as a test whether Iran actually wanted closer 
relations with the US more than it desired the capability to enrich uranium.  
 As Rice (2006) promulgated the change in the American position, she also 
outlined a choice for Iran – “two very clear paths”; it could either cooperate by 
suspending uranium enrichment and implementing the additional protocol, and reap 
the benefits in the form of “long-term security” and “progressively greater economic 
cooperation,” or if Iran chose not to work together with the IAEA, the US would 
impose “great costs” in the form of “international isolation and progressively stronger 
political and economic sanctions”. As for the military option, Rice (ibid) refused to 
rule out the use of force and said that the president “is not going to take any of his 
options off the table,” however, she went on to assure that the administration was 
“committed to a diplomatic solution”. 
 On June 5, Javier Solana, the EU’s foreign policy director, comes to Tehran 
with a diplomatic package of “incentives and disincentives” agreed on by the veto 
powers and Germany (Cooper 2006a). The offer stipulates that Iran’s civilian nuclear 
program is to be supported through building a light water reactor and that economic 
sanctions toward Iran are to be partly lifted, thus allowing Iran to generate electricity 
through nuclear power, import spare aircraft parts and buy agricultural technology. In 
addition, the US would agree to join direct talks with Iran and withdraw its 
opposition to Iranian WTO membership. The incentives were contingent upon Iran’s 
willingness to suspend enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. Should Iran 
fail to comply, the package also set forth a set of punitive measures to be 
implemented. They included a travel ban against the Iranian leadership and a freeze 
of selected Iranian bank accounts (ibid).  
 As Iran failed to accept the June offer, the Security Council (UN 2006a) on 
July 31 issues resolution 1696 which “demands … that Iran shall suspend all 
enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development” 
by the end of August. In the event that Iran would choose not to cooperate, it would 
“face possible economic, diplomatic sanctions”, however, “further decisions will be 
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required should such additional measures be necessary”. The US thus succeeded in 
persuading the other veto powers to vote in favor of a resolution that condemned 
Iran’s enrichment program and threatened to impose punitive sanctions, although the 
text was rather ambiguous as to the prospect of punitive measures. 
 In response to the “package”, Iran makes a counteroffer approximately three 
weeks later. The first formal reaction of the administration noted the inadequacy of 
the proposal. Although it “fell short” of expectations, a spokesman for the 
administration promised that “we will review it” (Cooper 2006b). In the counteroffer 
Iran did not promise to suspend enrichment, but did propose “serious talks” over the 
nuclear program as a whole (ibid).   
 As Iran failed to address the primary US concern, the administration pressed 
quietly ahead in its pursuit of sanctions. According to Cooper (2006c), the US toned 
down its reaction to Iran’s refusal in order to appear patient, measured, and 
reasonable. A more moderate American response would “keep the temperature 
down”, thus making it easier to maintain unity among the veto powers. On October 6 
R. Nicholas Burns (2006), then under secretary for political affairs, gave a briefing 
announcing that the US had “no alternative but to proceed along the second path”.  
 In an effort to avoid sanctions Javier Solana travelled to Vienna to meet Iran’s 
chief negotiator, Ali Larijani, hoping to clarify ambiguities concerning the refused 
incentives (Dempsey 2006). Meanwhile, the US decided to single-handedly raise the 
pressure on Iran by barring Bank Saderat, one of Iran’s main state owned banks, from 
interacting with the US financial system (Weisman 2006b, New York Times 2006).  
 As the US found it difficult to unite the EU3 and Russia and China over the 
need to introduce sanctions and as Solana’s efforts seemed to be making some 
progress, secretary Rice softened the US position slightly by declaring that the US 
would be willing to halts its efforts to impose sanctions if Iran suspended enrichment 
(Bilefsky 2006).  
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 As Iran refused to meet the American demands and failed to present an 
acceptable counteroffer, the US, in cooperation with the EU3, drafted a Security 
Council resolution text which is given to Russia and China. The draft included a 
prohibition of any technical or financial assistance to Iran’s nuclear program and a 
travel ban on Iranian citizens involved in activities related to the nuclear program. In 
addition, the document suggested that Iranian students should be prevented from 
studying nuclear physics abroad. A spokesperson for the state department conceded 
that the draft resolution would have been somewhat harsher if the US were the sole 
author (Cooper and Shanker 2006).  
At the end of October the US holds a daylong military exercise in the Persian 
Gulf 20 miles outside Iranian waters. The US insists that the training maneuver which 
included, among others states’ naval units, British and French warships, merely 
constituted an effort to develop coordinated procedures for intercepting vessels 
believed to be transporting unconventional weapons, and was not related to the 
ongoing nuclear dispute (Fattah 2006). 
 The draft proposal failed to bring agreement among the veto powers. China 
and Russia, in particular, voiced reluctance to support stiff punitive sanctions (Cooper 
2006d). Six months after the incentives were offered, Rice (quoted in ibid) 
announced that “unity is not an end in itself” and in the absence of agreement among 
the six states the US would put a resolution up to a vote, thus making Russia take a 
stance in public. The continuing discord between the six states blocked a resolution 
from the Security Council. 
Against the background of international debate and disagreement over 
sanctions, the US deployed two aircraft carriers with supporting ships to the Persian 
Gulf on 20 December. According to Shanker (2006), who cites anonymous sources, 
the ships were to be stationed within quick sailing distance off Iran, but this display 
of naval power should not be perceived as a preparation for the use of force, although 
no aircraft carrier had been inside the gulf since July. The anonymous officials did 
concede, however, that the capacity to project power had increased and that the 
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administration hoped to communicate to its adversary that, despite an overextended 
army, the US still had the capacity “to watch Iran” (ibid).  
 Three days later the Security Council through resolution 1737 (UN 2006b) 
imposed sanctions on Iran after months of discussion. Its punishing measures were 
non-military and included trade prohibitions with respect to Iran in three areas: 
enrichment, processing, and heavy water projects. In addition, the resolution forced a 
freeze of assets belonging to key individuals and companies connected to the nuclear 
program. Acting American ambassador to the UN, Alejandro D. Wolff (quoted in 
Gootman 2006), noted that the resolution should be viewed as a “first step” and that 
“we [the US] will not hesitate to return to this body for further action if Iran fails to 
steps to comply”. The constraints imposed on Iran through resolution 1737 were 
weaker than those outlined in the joint American-European draft as, among other 
things, the travel ban was removed (ibid). 
 According to Cooper and Weisman (2007), the US and its European allies did 
not believe that the sanctions had sufficient bite to alter the Iranian calculus with 
respect to its enrichment program. Therefore the US instead sought to isolate Iran 
financially by persuading other governments and financial institutions to minimize 
their dealings with Iran. The outcome of this unilateral tactic aimed at hurting the 
Iranian economy was far from certain as those countries that were willing to cut their 
financial ties already had little involvement with Iran (ibid). In addition, the effort to 
convince banks to stop doing business with Iran could backfire, given that Iran would 
possibly be forced to sell its oil in a different currency, thereby possibly weakening 
the position of the dollar as a reserve currency (Weisman 2006b).  
 In a January 10 speech the president (Bush 2007d) struck a more 
confrontational tone on the rhetorical level toward Iran, as he formally announced 
that a second aircraft carrier was on its way to the gulf, and that the US was about to 
deploy a battery of Patriot missiles. 
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 According to Cooper and Mazzetti (2007) central figures within the 
administration, including Rice and Hadley, had grown tired of Iran’s stonewalling 
and the slow pace of diplomacy and decided that in the absence of an accommodative 
move from Tehran, the American initiative to engage Iran had finished. 
 A week later Robert Gates (quoted in Garamone 2007), secretary of defense, 
downplayed the risk of military action assuring that the US was not contemplating a 
military option because “nobody wants another conflict in this region”. Gates warned, 
however, that Iran was “mistaken in believing it has the United States at a 
disadvantage”. On February 10 Gates (quoted in Kozaryn 2007) again pledged that 
the US had no plans to use military force against Iran: 
I don't know how many times the president, Secretary Rice and I have had to repeat that we 
have no intention of attacking Iran, that the second carrier group is there to reassure our 
allies, as well as to send a signal that we've been in the Persian Gulf for decades and we 
intend to stay there 
Vice-president Cheney (2007a) also appeared to reduce the emphasis on the military 
option during an interview in late February, although the reference to the possible use 
of force was also present:  
We hope that we can solve the problem diplomatically. The President has indicated he wants 
to do everything he can to resolve it diplomatically. That's why we've been working with the 
EU and going through the United Nations with sanctions. But the President has also made it 
clear that we haven't taken any options off the table 
After the second round of sanctions was passed, the US adopted a more 
confrontational posture toward Iran as it increased its naval presence in the gulf, 
although some members of the administration may have attempted to minimize the 
risk of escalation by toning down the rhetoric. The vice-president’s catch phrase ‘all 
options are on the table’ may have intensified Iranian threat perception as the 
statement fell within the context of American naval deployment off the coast of Iran, 
thus possibly strengthening the perception that the US intended to use its sea and air 
power to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities.  
 At the end of February, however, the US declared that it is willing to hold 
diplomatic talks with Syria and Iran over the political situation in Iraq, thus partly 
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ending its policy of ostracizing Iran from international society. The change of policy 
toward Iran, albeit on a different issue, marked another step from coercion towards 
conciliation. As the US had failed to consolidate the rule of the new Iraqi 
government, Iran was increasingly held responsible for the lack of political 
development, thus widening the rift between the two states (Milbank 2007). The 
report from Iraq Study Group (2006) recommended that Iran and Syria should be 
consulted on the diplomatic level and be included as stakeholders in the Iraqi political 
process. American policymakers had increasingly blamed Iran for the lack of stability 
and for the deteriorating security situation in Iraq. The February decision to engage 
Iran on the Iraq issue may be understood in this light and thus marked a significant 
movement toward Iran (Milbank 2007). 
 Concurrently the six states began to draft a new resolution after the IAEA 
reported that Iran had stepped up its efforts to enrich uranium, thus defying the 
Security Council. To increase the pressure on Iran, the US now sought stronger 
sanctions (Cooper 2007a).  
 On March 24 the Security Council (U.N. 2007) unanimously decided to adopt 
new round of sanctions to increase the pressure on Iran to suspend its enrichment 
program. The 1747 resolution tightened the sanctions already in place through the 
December resolution and expanded the scope of the punitive economic punishments 
to include the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Command (IRGC). In addition, the 
resolution added an arms embargo and threatened “further steps” if Iran failed to 
comply within 60 days (ibid). 
According to under secretary R. Nicholas Burns (2007) the administration was 
“very pleased by the strength” of the resolution and viewed it as “a significant 
international rebuke to Iran [and] a tightening of international pressure”. However, 
Burns also expressed hope that “Iran will reconsider [the June 2006 offer] and will 
come to the negotiating table”. During the press briefing the under secretary was 
asked why the sanctions targeted groups and areas not directly related to the nuclear 
program. Burns (ibid) replied that the sanctions should be broad so as to increase 
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pressure to get Iran to negotiate. In that respect, Burns (ibid) holds, the arms embargo 
was important because “we see them [Iran] trying to become the most dominant 
military state in the region” and the US is “engaged” in a policy “to block and contain 
Iranian power in the Middle East”.  
 At the same time it became clear that the parallel US tactic of isolating Iran 
financially achieves its intended effects as more than 40 major international banks 
had cut off or reduced its business with the government in Tehran or Iran’s private 
sector. As a result, Iran struggled to finance projects in the oil and gas sector and to 
pay for imports, and simultaneously failed to attract foreign investors. A chief focus 
for this tactic was to target the IRGC, thus merging the UN sanctions and the parallel 
unilateral efforts (Wright 2007).  
 At the end of March the US held another military exercise in the gulf. The two 
aircraft carriers dispatched to the region in December took part along with a dozen 
other warships. More than 10 000 personnel and 100 aircrafts were involved in 
simulated air warfare. According to Calderwood and Krane (2007) the muscle flexing 
should be understood as a message to Iran that the US, in spite of its troubles in Iraq 
still had the capability to project power in region. This was the first time since the 
2003 invasion of Iraq that two aircraft carriers had coalesced in the gulf (ibid). 
 On May 12 vice-president Cheney threatened Iran onboard the deck of the 
Stennis aircraft carrier, which at the time was anchored only 150 miles off the Iranian 
coast. Cheney (2007b) forcefully proclaimed that:  
With two carrier strike groups in the Gulf, we're sending clear messages to friends and 
adversaries alike. We'll keep the sea lanes open. We'll stand with our friends in opposing 
extremism and strategic threats. We'll disrupt attacks on our own forces. We'll continue 
bringing relief to those who suffer, and delivering justice to the enemies of freedom. And 
we'll stand with others to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons and dominating this 
region. 
Cheney’s remarks did not represent anything altogether new, although the backdrop 
against which his statements were made, may have reinforced the coercive aspect of 
his message.  
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 Two days later IAEA inspectors reported that Iran has solved its technological 
problems and was enriching uranium on a far greater scale than expected, operating 
1300 centrifuges. The IAEA now believed that Iran had the knowledge to enrich, and 
according the ElBaradei (quoted in Sanger 2007), “[f]rom now on, it is simply a 
question of perfecting that knowledge”. Given the acquired capability to enrich, Iran 
had thus crossed a rather ambiguous red line drawn by the US. As such, the 
diplomatic strategy could be described as a failure given that it had not deterred or 
convinced Iran from gaining that expertise.  
 Mid June the New York Times (Cooper and Sanger 2007) reported that 
diplomatic strategy toward Iran was stirring disagreement within the administration. 
Allegedly, the internal debate pitted secretary Rice against vice-president Cheney. 
Some members of the administration had reportedly grown impatient with the 
diplomatic “track” and perceived its chance of success as quite meager. Instead the 
US should seek to further isolate Iran and contain its influence, and reflect more on 
the military option. Only two weeks earlier Rice had rejected any internal division 
and had assured that the US was committed to diplomacy and that there was no split 
between her and the vice-president on the issue, “we are on a course that is a 
diplomatic course [which] is supported by all of the members of the cabinet, and by 
the vice-president” (Rice quoted in Cooper 2007b).  
 Whether the alleged divide between Rice’s state department and Cheney’s 
office was real or an orchestrated division that facilitated Washington’s carrot and 
stick approach toward Tehran is a judgment considered of lesser importance here. In 
a speech Bush (2007e) held in September, however, he made the case for “staying the 
course” in Iraq and appeared to having sided with the assumed more bellicose faction 
with respect to Iran:  
If we were to be driven out of Iraq, extremists of all strains would be emboldened…. [A free 
Iraq] will counter the destructive ambitions of Iran 
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In the meantime, however, the two aircraft carriers deployed to the gulf were replaced 
by a single carrier, thus weakening the American military presence in the gulf, and 
possibly undermining the tough rhetoric (Thompson 2007). 
On September 21 secretary Rice met with the French foreign minister and 
made no reference to the possible use of force. Instead she (Rice 2007a) argued that 
the US was seeking to increase diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran, and 
through emphasizing the standing offer to join the European led talks, she 
simultaneously extended an olive branch: 
we have set out a diplomatic path that includes negotiation as the preferred means by which 
to resolve this issue [but] we also have a UN Security Council track [and] we will seek 
further sanctions [if Iran does not] take up the negotiating track. 
Rice also stressed the American willingness to talk and said that “the question isn't 
why won't the United States talk to Iran; it's why won't Tehran talk to the United 
States,” (ibid) thus partly shifting the responsibility towards Tehran for lack of 
progress on the diplomatic track. 
 In stark contrast to Rice’s more moderate view stood Bush’s (2007f) remarks 
on October 17 when he argued that if Iran were to possess nuclear weapons, it could 
lead to World War III, thus one ”ought to be interested in preventing the from have 
[sic] the knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon”. By implication the 
presidents seemed to suggest that preventive action should be taken in order to avoid 
such an outcome. However, Bush (ibid) concurrently attempted to tone down the 
rhetoric and said that his administration “will continue to work with all nations about 
the seriousness of this threat. Plus we’ll continue working the financial measures”. 
Bush (ibid) concluded by summing up the diplomatic strategy toward Iran: 
[T]he whole strategy is, is that at some point in time, leaders or responsible folks inside of 
Iran may get tired of isolation and say, this isn’t worth it…. [M]y intent is to continue to rally 
the world to send a focused signal to the Iranian government that we will continue to isolate 
you. 
Bush’s pointed warning to Iran came at a time when the US attempted to persuade the 
EU3 and Russia and China to support stronger sanctions.  
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 Later that week the vice-president (2007c) also ratcheted up the pressure on 
Iran and called the state “a growing obstacle to peace in the Middle East”, and 
promised to “impose serious consequences” if Iran were to “stay on its present 
course”. Most importantly, Cheney (ibid) appeared to draw a new red line: 
The United States joins other nations in sending a clear message: We will not allow Iran to 
have a nuclear weapon. 
According to David Makovksy (quoted in Stolberg 2007), scholar at the Washington 
Institute, up to this point members of the administration had said that it was “not 
acceptable” for Iran to have nuclear weapons. Cheney’s remark thus indicated a 
stronger commitment to keep that from occurring. In addition, Cheney (2007c) also 
took a swing at the Iranian regime: 
Given the nature of Iran's rulers, the declarations of the Iranian president, and the trouble the 
regime is causing throughout the region -- including direct involvement in the killing of 
Americans -- our country and the entire international community cannot stand by as a terror-
supporting state fulfills its most aggressive ambitions 
Within the context of Bush’s threat to Iran, Cheney’s remarks piled a significant 
amount of pressure on Iran. At the time, in some media (e.g. Stolberg 2007), 
Cheney’s speech was interpreted as laying the groundwork for military action, either 
to strengthen the multilateral approach or because the US actually intended to use 
force. 
 At the end of October the administration announced a new set of unilateral 
sanctions aimed at increasing the economic and diplomatic pressure on Iran by 
designating the Quds Force, an elite unit of the IRGC, and four state-owned banks as 
supporters of terrorism. According to Rice (2007b) these measures would provide ”a 
powerful deterrent to every international bank and company that thinks of doing 
business with the Iranian government”. Despite these unilateral actions Rice (ibid), 
did pledge that her administration was “fully committed to a diplomatic solution with 
Iran“ and reiterated the offer of joining the talks, thus mixing caution with hostility.  
 Anthony Cordesman (quoted in Cooper 2007c), the Middle East and national 
security specialist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, perceived the 
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unilateral sanction as a “warning” and argued that this move was “more a 
demonstration of restraint than a signal that we’re going to war”. However, the 
administration’s actions marked a turn toward more a unilateralist diplomatic 
strategy.  
 In a later article Cordesman (2008) wrote that there had been unofficial contact 
between Iran and the US to “make it clear that the United States continued to pursue 
diplomatic options and was not preparing for war”, thus supporting the notion that the 
tough rhetoric was most likely aimed at allies in order to drum up support for more 
punitive sanctions. 
 The release of 2007 NIE on December 3 2007, however, severely weakened 
the credibility of the bellicose American rhetoric and the administration’s judgment 
regarding the threat from Iran, thus complicating the multilateral efforts to agree on a 
third round of sanctions. According to Litwak (2008), the intelligence assessment 
“removed the onus” from Russia and China to support further sanctions. The 
administration succeeded, however, in maintaining the coalition of six as the Security 
Council (U.N. 2008) voted for resolution 1803 on March 3 2008. Although the six 
powers had already agreed on a draft on December 1, the final resolution, as a result 
of the negotiating process, was rather weak. The resolution did little to add to the 
pressure on Iran, although it increased the scope of the travel bans and the asset 
freezes and authorized inspections of goods suspected of containing prohibited 
equipment from and to Iran. The Security Council gave 90 days to respond, and in 
case of compliance, the six states promised to restore economic relations with Iran 
(ibid). 
 At the end of April 2008 president Bush (2008d) revealed that the September 
2007 Israeli air strike on Syrian territory was a bombing mission aimed at destroying 
an alleged facility of a nascent nuclear program. Bush (ibid) argued that fear of 
“confrontation” or “retaliation” in the region had caused his administration to wait 
over half a year to disclose this information. In addition, according to Bush (ibid),  
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we have an interest in sending a message to Iran, and the world for that matter, about just 
how destabilizing a -- nuclear proliferation would be in the Middle East, and that it's essential 
that we work together to enforce U.N. Security Resolutions aimed at getting Iran to stop their 
enrichment programs 
A modest interpretation of Bush’s statement would be that he tried to remind Iran 
that, despite lack of domestic support and an overextended army, the military option 
is still being considered as the US still has command of the air and the sea.  
 On April 30 it is reported that the US have two aircraft carriers in the gulf. 
Secretary Gates (quoted in Miles 2008) maintained, however, that “[the] size of our 
naval presence in the gulf rises and falls constantly [and] this deployment has been 
planned for a long time” and should not be interpreted as “an escalation”, although “it 
could be seen … as a reminder”. 
 In the beginning of May the six states agreed on a new package of incentives 
to Iran. Although the details are yet to be disclosed, the incentives are said to be 
“modest” and build on Javier Solana’s June 2006 proposal. Among the incentives 
stipulated in that offer there was a promise to support construction of light-water 
nuclear reactors, thus signaling willingness on part of the six states to provide Iran 
with help to build a modern nuclear program that may produce electricity. In 
addition, the six states pledged to allow the sale of commercial planes, hold a regional 
security conference, and develop their economies ties to Iran (Sciolino 2008).  
 The May proposal concludes the analysis of the diplomatic strategy. The next 
subchapter summarizes the findings and attempts to connect those with the 
administrations’ key strategic belief and image of Iran.  
5.3.3 Linking the Belief and the Image to the Diplomatic Strategy 
The diplomatic strategy evolved as the nuclear dispute assumed a more central 
position on the American foreign policy agenda. During the period under study the 
diplomatic strategy toward Iran has developed. The first Bush administration gave the 
issue little attention as Bush and his advisers were most likely preoccupied with the 
invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq and perhaps approached the nuclear issue 
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through the prism of its new strategic vision for the region. The nuclear dispute 
heated up as Iran in defiance of the Security Council pressed ahead in its pursuit to 
gain the knowledge to enrich uranium. The second Bush presidency saw 
developments both in the coercive and the accommodative aspects as the US pushed 
for stiffer sanctions but also provided stronger incentives. 
 The coercive part of US diplomatic strategy, as defined here, may thus be 
divided into three subparts. The US has, first, sought to punish Iran through 
multilateral sanctions imposed by the Security Council, second, attempted to squeeze 
Iran’s economy further through unilateral sanctions, and third, tried to increase the 
pressure on Iran by hinting to the possible use of force and reinforced those words by 
deployments of US naval forces in the Persian Gulf. In addition, the US has promoted 
ambiguity as to the possibility that Israel single-handedly may attack Iran’s nuclear 
facilities from the air.  
 The accommodative aspect of the diplomatic strategy has been less developed 
as concessions to Iran remain rudimentary. The June 2006 proposal does most likely 
not, from an Iranian perspective, amount to a serious offer. In addition the US offered 
in May of 2006 to meet its Iranian counterparts if Iran suspends enrichment, thus 
partly reversing its policy over 27 years of isolating the regime. That carrot may have 
been deprived some of its attractiveness given that the US in 2006 agreed to meet 
Iran unconditionally on the Iraq issue. Although the American accommodative moves 
most likely are perceived by US policymakers as generous, the US has failed to 
alleviate Iranian security concerns, thus possibly causing the incentives to lose some 
of their appeal.  
 In sum, throughout the period under study the coercive measures have formed 
the gravity point of the diplomatic strategy, although the concessions to Iran have 
increasingly become more important. A central premise for the diplomatic strategy 
seems to have been that sanctions and threats of force do not undermine diplomatic 
advances, but adds to the American bargaining power by hurting the Iranian position, 
thus giving the US more influence.  
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 The sub-analysis of the belief suggested that the bandwagon proposition 
prevailed during the first Bush presidency but as the intended effects failed to 
materialize, the balance tilted toward the balancing proposition. As for the image, the 
sub-analysis argues that a modest change occurred throughout the period under study 
as the image evolved gradually from being strictly revolutionary to becoming slightly 
less so. According to the theoretical model one should thus expect the diplomatic 
strategy to initially rely primarily on coercion to gradually develop into becoming 
more conciliatory.  
 Although the predictions of the theoretical model are to a certain extent 
congruent with the developments during the period under study, the research design 
and the preliminary character of the analysis preclude the inference that changes in 
the key strategic belief and the image are related to the evolution of the diplomatic 
strategy. However, the results strengthen my intention to further develop the model 
by expressing it more clearly to reduce vagueness and by more explicitly specifying 
the conditions under which it may be useful.  
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6. Conclusions and Discussion 
The diplomatic strategy evolved as the nuclear issue received more attention. The 
first Bush administration met Iran’s defiance with an aggressive posture which 
downplayed the possibility of accommodative measures. As the nuclear issue gained 
importance, the stick remained dominant, although the US increasingly offered 
limited concessions. The two-track diplomacy neatly reflects the theoretical construct 
as the US has tried to present Iran with a choice between two outcomes; one, agree to 
the suspension of the enrichment program and receive the concessions stipulated, or 
two, remain defiant and reap increasingly stiffer punitive measures. It seems apt to 
portray the American strategy as a mixed approach in which minor concessions are 
coupled with possible major repercussions. As of today the diplomatic strategy has 
failed given that Iran has refused to halt its enrichment program.  
 The analysis of the key strategic belief concluded that the first Bush 
administration held the bandwagon proposition as a valid hypothesis as to how states 
act in the face of threats. As unintended effects of the prescriptions of the bandwagon 
proposition may have gradually weakened the American position in the Middle East, 
preliminary evidence suggests that the competing balancing hypothesis became the 
premise on which the diplomatic strategy was formulated.  
As for the administrations’ image of Iran, the analysis suggested that the image 
of Iran as an essentially expansionist power had been sustained by both 
administrations, although that perception had weakened somewhat. Given the 
inherent difficulty in reading an adversary’s intentions and the cloud of uncertainty 
surrounding the Iranian nuclear program, I hypothesized that the policymakers’ 
image of Iran could help them reduce ambiguity and facilitate an interpretation of 
Iran’s rationale for its nuclear program. If the decision makers held that Iran’s 
program was intended to meet military needs, then I assumed that their inference was 
based on an expansionist image of Iran. Conversely, if the policymakers believed that 
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the nuclear program was civilian in nature, then I took their interpretation as an 
indication that their image of Iran corresponded to that of a status quo oriented state.  
Furthermore, I added a distinction between the intention to develop nuclear 
weapons and the intention to develop the capability to do so. In the former case the 
image of Iran as a revolutionary power would be strengthened, and in the latter I 
assumed that the decision makers still held an image commensurate with that of an 
expansionist state, though a somewhat weaker one.  
 Throughout the period under study the perception that Iran was set on 
developing nuclear weapons grew weaker and the perception that Iran most likely 
intended to achieve the capability to produce such weapons became stronger, thus 
suggesting that the image of Iran remained expansionist, although it became slightly 
less so throughout the period under study.  
6.1 Policy Implications 
It is beyond the purview of this thesis to explain why the strategy has failed. 
However, a few observations may be called for. I have emphasized the role of 
cognitions and believe them to be important in the decision making process. 
Although the policymaker must make decisions under pressure and time constraints 
on the basis of insufficient information, and therefore interprets events in light of 
beliefs and images, those cognitions should from time to time be reassessed. The first 
American president, George Washington, is reported to have said that:  
The nation, which indulges toward another a habitual hatred, or a habitual fondness, is in 
some degree a slave. 
Although the thesis has not been preoccupied with the question of the most accurate 
image of Iran, US policymaker should perhaps revisit their assumptions regarding 
Iran, and in particular, reassess the notion that Iran’s Islamic revolution extends 
beyond its borders.   
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 The diplomatic strategy has failed to create an incentive structure that may 
induce Iran to comply. Instead the US has played its hand in such a manner that may 
have reinforced Iranian security concerns; the US has not managed to convince Iran 
that the suspension of enrichment is not a subgoal of a broader ambition to strip the 
regime of its power, thus possibly strengthening Iran’s motivation to press forward 
with its nuclear program.  
 As Thomas Schelling (1980) noted, threats do not work unless the coercer 
simultaneously communicates a credible promise not to realize the undesired action if 
the other party chooses to comply. If Iran’s leadership cannot change its behavior and 
remain in power, threats of punishment will not have the desired effect; it is entirely 
rational to refuse to give in to the stronger power if the fulfillment of the initial 
demand cannot satisfy the other party.  
 Although the analysis has only dealt with the substantial aspect of diplomacy, 
a brief comment on the style of American diplomatic advances toward Iran may be in 
order. Holsti (1992) argues that in most cases, hostility begets hostility. The manner 
in which the US has pursued the “diplomatic track” and the somewhat naïve belief 
that the nuclear dispute may be approached in isolation from other issues, thus 
allowing “democracy promotion” in Iran and the extensive use of disrespectful 
language, impinge upon a central presumption concerning dealings between states; 
any diplomatic overture that fails to acknowledge the other state as a peer will most 
likely not succeed; dialogue can only succeed among equals.  For instance, the phrase 
‘change its behavior’ is illustrative, although also adopted here for the sake of 
convenience, as it implies that the US does to perceive Iran’s standing as equal to its 
own. In addition, the US policymakers have been little attentive in both words and 
actions to the possibility that Tehran perceives its nuclear program as perfectly 
legitimate.  
As Jervis (1989: 7) writes, “[i]f state A can convince B of its good will, that is, 
of its friendly intentions toward B, B may be more willing to cooperate since it will 
not fear that A is trying to draw it into a trap”.  
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Takeyh (2007) argues that the diplomatic strategy itself is predicated on a false 
idea because “coercion, sanctions, naval deployments” may undercut the “diplomatic 
track”. Others (e.g. Levitt 2007) reach the opposite conclusion and hold that coercive 
measures bolster American influence, and thus strengthen the diplomatic efforts to 
persuade Iran to accept the incentives in return for suspending enrichment. I will not 
assess the merit of these arguments, but I would like to comment on the 
implementation of the diplomatic strategy. 
 The analysis portrayed to some degree a muddled image of the diplomatic 
strategy which from the vantage point of a strategist could be criticized for several 
reasons. For one, the diplomatic strategy seems to lack a high degree of coordination; 
perhaps the president has failed to exercise leadership to ensure a clear and consistent 
attitude toward the matter. Possibly Iran may have exploited US indecision in the 
nuclear dispute.  
 Second, American red lines have been ambiguous, though clear and definite 
enough to damage the American image as perceived by the Iranian policymakers. By 
forcefully proclaiming that “not one centrifuge will spin” and “we will prevent Iran 
from acquiring the knowledge to enrich” the policymakers have laid down markers 
for themselves which they have not met.  
 In a given conflict both the balancing and the bandwagoning perspective 
assume that reputation is an important quality for states. If the stronger power is 
perceived by weaker side as a paper tiger, threats will no longer be credible, and as a 
result, they will become meaningless. Should the US develop the intention to take 
military action and voice its determination to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities from the 
air, in the absence of a reputation for living up to threats, Iran will most likely not 
back down, thus possibly increasing the risk of a violent confrontation.  
 Perhaps the diplomatic strategy should have been aimed at altering Iran’s 
calculus by persuading Tehran that it would be in its interest to refrain from enriching 
uranium. Instead the US efforts may have strengthened Iran’s intention to press 
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forward with its enrichment program. Given the findings of the 2007 NIE which 
concluded Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program, the US should perhaps avoid 
compelling Iran to restart it.  
6.2 Theoretical Implications 
The theoretical model posited two causal mechanisms as explanation for the 
diplomatic strategy. The analysis found correlation between the independent 
variables and the dependent one; however, given the research design, one cannot 
prove that the hypothesized mechanisms were present. The truism that “correlation 
does not imply causation” applies here, as I cannot preclude errors of measurement or 
the possibility that important variables were omitted. Moreover, the rudimentary 
character of analysis further undermines the possibility of inferring causality. In 
addition, the deduced predictions were vague, given that they merely included an 
expectation as to the direction of the co-variation. Thus the analysis cannot be 
described as a full-fledged congruence procedure, and the prospect of establishing 
causal mechanisms is severely undermined.   
 Despite the shortcomings mentioned above, one may argue that my efforts, to 
some extent, have been fruitful as the model did survive; the analysis could not prove 
that the hypothesized causal mechanisms were absent. Moreover, given that the 
development of the model is at an early stage, one could perhaps describe this project 
as a moderate success.  
 For the sake of the argument, I assume in the following discussion that causal 
mechanisms between the independent variables and the diplomatic strategy have been 
identified. 
 The tentative causal model assumed that the image is a more immediate factor 
than the key strategic belief. Could the case study shed light on the question of 
relative impact of the independent variables on the diplomatic strategy?  
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Despite some concessions, the US has not extended a security guarantee to 
Iran. In the absence of security, accommodative measures inevitably lose some 
appeal. To provide a state perceived as revolutionary with an assurance that its 
sovereignty will not be violated, and thus tying one’s hands, could not be considered 
a prudent policy.  
Furthermore, the analysis argued that the bandwagon proposition as the key 
strategic belief was largely replaced by the balancing perspective. Throughout the 
period under study the accommodative aspect has to a certain extent grown more 
important, but the coercive part of the strategy, threats of force, naval deployments, 
sanctions, etc., has remained strong. 
 Moreover, as the analysis of the image revealed, the US was concerned that 
Iran would acquire the knowledge to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Many 
states have the know-how to produce nuclear weapons, but have concluded for a 
variety of reasons that it would not be in their interest to do so, thus suggesting that 
the image of Iran as a state plays an important role.    
 Given that the US has failed to reassure Iran that it will not violate its 
sovereignty; and that the weakening of the balancing perspective was not 
accompanied by a moderation of the coercive aspect; and the fact that the diplomatic 
strategy has been aimed at denying Iran the necessary technical expertise to enrich, in 
sum one may speculate that the image may play a more central role than the key 
strategic belief for the formulation of the diplomatic strategy. The choice to assume 
that the image was a more immediate factor than the key strategic belief thus seems 
partly justifed. 
 The model assumed no interplay between the key strategic belief and the 
image, i.e. the policymakers’ belief and image were conceived as products of distinct 
cognitive processes. By extension, I argued that a decision maker, who subscribes to 
the belief that states in most cases join the bandwagon, may concurrently hold that 
the relevant adversary is oriented toward the status quo. One of the characteristics 
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that separates those who believe that states as a rule balance against threats, from 
those to who hold that power attracts, concerns the attentiveness to security dilemma. 
In relation to the image, a status quo oriented power investing in its power resources 
is presumed to react to external stimulus perhaps hoping to rectify legitimate security 
concerns. Given that the balancer ascribes more weight to the security dilemma, he 
may be more prone to perceive the behavior of adversaries as contingent upon 
conditions imposed on them from the outside, thus possibly affecting his image of the 
opposition toward the status quo type. The presupposition that the key strategic belief 
is unrelated to the image thus seems too simple.  
 The analysis argued that the image of Iran as expansionist largely remained in 
place over the six years, and that the belief that states act according to the balance 
proposition grew stronger to the detriment of the standing of the bandwagon 
hypothesis.  
 Assuming instead that the bandwagon perspective had retained its dominant 
position as the key strategic belief throughout the period of study, would the image 
also have remained the same? Two factors suggest that the posited mechanism in 
which the balancer is more inclined to perceive adversaries as oriented toward the 
status quo than the bandwagoner, thereby possibly weakening the revolutionary 
image of the opposition, may have been at work here.  
 First, the general perception of Iran as conveyed by the president endured 
throughout the period under study; the perception of Iran’s rationale for its nuclear 
program, however, was altered and implied a greater role for the security dilemma as 
Iran no longer was assumed to be set on developing nuclear weapons, but instead 
seeking the capability to do so, thus allowing for the possibility that Iran’s intentions 
could be affected by the international environment. Second, the administration’s 
reaction to the intelligence community’s threat assessment, where Bush and his 
advisers acknowledged that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program, but warned 
that it could be restarted any time, may indicate, as argued by Jervis (1976: 68), that 
images are resistant to change. The administrations may, on the one hand, altered its 
 134 
perception of Iran’s rationale for its nuclear program, and on the other, maintained 
the image of Iran as essentially a dangerous state.  
One may therefore question to wisdom of conceiving the two cognitive 
constructs as entirely unrelated as the change in the image, given that it was measured 
through Iran’s perceived rationale for its nuclear program, may be accounted for by 
the weakening of the bandwagon proposition, thus to a certain extent invalidating the 
theoretical model. 
According to tradition, the student should in conclusion assess the contribution 
of the thesis in a larger perspective. As noted in the introduction the model presented 
here represented something different, and the case study could neither confirm nor 
disconfirm it. At the very least, the model as a structuring device helped describe the 
diplomatic strategy in a precise manner.  
 In its present state the model cannot render any more than vague probabilistic 
predictions and for that reason is hard to falsify. Perhaps at some point in the future 
the model could benefit from process-tracing in which the researcher tries to trace the 
links between the key strategic belief and the image, on the one hand, and the 
diplomatic strategy, on the other, by examining now classified documents, memos, 
and perhaps conducting interviews with central policymakers where their reflections 
could be revealed.  
In the end, we all choose our gods. The thesis is based on the conviction that 
international politics cannot be fruitfully conceived as a sphere that is ruled merely by 
rational laws. Rather, I would propose an interdisciplinary approach into which 
insight from history and psychology could contribute to a higher level of 
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